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7New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
Introductory Note
The ‘Letter of the Eight’ signed, inter alia, by Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and later by Slovakia; the subsequent letter of the ‘Vilnius Group’; 
the US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s suggestion that the centre of gravity 
is shifting from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Europe; and finally the reaction of President 
Chirac to the political position of the EU candidate states – these develop-
ments led to a profound shock in Europe. The European constitutional 
debate that went through a deadlock in Brussels added uncertainty to the 
future relations between new and old Member States. The countries once 
located on the Western periphery of the Soviet Union, apparently doomed 
also to be peripheral within the European Union, have found themselves in 
the centre of a heated debate on the future of the transatlantic relations and 
a new balance of power in Europe.
For the past decade, the Western perception of Central and Eastern 
Europe was shaped first by a romantic vision of the peaceful revolution of 
1989 and the slogan ‘Return to Europe’, later by the less admirable picture 
of the national and ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia, and the growing 
role of populist politicians and nostalgia for the communist past. By the 
end of the 1990s, the situation became more stable, giving way to a routine 
of mutual contacts based on a profound asymmetry between the Member 
States and the Candidate States. The concept of reunification was replaced 
by the project of enlargement with clearly defined roles: the Candidate 
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States were questioned and evaluated on how they conformed to the set 
conditions, and eventually either praised or reproached. Paradoxically, the 
Western interest in these countries seemed to be fading. Central Europe 
was no longer a fascinating revolutionary phenomenon, nor a source of 
instability jeopardizing Western Europe’s security. ‘New Europe’ dreamt 
about becoming the West, finding the way to the luxurious club that ensured 
security, prosperity and high status among the nations. These aspirations 
did not generate much excitement in Western Europe.
‘New Europe’s’ perception of its strategic priorities and attitude toward 
the EU and the United States started to evolve in a manner that initially was 
not recognized in Western Europe. In this context Poland is seen as a country 
not only willing to integrate with the EU and strengthen its relations with 
the United States, but also to assume a leading role in the region. Yet among 
countries demonstrating a strong preference for a close alliance with the 
US, there are important differences in the degree of assertive formulation 
of the national interests; in the readiness to play an active role in the trans-
atlantic relations and within the European Union. Finally, some countries 
seem inclined to strike an alliance with a particular dominating state, or to 
follow the ‘coalition of the willing’ model – in other words, to shift coali-
tions within Europe depending on their particular interests.
Perhaps for the first time after 1989, Central Europe is facing truly dif-
ficult political choices. Following their Cold War experiences, the countries 
of the region are not prepared for this challenge; their previous history is 
not very helpful either. The necessity to make tough political choices in the 
times of profound changes taking place globally and in Europe is, however, 
the price of freedom and sovereignty that these countries achieved only 
fifteen years ago.
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Letter to the participants 
of the Conference from
Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
President of the Republic of Poland
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me extend my thanks to the Stefan Batory Foundation, to the Centre 
of European Studies of St. Antony’s College at Oxford University and to the 
German Institute of International Affairs and Security in Berlin for organ-
izing this Conference and for suggesting that I should become honorary 
patron of this project. The debate on the new geopolitics of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the relations between the European Union and the 
United States is very topical and interesting. This Conference is taking place 
in the first days of a completely new reality in Central and Eastern Europe. 
A majority of countries in the region are today rightful members both of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and of the European Union. For the 
first time in decades, we have had the chance to define our own foreign 
policy independently. This is a great opportunity for our countries, but also 
a challenge. I believe we can meet this challenge.
Today, Central Europe is in an exceptional situation. In many places in 
the world, and on many levels, the countries of our region are co-operating 
with the United States and other NATO members in order to build a system 
of international security. Within the united Europe, we are striving to en-
sure the best possible standards for our citizens in various spheres of life. 
Through international organizations, and individually, we are developing 
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friendly relations with other countries and regions around the world. At the 
same time, we are forging partnerships with our East European neighbours. 
Together – if sometimes by different methods – we are facing up to the 
threats of today’s world, including international terrorism. I firmly believe 
that, despite occasionally serious problems and differences of opinion, we 
can rise above particular interests and work together in the name of de-
mocracy, solidarity and fraternity. Unquestionably, there are more things 
that unite us than those that could divide us.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Central and Eastern Europe must find its own 
place in the changing reality. But I am convinced that this should not mean 
taking sides with the United States against the European Union, or taking 
sides with the European Union against the United States. Such an attitude 
would be extremely risky. Today’s globalized world, full of new dangers 
that individual states, and sometimes even groups of states, are not able 
to cope with, is forcing us to find a common ground for agreement and 
co-operation, not new lines of division. The partners in the transatlantic 
alliance are competing with one another in the economic sphere and dif-
fer in their perception of certain issues in world politics. We should speak 
about this honestly, because only an open exchange of views will allow 
us to build positive transatlantic and European relations. The countries 
of our region have a unique opportunity to emphasise the fundamentally 
common strategic interests of the European Union, the United States and 
other democratic countries in the world. They should contribute to the 
strengthening of the transatlantic alliance, but without undermining the 
need for a common foreign policy and greater political integration. I believe 
that this Conference will afford you the opportunity to draw conclusions 
that will inspire decisions determining the new geopolitics of our region. 
I wish you all a fruitful debate.
Aleksander Kwaśniewski
President of the Republic of Poland
10
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Welcome Address
Aleksander Smolar
President of the Stefan Batory Foundation
I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all the 
guests from Poland and from abroad to the conference 
organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation in co-opera-
tion with the German Institute for International and Secu-
rity Affairs of the Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, 
Berlin and the European Studies Centre at St Antony’s 
College, University of Oxford, on: ‘New Geopolitics of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Between the European Un-
ion and the United States’. We thought that celebrating 
the enlargement of the European Union is an excellent 
opportunity to approach one of fundamental problems 
concerning our region, as well as the whole of Europe, 
a problem which was fully revealed around a year ago. 
I refer here to the general orientations of foreign policy 
of the countries in our region. During this conference 
we would like to consider to what extent the differences 
which have appeared between Central and Eastern Eu-
12
rope, and the public opinion and many governments in Western Europe, 
are rooted in historical experiences and in a particular attitude towards the 
problems of security, and to what extent they have been influenced by the 
current situation in Europe and in the world.
The present moment is rather exceptional in the short history of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. During the past fifteen 
years – although it may sound paradoxical – the problem of making a choice 
was non existent. Not because we did not have alternatives, but because 
our objectives were obvious and generally accepted by the societies and 
governments of the countries which joined the European Union a few days 
ago. All the countries in our region chose integration with the West, that 
means with NATO and with the European Union. They were motivated by 
old dreams about Europe and the West, the desire for security, the hope to 
finally join the world of stable democratic institutions and to pursue devel-
opment opportunities after unsuccessful communist modernisation.
The real problems with making choices in politics have appeared only 
now that two fundamental challenges facing Central and Eastern Europe 
have been completed. We are now in a normal situation of European states 
and we are facing similar choices. By nature these choices are much more 
complex and much less obvious as for the costs and benefits. Our aim in 
organising this conference has been to show the complex international 
context which co-determines the decisions of the countries in our region, in 
particular the decisions concerning relations between Europe and America, 
as seen from the two sides of the Atlantic. The title of the conference is in-
tentionally provocative, both because of the timing of our discussions – just 
a few days after the enlargement of the European Union – and because of 
the suggestion contained in the title itself, that tensions and differences 
between the United States and Europe are unavoidable and permanent. 
Is the United States interested, as it used to be, in the European integra-
tion? Or rather, will the Washington policy be dominated by the distrustful 
principle ‘divide et impera’? And as for the European Union: will we witness 
a domination of the sense of fundamental bonds and unity of interests with 
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the partner from the other side of the Atlantic, or just the opposite – will 
an increasing sense of dissimilarity, which Freud once called ‘narcissism 
of a small difference’, contribute to separating Europe from America, and 
in consequence also to weakening the bonds within Europe itself? These 
questions and concerns will define the background of our debate. 
In these introductory remarks, I would like to warmly thank those without 
whom this conference would not be possible: Ms Ingrid Hamm, the execu-
tive director of the Robert Bosch Foundation and Mr Paweł Piwowar, the 
CEO of Oracle Poland. I would also like to thank the Embassy of the French 
Republic for their support.
Also, I would like to express my gratitude to Mr Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 
President of the Republic of Poland, for extending his patronage over our 
conference.
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Opening Speech
Adam D. Rotfeld
Secretary of State, Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
I would like to question the title of this Conference, 
not on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in my 
own name, as one of the participants of this debate. The 
point is that the idea of new geopolitics is – in my view 
– an attempt to respond to the need to formulate a new 
attitude vis-à-vis the current process of changes in the 
international system. Traditional international systems 
in the history of Europe were defined by the results of 
great wars: after the religious wars there was the Treaty 
of Westphalia, after the Napoleonic Wars – the Congress 
of Vienna, after the Balkan wars – the Berlin Conference, 
after the First World War – the Versailles Treaty, and after 
the Second World War – Yalta and Potsdam. But it so 
happens that what we have been witnessing over the 
last fifteen years is not the result of defeat in a great war, 
but of a change that came about due to countless factors. 
And as a rule, these factors were internal.
16
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My first claim is that today international relations are shaped to an 
incomparably higher degree by the development of the internal situation 
in individual countries than by relations between countries. This is evi-
denced by the fact that out of the more than twenty serious armed conflicts 
that took place last year, only one can be described as a conflict between 
states; all the other conflicts were internal. But experts and researchers of 
international relations usually focus on what is going on between states, 
not inside states. Consequently, this research is somehow detached from 
reality. Many eminent and prolific scholars of the international system had 
not, in fact, been able to accurately predict the developments of the years 
1989–1990 which would fundamentally change international relations. 
Only a few of these scholars had the courage to ask themselves why their 
predictions had been wrong.
I do not intend to analyse – here and now – the incapacity and helpless-
ness of the social sciences in this regard. I will only repeat that international 
relations are usually studied by those who focus on relations between states; 
they are much less interested in what is going on inside states. And it is 
precisely the situation within states that defines the relations between 
states in the present day.
The second reason to question the thesis that now we are dealing with 
a new geopolitics is that today geography is losing its significance; in the 
sense that the world is becoming smaller and smaller, that we are dealing 
with globalization and fragmentation of the world. Geography is not the 
causal factor. Formerly, a state’s security was defined largely by natural 
geographical obstacles – distance, mountains, rivers, seas. Today all of 
these are losing their significance. The US army, as well as the armies of EU 
countries – including the Polish army – maintain a huge part of their armed 
forces in various regions of the world, far away from those countries’ own 
borders. These distant armies are performing diverse functions usually not 
connected with their geographical region. In other words, geography is not 
the decisive factor anymore.
16
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Moreover, in order to emphasise how little significance geography now 
has, I will remind you that fifteen years ago Poland had three neighbours: 
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. 
Since 1991, Poland has had seven neighbours, and none of them is what 
it used to be. Instead of the Soviet Union we now have Russia, Lithuania, 
Belarus and Ukraine; instead of Czechoslovakia we have the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia; and instead of the German Democratic Republic we have the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In other words, Poland has remained in the 
same place, its geographical situation has not changed at all, but the world 
around it has changed dramatically.
My third claim is that, contrary to the widespread opinion that Sep-
tember 11 changed our world, I do not think the world has changed. The 
world, meant as an international environment, and the security should 
be both perceived as processes. Our perception of the world has changed 
radically, that is, some phenomena have started to be perceived with much 
more clarity than before September 11. In short, the result of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 was that all countries, and especially the United 
States, realised that they were now in a completely different situation, in 
the sense that the nature of the threat had changed. It was at that time that 
the concept of asymmetrical threat emerged. Well, I would like to question 
this concept as well. In my view, threats have never been symmetrical. Here 
we are simply dealing with a different kind of threat, one that does not 
come from the outside, but from within. The United States was attacked by 
a group associated with Al Qaeda, but this group did not attack the United 
States from a foreign territory, from Canada or Mexico, but from within 
the United States itself; indeed, the attack was actually prepared within 
the country. What happened on September 11 to some degree shattered 
the definition of aggression formulated by the League of Nations in 1933 
and enshrined in a convention signed by eight countries at that time. As 
a matter of fact, the first state to sign the convention was Afghanistan, ac-
companied by two Baltic states (Estonia and Lithuania), as well as Poland, 
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Romania, Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union. But the signatories included 
none of the leading countries of that period.
That definition of aggression was in a sense much better at predicting 
various situations than the many definitions suggested later on but never 
universally adopted: it is worth mentioning here that of the elements in-
cluded in the definition was a state’s support for organized armed groups 
invading the territory of another state. Yet those who formulated the defini-
tion back in 1933 displayed a certain lack of imagination in assuming that 
such an attack would always come from the outside, not from the inside. 
My main point is that everyone who deals with international relations must 
realise that in today’s world internal situations determine security to higher 
degree than do traditional threats of attack from the outside.
Finally, two more remarks, one of which concerns Poland. Recently I was 
asked what the biggest threat facing Poland is. I replied that the biggest 
threat to Poland was its internal situation. Mind you, I am not referring 
here to a presumed weakness of Poland; indeed, if we consider some clas-
sical criteria of stability, we cannot but recognize that over the last fifteen 
years, and even over the last three years, Poland has made some consider-
able achievements. I am referring to the relations between Poland and its 
neighbours, to the country’s relations with the great powers and, above 
all, to its economic development. In other words, Poland has stabilised 
relations with its neighbours, the transition to market economy and liberal 
democracy has been a success, and, from a legal and constitutional perspec-
tive, Poland has forged a sound basis for future development. Nevertheless, 
I believe that Poland’s internal situation impinges very negatively on the 
country’s security. What I mean here is that in Poland, as in many other 
countries, populism is on the rise. If I were asked how to express in one 
sentence the biggest threat to modern Europe, I would reply, paraphras-
ing the famous 19th century Manifesto: ‘A spectre is haunting Europe: the 
spectre of populism’. But this populism does not exclusively relate to the 
parties of Le Pen, Heider or Lepper. Above all, it relates to long-established 
parties considered to be stable and middle-class, which are succumbing to 
18
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populist pressure. It is precisely these parties that are most threatened by 
the new populist disease and which could significantly change the situation 
of Europe. From the Polish perspective, accession to the European Union is 
a means of preventing such a turn of events.
Today, Poland should not be perceived in terms of ‘Poland and the 
European Union’. Poland has become an integral part of the Union and 
will influence it just as other Member States will influence Poland. This is 
a qualitatively new situation.
Aleksander Smolar
I just want to remind you that general de Gaulle used to say that while 
geography is a fate, geopolitics is a choice.

Session I
Between Germany and Russia, Europe and America: 
historical points of reference 
of Central and Eastern Europe
Intellectual and political traditions and choices
Chair: Adam D. Rotfeld, Secretary of State, 
 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Panellists: Marcin Król, University of Warsaw; 
 Jacques Rupnik, Centre for International Studies 
 and Research, CERI, Paris; 
 Timothy Snyder, Yale University.
Adam D. Rotfeld
The dilemma of choice between Russia and Germany has been faced by 
many countries of this region but most obviously so by Poland. Aleksander 
Smolar has just observed that geography is an objective factor, while geo-
politics is a choice. And indeed, in the past, Poland was constantly forced 
to choose between Germany and Russia in order to seek its security either 
in alliance with Germany against Russia, or with Russia against Germany, or 
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else – the course chosen by the pre-war government – attempting to strike 
a balance between the two powers.
After World War II Poland, like all the other countries of Central Europe, 
was deprived of this choice (at this point, let me add a footnote: I do not 
think this was agreed at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences; it was rather 
a consequence of the development and the outcome of the war). Would the 
situation have been different – let us consider this scenario – had there been 
no Yalta and Potsdam? It would have been just the same. The presence of the 
Red Army in the heart of Europe, in the heart of Germany – Berlin – was, of 
course, the decisive factor. If the Russians had not crossed the Polish border 
and if Poland had been liberated by the Allies, it would have belonged to the 
other part of Europe and its present condition – and the level of civilization 
– would be radically different. In other words, the position a given state 
occupies among other states is determined by facts – not conferences. This 
is a mistake committed by many scholars who are impressed by events like 
round table talks which result in some agreements. As a rule, such confer-
ences only sum up a given stage of the historical process. Of course, they 
come handy for the purpose of periodization and labeling. Let me remind 
you of an article by professor Zbigniew Brzezinski published in 1985 in For-
eign Affairs under the title ‘A Divided Europe: The Future of Yalta’. Its first 
sentence read: ‘Yalta is unfinished business’. Professor Brzezinski made the 
point that in fact, the Yalta agreement obliged the powers to grant Poland 
an opportunity to become strong, democratic and independent, and he 
extensively quoted the document, which hardly anyone has read, to prove 
that. Of course, the real significance of the agreement was very detached 
from the wording it was given. Its authors put those obligations on paper to 
have a clear conscience; they knew that the situation would not be shaped 
by the phrasing of the document but by military action – the presence of 
Soviet divisions in the heart of Europe.
After 1989, the situation of Poland and Central Europe changed radi-
cally. For the first time in many decades Poland was free to make sovereign 
choices. Nowadays, one can often hear the accusation that Poland is becom-
22
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ing dependent on Washington just as it used to be dependent on Moscow. 
Those who make this claim ignore a basic fact: this time it is a matter of 
free choice. It is the Poles who have decided, the way they wanted to. The 
Americans did not invade Poland and did not impose their law and order. 
Poland wanted to be an ally of the USA and still does. The case of Poland 
can be generalized to embrace the other countries of Central-Eastern Europe 
and to prove a substantial change in the situation of the region.
My second point relates to the conference title which expresses the 
view that while previously a choice had to be made between Russia and 
Germany, nowadays a choice to be faced is between America and Europe. 
Let me repeat the claim that geography is never decisive. I believe that the 
bone of contention, the cause of misunderstandings between America and 
Europe, is not the physical distance but certain cultural differences: the USA 
has developed a civilization, a mentality and a culture that differ from those 
we find in Europe. For a very long time, American politics was dominated 
by European standards. American intellectuals from the East Coast defined 
the way America viewed the rest of the world. Still, the USA did not seek the 
dominant position and rather turned inwards. America was a universe of its 
own kind – the relations between its states were of more importance than 
the relations between global powers. Texas was certainly more important 
than, for instance, Belgium or Luxemburg. This has changed. In the new 
context the powerful position of America makes it impossible for Americans 
to run away from their new destiny: they have taken great responsibility for 
the world and the world vests great expectations in America. On the one 
hand, Europe criticizes America, but on the other hand, Europeans expect 
a lot from Americans.
Session I
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Marcin Król
Let me make a few points which will be deliberately 
overstated. Also, let me add that I have no intention to 
logically structure my argument, because such a task is 
impossible as I will try to prove further on.
First, let me share my impressions of the last ten days 
filled with celebrations and political statements concern-
ing Poland’s accession to the European Union – impres-
sions that could be shared by anyone in this room, Poles 
and visitors from abroad alike. I have noticed a surprising 
convergence of rhetoric employed on this occasion in the 
three countries I can speak of with a measure of compe-
tence, namely Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
and also in Hungary which I mention here with diffidence 
in the presence of Elemér Hankiss.
Presidents of those three countries stated that ‘We are 
returning to Europe’. To my great surprise, this view was 
expressed by president Vaclav Klaus and also by presi-
dent Gasparovich. President Kwaśniewski had voiced this 
opinion many times before. ‘The return to Europe’ – such 
is the present political stance. There is also another position, presented 
most often (but not exclusively) by the Polish Church: we need not return 
to Europe, since we have always been a part of it. We have discovered again 
our true location which for some time was ‘hidden’ from us.
My point is simple: I believe that both claims are completely false. 
I shall try to explain why this is so with the proviso that I am not going to 
talk about culture, civilization and the Church (or rather Christianity). As 
far as culture is concerned, I concur with an opinion expressed by Czesław 
Miłosz: in Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia and Hungary the thin ‘cream’ which 
was European in its cultural ambitions has always floated on a swamp, to 
repeat Milosz’s blunt formulation. In the 19th century there was a strong 
24
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tendency in those countries to advance civilization following West Euro-
pean patterns (professor Jerzy Jedlicki described this process brilliantly in 
his book). And finally, Christianity, especially Western Christianity – and 
this point is perhaps most crucial – has always united us with Europe (the 
case is not so clear with the Church hierarchy). These three points are 
settled: we may go on repeating that Polish, Czech or Hungarian writers 
have been European writers – nobody will question that. In the 1980s such 
a perspective on Central Europe was extremely fashionable and it was not 
entirely groundless because at that time several remarkable writers and 
thinkers born in the region made a significant contribution to European 
culture. However, this fact has nothing to do with politics and my subject is 
not the history of cultural ideas but the history of political ideas in Poland 
and some other countries.
I have nothing to say about this history up to the end of the 16th century. 
First of all, because I am not competent enough; and, secondly, because it is 
very difficult to talk about Europe at the time when Latin was its common 
language. I leave speculations on this subject to the historians of relevant 
periods; I believe that they would have little bearing on our discussion.
From the end of the 17th century till the year 1989, perhaps even later, 
there was not a single pro-European party in Poland, nor a pro-European 
tendency (in the political sense), nor even pro-European thought of any 
stature. This state of affairs could be explained in three ways. First of all, 
such political ideas were not to be found anywhere – this is one reason. In 
the 18th and 19th centuries the idea of common Europe was not very exciting 
for Europeans and very few people dealt with Europe as a whole of some 
kind. It is also doubtful whether anyone conceived the idea of Europe as 
a whole. Second, even though from the Polish perspective ‘Europe’ did 
exist (this name could be found in the titles of some excellent books pub-
lished in the 19th and at the turn of the 20th century), it could never serve as 
a political point of reference for reasons to be mentioned in a moment. And, 
last but certainly not least, Europe never wanted to be a political point of 
reference for us, if we accept that it existed in some very limited sense (in 
26
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the period from the second half of the 18th century till the first half of the 
20th century).
What was the Polish, Czech and Slovak perspective on these issues? Who 
did we address our political longings to? How were they formulated? What 
imaginary geopolitics could be discerned in those longings? In that period, 
Russia was a fundamental and constant element of this imaginary world. 
I want to remind you – and I am saying this with no intention to offend 
– that, for instance, the founding father of the Slovak nation, Ludovít Štúr, 
whose monuments can be found in any Slovak town, had a very unequivo-
cal view on this matter: since he was anti-Hungarian and anti-Austrian, 
he drew the conclusion that Slovaks should adopt Orthodox Christianity 
and develop as strong as possible ties with Russia. That never happened, 
which was lucky for Slovaks, I believe. When Štúr’s biography is presented 
today, these views are never highlighted, which is quite understandable. 
Let me remind you that conferences of the Panslav Movement, a powerful 
organization, would take place in Prague, since Czechs strongly promoted 
the panslavic idea. Poles were much more skeptical about this movement. 
Let me also remind you that in the Polish political thought of that period, 
till as late as the seventies of the last century, Russia constantly played a 
crucial role – not only in a negative sense, but also as an alternative to 
the West. This was visible in dramatic circumstances – for instance, when 
the Marquis Wielopolski, indignant with Austrians who instigated the 
Galician Jacquerie, turned to Russia for protection; this attitude was also 
visible in more peaceful or even comical contexts – for instance, in 1979 
Stefan Kisielewski wrote his famous article ‘Is geopolitics still important?’, 
in which he suggested that Poles should have a party representing their 
interests in Russia.
The conviction that there should be a Polish party or a Polish lobby in 
Moscow is at least 150 years old and it seems to have been shared by most 
Polish politicians and political thinkers till the year 1990, when it mysteri-
ously disappeared. I think this is a great shame, because a Polish lobby in 
Moscow is needed also today.
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There is also another very important attitude towards Russia, namely 
fear. This attitude was rooted in the belief that Poland was actually the only 
nation which defended the world against Russian barbarism. Astolphe de 
Custine visited Russia and wrote his famous book ‘Russia in the year 1839’. 
A few years later, Polish writers – Zygmunt Krasiński in particular – wrote 
numerous memorials which landed on the desks of important politicians 
thanks to Krasiński’s aristocratic status (there is no evidence, however, that 
they were read). Krasiński (like many other Poles, but with more eloquence) 
tried to convince pope Pius IX, Malebranche and other personages that 
Russia was a real threat to Europe. In other words, Europe’s historical func-
tion is to defend Poland against Russia, since in this way Europe defends 
herself against Russia. Otherwise, Europe is objectively an ally of the future 
‘Red Republic’, as Krasiński so aptly and brilliantly calls it. Remember that 
we are talking here about the turn of the forties of the 19th century. Such 
awareness is quite impressive.
I do not know any serious Polish writers in the 19th century whose posi-
tion was unambiguously pro-European. The most sober of them, thoroughly 
liberal Henryk Kamieński wrote a book about Poland, Russia and Europe 
in which Poland is again assigned the role of a go-between of sorts. This 
view survived for a long time, even – to a degree – influenced the intentions 
and sometimes actions of Polish communist leaders, who also had some 
pretensions to act as intermediaries between Europe and Russia, the West 
and the Soviet Union.
Of course, these pretensions had little weight. Up to a point this view 
was, however, decisive. Afterwards, another factor made its appearance 
– namely, Germany. It is clear that in the Polish political imagination and 
political thought Germany appeared in earnest at the time of Bismarck. 
Previously, as Stanisław Stomma described in his excellent book, Germany 
had not been Poland’s enemy; it had not even existed, had not been per-
ceived as a serious problem.
Germany appeared only together with Kulturkampf. At that moment 
‘the problem of Germany’ was triggered off – by Germany itself, not by Po-
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land. ‘The question of Poland’ in the terms of its place between Russia and 
Germany was conceived by Polish political thinkers as late as the interwar 
period, when several books with this very title were published.
Now, let me add an explanation concerning the Church. To tell the 
truth, Poland was a Catholic country which suffered an incredibly deep 
breakdown of Catholicism during the Partitions. Catholicism was saved only 
thanks to the Romantic thinkers and their followers, and thanks to numer-
ous and almost sectarian movements which became influential with time. 
The breakdown of Catholicism is also linked with the Papacy and its total 
disregard of the whole region, or an extremely negative attitude towards 
it, and Poland in particular. In the 19th century the popes did not uphold 
the Polish cause; on the contrary, they repeatedly condemned the Polish 
struggle for independence. Catholicism survived in Poland, and even grew 
stronger only by the fortunate coincidence that the great Polish Romantics 
were also believers (though not following the contemporary teaching of the 
Church in the case of Mickiewicz; Słowacki was a complete heretic, while 
Krasiński was on the verge of heresy; Norwid, perhaps, was the only true 
follower, if we do not apply very stringent criteria). The literary influence 
of the Romantics is today visible in the language used by the Pope, who 
very often quotes Krasiński (probably unwittingly, after much exposure to 
the poet’s literary output).
This is one side of the coin. As for the other one, in the 19th and 20th 
centuries nobody in Europe had ever good political intentions towards 
Poland. Naturally, one can find plenty of favourable references in the do-
mains of culture, civilization or Catholicism, but in the domain of politics 
– not a single one.
It is not difficult to find the reasons. The European Conservatists (whose 
genealogy, which dates back to Metternich, was described so brilliantly by 
Henry Kissinger) were after the balance of power and Poland could only 
upset this balance. The success of Polish insurrections would have ruined 
Metternich’s plan. Several years ago this observations was made for the 
first time by the great Polish historian Emanuel Rostworowski. In fact, 
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Poles have never admitted that their insurrections – crucial as they were 
under many other respects – never had any political chances of success, 
simply because Europe did not want an independent Poland. So much for 
the Conservatives.
As far as the Liberals are concerned, John Stuart Mill is one of many 
authors who mention Poland. Mill enumerated twelve non-barbaric na-
tions (those passages are not widely known and liberals do not quote them 
willingly). Mill’s position was clear: there is no reason for the barbarians to 
become free, liberty cannot be imported, nobody can be forced to be free. 
Only those who want to be free can be so; if someone does not want to be 
free, let him remain a barbarian. In this context Mill had no doubts: Russia 
is barbaric, while Poland is non-barbaric.
Mill wrote about civilization. If we follow, on the other hand, the history 
of liberal foreign policy statements in the 19th century, we shall find out that 
all liberals unanimously speak against the independence of Poland – not on 
principle, but because the struggle for Polish (and also Italian) independence 
would lead to war, while the basic tenet of liberalism in the 19th century (as 
in the 20th) was the avoidance of war. The risk of an eruption of war in the 
process of liberating Poland was too big to give it a try. That explains why 
liberals did not back up Polish aspirations.
And finally, the Socialists, who were for the most part Luxemburgists. 
I believe that Luxemburgism was often painted black, while in many respects 
it is quite reasonable and also not far removed from my own standpoint. 
I am not convinced that the nation-state, rejected by the Luxemburgists, is 
the best idea born in the history of humankind. This claim may be risky but, 
after all, I have warned you that I am not going to prove theorems. Among 
socialists of note there was one unambiguously pro-Polish thinker – namely, 
Karl Marx. One should realize that he was the most pro-Polish thinker (in 
the political sense!) of the 19th century; I do not think, however, that this 
fact is enough to draw any far-reaching intellectual conclusions.
And now we reach the interwar period: despite the widespread view that 
Poland returned to Europe at that time (as people used to say in the years 
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1918–1922), there was, in fact, no return to Europe. Naturally, the impressive 
Polish culture and literature of the time developed numerous contacts with 
Europe – this applies also to the Czech and partly to the Slovak culture – but 
Poland did not enter Europe in the political sense. Poland, of course, did not 
become a member of the League of Nations, which was a European body 
(it is not my task here to evaluate it). Throughout this period Poland was 
a burden for Europe. Poland was perceived as a problem very early – already 
in the year 1920, when Europe (if such an entity existed) could not make up 
its mind about the Polish-Soviet War and did not know how to deal with it. 
We cannot be sure but, perhaps, if Western Europe had given us a hand, 
the fate of the world would have been different.
In the subsequent years, Polish foreign policy cannot serve merely as 
a proof of irrationality. The compacts with Romania and France, the so-called 
‘exotic alliances’, did not result from mistaken judgments. They resulted 
from a lack of options, as simple as that. On the one hand, we faced Russia, 
on the other hand, Germany. The Poles were quite aware of the develop-
ments in Germany, even more so – I would say – than the countries of the 
West. The same goes for Russia: in the interwar period Polish Intelligence 
was very effective and we had almost the full picture of the situation in the 
Bolshevik Russia. Already in the thirties there were reports on the Ukrainian 
famine in the Polish press, especially in Jerzy Giedroyc’s Bunt Młodych and 
Polityka – much earlier than Robert Conquest published his famous book. 
Poland, however, had no options, no offers coming from the West. Europe 
still had no idea how to deal with Poland, while Poland did not know what 
its place in Europe should be. For me, this sorry state of affairs is reflected 
in the French-Romanian-Polish alliance, which was a failure and, in a sense, 
a bit of a joke.
Let me raise the last point. Can we find in the last two centuries any vir-
tues in the Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian geopolitics – in our foreign 
policy debates, in the reflections concerning our place in Europe? To quote 
once again Jerzy Jedlicki’s brilliant text ‘A thousand years of Poland’s return 
to Europe’: all the time, we have believed that we are returning to Europe; we 
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have cherished three fictions: the fiction of ‘Europe’, the fiction of ‘a return’, 
and the fiction of ‘us’ (it is not clear whether ‘we’ refers to ‘the Poles’ or just 
‘the Polish elite’). ‘We, the Poles’ – this is a very recent phenomenon, not 
older than 15 or possibly 45 years; in any case, not much more than that. ‘We, 
the Polish elite’ have, indeed, attempted to return to Europe but Europe has 
never really wanted us back. To tell the truth, in the last 250 years Europe has 
done nothing in the least for us. This is not meant as a reproach; my point is 
that such facts shape attitudes. If one has never ever answered your pleas, 
then this is bound to have consequences. Now, there was one institution 
with ‘Europe’ in its name which played an enormous role in Poland, namely 
Radio Free Europe. But it was an American, not a European body. This case 
apart, I know of no other form of help on the part of Europe; even in the 
‘Solidarity period’ – in the early 1980s – the situation did not change radi-
cally. But I do not want to dwell on bygones. Are such sentiments important? 
They should not be overestimated, perhaps; at the same time, one must not 
underestimate them. In Poland, the historical memory (ever weakening, I 
admit) tells us that there were the partitions, World War II, the new order 
after WW2, and nobody raised a finger to help us.
This burden is our legacy and also a backdrop against which America 
appears as our benefactor: America has never done anything to hurt us and 
much to make us happy. You remember, perhaps, Tocqueville’s description 
of American (and, to be fair, also French) reactions to the November Rising 
of 1830: in Boston, Americans celebrated the Rising and Polish liberty. At 
that time, John C. Calhoun, vice-President of the USA and one of the most 
remarkable minds of the 19th century, albeit very conservative, praised the 
idea of liberum veto as a very ingenious and useful device (but one misused 
in practice); he belonged to the select group of thinkers who understood 
its true significance and perceived it as an embodiment of Rousseau’s ideal 
of democracy. Since that time till the present America has never hurt us, 
which explains the natural pro-American sentiments in Poland.
To sum up: we do not want to be pro-Russian, because we are afraid 
of barbaric influences; we are pro-European, since we are Europe’s neigh-
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bours and there is no alternative; we are pro-American, because the USA 
has never hurt us.
Let me finish with an anecdote. Several years ago, I had a meal at 
a restaurant in Alabama and I was asked about my place of origin. I an-
swered ‘Europe’ and this was followed by some other questions. At last, 
the bartender exclaimed: ‘Aha! Europe, Utah, my relative lives there.’ I did 
not make it to Europe in Utah but till this very day I have been convinced 
it must be a lovely place.
Adam D. Rotfeld
Two brief comments. Professor Król helped us realize that history very 
often exerts subliminal influence; in other words, that we are simply not 
aware to what extent our attitudes are conditioned historically. History does 
influence our decisions, it has shaped us – this point was well-made.
As for the other comment, professor Król mentioned the Polish party 
in Russia. If we do not stick to this 19th century terminology, we could say, 
I believe, that there is a Polish lobby in Russia. I have in mind groups we tend 
to underestimate; most of all, Russian liberal-democratic intelligentsia for 
whom Poland in any period was a window on the world and remains to be 
perceived (like it was during the communist years) as the country through 
which the ideas of liberty, democracy and openness infiltrate Russia. This 
attitude is still present and, I would say, it even gains in importance. It is not 
reflected in politics, however, for the simple fact that the Liberal Democrats 
in Russia are losing their support – but this is another story.
Jacques Rupnik
Speaking in Warsaw, at the beginning of May 2004, one cannot help 
feeling that the great geopolitical programme of post-1989 Central Europe 
has just been completed with the joining of the European Union and of 
NATO. You can say that the transition is over, that the integration is over 
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and maybe the age of conferences might be over, as well. 
From Central Europe attention will be shifting to the Mid-
dle East. Unless of course the transatlantic divide and the 
Central European involvement in the Middle East brings 
a new dimension to our discussion.
From being for half a century and in some respect 
longer the West of the East, Central Europe is becoming 
now the East of the West. And of course as soon as one 
says ‘the West’ or ‘United Europe’, one is immediately 
made aware of the underlying divides of both Europe 
and the West and the role Central Europeans played in 
the new European and transatlantic situation which is at 
the background of our present discussion and which is 
a reformulation of some of the traditional geopolitical 
dilemmas of the past. Indeed these reflections from the 
past, of which Marcin Król gave us a wonderful account 
just now, are interesting not because history repeats it-
self, in fact quite the opposite, but because the political 
thought of this region has very largely been shaped, since 
the 19th century, by geopolitical discussion or the discus-
sion about the geopolitical predicament of the region which traditionally 
was between Russia and Germany and which in some respects is now being 
redefined (and we will have to discuss to what extent) as being between 
Europe and America. These discussions in East Central Europe have a long 
history. I will briefly look at the legacies of the debates about the empires 
of the past, briefly refer to the legacies of the Cold War and of the Soviet 
Empire and look at the way this affects the current predicament.
Marcin Król has made my task more difficult and easier at the same 
time by already pointing out some of the defining features of East Central 
Europe, where the term Europe has always needed a constitutive other. The 
constitutive other for Central Europeans, particularly for the Poles, has been 
Russia. For the nations of the Balkans, even for some Central Europeans it was 
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Turkey. Turkey was a constitutive other for instance for the Hungarians, the 
major historical landmark being the battle of Mohacz in 1524 and a century 
and a half of Turkish domination. I will briefly mention three patterns, Czech, 
Polish and Hungarian, and return hopefully to the Balkan comparison in the 
conclusion. I can be brief about Poland because Marcin Król and Timothy 
Snyder are both infinitely more knowledgeable than I am about Poland. 
Clearly if you look at the history of political thought in Poland since the 
19th century, at the divides between Piłsudski and Dmowski, between the 
Endecja and the socialists, they reflected two priorities in foreign policy, 
one considering Germany, the other Russia, as the main threat but also 
two internal visions of Poland, the narrow homogeneous vision of Poland 
of Endecja and the multinational, cosmopolitan vision of Piłsudski. That is 
interesting not only as a background of course, but also in the way it has 
affected the thinking of the opposition thinkers in Poland since 1956 and 
in the 1970s. In particular I have in mind an article by Adam Michnik in the 
mid 1970s entitled ‘Piłsudski and us – the choice of a tradition’. So this is 
a very deliberate, very explicit reference to that line of thinking. Of course 
Michnik in that period rejected revolutionary culture associated with that 
tradition but not the geopolitical predicament that was there. And I think 
that it is still relevant, if we want to understand some of the current ap-
proaches to the issue.
The Hungarian and the Czech situation provide a contrast. Since dualism 
was established in 1867 till the end of the World War II, the dominant ori-
entation of Hungarian politics was Austro-German, considering panslavism 
and Russia as the main threat. This has led to two disasters associated with 
the two World Wars. Although the Hungarian elites and most Hungarian 
intellectuals (this applies to many leading historians up to the present, Pro-
fessor Peter Hanak was I think the most recent of them) consider the period 
since 1867 to the first World War as a kind of ‘golden age’ for Hungary. But 
already during that golden age others have anticipated that this could also 
be a dead end. This was particularly the view of Lajos Kossuth, who from his 
Italian exile clearly understood that what happened after 1866 at Sadová 
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meant that Austria became too dependent on Germany and that its fate 
therefore would be shaped by that of Germany, and that if those central 
powers failed, Hungary would suffer with it. And indeed this is what hap-
pened in 1918. The two dominant obsessions, two dominant traumas of the 
post-1918 politics of Hungary that shaped Hungarian politics were Trianon 
and basically the whole revisionist obsession with the loss of territory and 
the Hungarian population; the second was the Bela Kuhn revolution and 
the fear of Russian Bolshevism.
Both the rejection of the Versailles system and the fear of Russian 
Bolshevism led Hungarian politics in the war period into pro-German 
orientation and made it the last ally of Hitler. This double failure in World 
War I and World War II has made a clear break. And it is very difficult 
today to try to establish some continuity between the kind of thinking 
that prevailed since the 19th century till the end of the war. But you can 
find certain intellectual affinities in the main dividing line in Hungarian 
political culture between the urbanists turning towards the West, whether 
they are liberal or social democrats, and the national populists, or now 
the national conservatives. Those cultural divides still play a role in the 
perception and definition of some of the Hungarian foreign policy posi-
tions. For example Victor Orban’s infatuation with Schuessel and Stoiber 
and their joint campaign two years ago for the abrogation of the Beneš 
decrees as a precondition for the enlargement of the European Union to 
the Czech Republic. In Prague, the Munich–Vienna–Budapest axis was 
called the ‘other axis of evil’.
There are remnants of that sort and you can say that for Hungarians 
the European Union is a way of reconnecting with the Hungarian national 
programme of reaching to the minorities and overcoming the legacy of 
Trianon. One could also say that the reluctance to follow the US in the 
Middle East adventures on the part of people like that of Victor Orban is 
sometimes justified in those circles by insinuation that this is a policy led 
by America and connected to Israel and therefore has a cause in Hungary 
in a very particular and not always very pleasant context. But on the whole 
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one can say that the debates of the past shape to a relatively small extent 
the debates of the present.
Marcin Król referred to Czech sympathies for the panslavic cause and 
he described Marx as the most pro-Polish writer of the 19th century. You 
could add that Marx was also the most anti-Czech writer of the 19th cen-
tury. In the ‘Neue Reinische Zeitung’ in 1848/1849 you can read him and 
Engels both competing who will be most radical in promising Czechs not 
only defeat but even extermination. That was the term used. It was meant 
as extermination by the process of industrialisation and modernisation, 
which was to make the small nations of Eastern Europe and their dialects 
disappear. But what is interesting about 1848 is that the basic choice that 
Czechs were confronted with could be summed up as follows: on the one 
hand the panslavic congress of 1848 was held in Prague, on the other 
hand you had the famous letter of the Frankfurt Parlament addressed to 
Czechs. So there were the two options: panslavic cause with the Tzar or 
Western ‘democracy’, ‘modernity’ in German cause. And the response of 
the main political thinker and actor of the time, František Palacký, was to 
reject both. The concept of Austro-Slavism was born from that: since the 
Slavs are in the majority in the Austrian empire, the aim is to democratise 
and federalise the empire. Palacký even said that ‘if Austria didn’t exist, 
we would have to invent it’ vis-à-vis Russia and Germany. Masaryk was 
a disciple of Palacký. He makes his contribution to this line of thinking 
during the First World War by abandoning Palacký’s concept of reforming 
Austria, considering that it is by now lost cause, and trying to formulate 
a programme for a ‘New Europe’. This is not only the title of his journal in 
London in 1915, but also of his lectures and later a book that he published 
still during the war, at the beginning of 1918. Czechs are not very good 
at fighting wars but they are reasonably good, at least Masaryk was, at 
formulating what the war’s aims should be for the Western powers. And 
he does formulate the vision of a new Europe, with the small, Central and 
East European democratic nations associated with the Western democ-
racies. In fact, the West then means both the European powers, France 
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and Britain, but also the United States. Masaryk relies as much on United 
States at that time.
The idea that Western democracy as opposed to both central powers, 
Germany and Austria, and as opposed to Russian Bolshevism is really born 
in 1918. And that new concept of Central Europe is of course supposed 
to be the antidote to Naumann’s Mitteleuropa, to the German concept. 
Masaryk’s first lecture, ‘The New Europe’, is launched in London in 1915, in 
the year that Naumann’s books are published. And he does refer to Central 
Europe of small nations as an antidote to the concept of Mitteleuropa from 
Berlin to Bagdad, that is how a German sphere of influence was defined in 
Masaryk’s writing. 
If you look at that and you try to see what connections you have to the 
present, you could argue that Havel is in many ways an inheritor of Masa-
ryk (the philosopher king, the idea of politics based on values, on culture), 
also in his orientation to the West meaning both America and Europe. The 
one major difference between Masaryk from his book ‘The New Europe’ 
and Havel from the 1990s would not be over America (both recognised the 
‘democratic mission’ of America) but over Germany. Masaryk formulates 
his position clearly on Germany as the main enemy. For Havel on the con-
trary, Germany is a vector of Central Europe’s integration into Europe. And 
that is obvious when he organises for the first time a Vyshehrad meeting 
with the German and Austrian presidents in 1994. The crucial thing about 
the Czech mindset (perhaps this can be more generally applied to Central 
Europe) is the Munich trauma and the feeling of the failure of Western 
democracies in that context and the return in 1945 to the idea of support 
from the East again. The pendulum swings again: the Slavofiles of 1848, 
then a 1918 swing to the West, and now in 1945 again a new swing to the 
East. That is materialised in Beneš’s theory that Central Europe should be 
a bridge between the East and West; that was supposed to fit the spirit of 
Yalta but, as we know, the spirit of Yalta did not last very long and was very 
dubious in any case.
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So we have there three different experiences, three different outlooks 
on the dilemma between Germany and Russia with, of course, the Cold War 
putting everybody in the same boat and considering the Soviet domination 
as the main threat and making the identification with the West as a prior-
ity. If you have to consider the legacies of the Cold War in a nutshell, you 
could say it strengthened the identification with the West. Oskar Halecki’s 
book The limits and divisions of European civilisation makes the point that 
it is the division of Europe that has created the Atlantic bond, the Atlantic 
community as a form of compensation. The idea of the West is born as 
a compensation for a divided Europe. But nowhere is this identification 
with the Atlantic community and with ‘the West’ stronger than in Central 
Europe, which was deprived of its belonging to that community. That is 
one important legacy which we find again in the present transatlantic 
debate. You could say that Central Europeans are European because they 
are Western, they belong to the West; the two terms are inseparable. The 
French and Germans are Western because they are European. And the 
second legacy or lesson from that experience is of course the primacy of 
keeping the United States and NATO in Europe. The famous quote for what 
the real purpose of NATO is (‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in 
and the Germans down’) in a way remains valid for the post-1989 approach 
of Central European elites. 
How do these two historical legacies with empires fit into the post-1989 
situation? Resisting, accommodating, thinking about empires, has shaped 
certain political categories which are not always terribly relevant or useful 
for the post-1989 world. Nevertheless, they exist and they become them-
selves a crucially important element in the transatlantic or the intra-Euro-
pean debate. The first lesson is the lesson of history. After World War I the 
United States left Europe and that has born very badly for Central Europe in 
particular. It remained in Europe after World War II and that has helped to 
create the conditions for the recovery of sovereignty and democracy after 
1989. So: America as a way of protecting Europeans from their own demons 
– you can find that idea in a number of writings, Havel in particular. 
O przyszłości Europy
38 39
Thinking about the security predicament of post-1989, you have basi-
cally three main modes of managing the international system available: 
hegemony, collective security or multilateralism, and the balance of power. 
The West Europeans tend to prefer the second, while Central Europeans do 
not mind the first because they fear the third. So that is the second legacy 
from that history.
The third element is that the reading of the postures in the transatlantic 
debate is seen through certain historical prism, not just the prism of the 
Cold War but also deeper historical roots. As soon as you had a diplomatic 
convergence or alliance between Paris, Berlin and Moscow, immediately 
this was seen as a ‘new Rapallo’ and the priority of the Central Europeans 
therefore was not to hold America, a ‘hyper power’ of the unipolar world, 
in check. They have no nostalgia for bipolar world and therefore seem 
to mind less the unipolar world. Here is a reconnection with the German 
question. The implicit reason for making the choice they made between 
old Europe and America is that this made sense in the strategy of entering 
Europe. America is seen as an equaliser of power on the European scene, 
and particularly vis-à-vis France and Germany. That is why not just former 
dissidents but also former communists from Iliescu to Miller or Fatos Nano 
with impeccable ex-communist credentials offer their bases as substitute 
for German or Turkish bases, i.e. those of the old imperial powers; Poland 
insists on Christian values being put in the European constitution, while 
ignoring the Pope’s statement about the war and claiming protection of the 
holy Shiite sites in Iraq. All this is understandable, not only with a little bit 
of irony which is absolutely necessary, but on the condition that we have 
those predicaments of the past somewhere at the back of our mind.
Central Europe provides a comparison with the Balkans. It is crucially 
important to look at the way political and intellectual elites in the Balkans 
have tried to interpret the post-1989 situation and particularly the war in 
former Yugoslavia. In mid 1990s the dominant mindset was to read the 
conflict of the Balkans through the prism of the beginning of the century, 
and to see it as a return on the Balkan scene of the powers that were de-
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feated in World War I. And you have cultural geopolitical axes: with the 
North East, Croatian-Slovene axis turning to Germany, the orthodox Serb 
axis looking East all the way to Russia and Greece as supporters, and the 
Muslim axis, supposedly with Bosnians, Albanians, backed by Turkey. Any 
closer examination of that proposition demolishes this. Germany was virtu-
ally non-involved in the managing of the crisis itself from 1992 onwards. 
Russia did not have the means, and reluctantly followed, most of the time, 
the Western world. And the same thing about Turkey who had a remark-
ably restrained policy.
These positions are completely anachronistic, however they have appar-
ently existed in some circles which continue to interpret the Balkan conflicts 
in these categories. It is particularly ironic given the fact that the current 
situation in the Balkans is not a conflict between Russia, Turkey and Germany 
but a conflict between the US-led intervention and the Protectorates under 
the European command. Of course there are different approaches to this 
issue within the Serb or Slovene elites, which would rather co-operate with 
Europe than with the US, while Muslims in Bosnia and in Kosovo prefer to 
trust the Americans rather than the Europeans. Actually, one can say that the 
situation is opposite to that of the Middle East one, where the Palestinians 
trust the Europeans rather than the Americans.
The choice between the US and Europe is actually a choice that is not 
rooted in the political culture of Central Europe because the main dividing 
lines in the political culture of this region were not between the support-
ers of Europe and those of the US but between the pro-Western circles 
pursuing the aims of modernisation and of uniting with Europe and with 
the West, and the nationalists, the populists who feared modernity. This is 
how the 19th century’s divides were shaped. Professor Jerzy Jedlicki superbly 
described these debates in his book Jakiej cywilizacji Polacy potrzebują?; 
interestingly enough, the translated version of this title is A Suburb of Eu-
rope. Nineteenth-century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization, which 
illustrates well the development of a debate that has many contemporary 
resonances.
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This historical and political divide in the political culture of Central 
Europe has now a limited significance in the context of the ‘Europe vs. US 
choice’ debate. Indeed, we can claim that Central Europeans themselves 
have nothing against filling up the vacuum generated by the collapse of 
old empires with new empires. The European Union may be perceived as 
a ‘substitute for an empire’ which imposes certain rules – economic integra-
tion – while the US provides security. The roles of these new empires are 
interpreted as complementary and not as contradictory.
The problem may consist in the fact the Central European vision is not 
in line with, or actually remains at the margins of, the current debate be-
tween the Western European countries, founders of the European Union, 
and the United States.
I believe that the Polish stance consisting in stressing the role of national 
state as a means of returning to the European arena after a long period 
of absence (we may compare this with the Spanish situation), and the fact 
that the first actions on this political arena were focusing on the use of the 
right to veto, is a symbolic return to an old Polish tradition.
However, if in our actions were guided by our fears or intuition-based on 
the geopolitics from the past, we generate the risk that they may become 
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The intellectual and political traditions of East-Central European coun-
tries may provide a useful background to understanding their perceptions 
but has not always made them well-equipped for coping with new post-
cold-war dilemmas. Thus Poland enters the EU by asserting itself in style 
and substance as a nation-state returning on the European scene after 
a long eclipse and its association with Spain (another recent returnee on 
the European scene) on the constitutional issue only reinforces that point. 
Its first political act in joining the European Union was to cast its veto over 
the draft of the new European constitution. I am not discussing, of course, 
the merits or the legitimacy of the Polish stance; simply in a historical per-
spective one is struck by the persistence of a certain political culture. The 
liberum veto has an old though not altogether very successful tradition in 
Session I
42
O przyszłości Europy
43New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
Polish politics. A number of observers in Western Europe have been sur-
prised by such assertiveness and the will to join the EU by opposing its two 
main founding members. Anachronism about the Cold War mind-set, the 
argument goes, coupled with anachronism about the return of the European 
nation-state at the beginning of the 21st century. Unless, of course, it is the 
other way around: Poland and more generally the experience of Central 
European countries of being at the receiving end of totalitarian powers has 
made them more sensitive than others inside the EU to new totalitarian 
dangers and the return of power politics in Europe. Perhaps their reserva-
tions about the heralded post-national era and shared sovereignties point to 
a more pessimistic scenario of post-Cold War and post-September 11 return 
of geopolitics and of the balance of power in European politics, perhaps even 
within the enlarged EU. However, the risk in acting upon a fear or intuitions 
inherited from reflections upon the geopolitics of the past is that it may also 
contribute to turning it into a self-fulfilling prophecy for the future.
Adam D. Rotfeld
One remark after listening to Jacques Rupnik: ideas live longer than 
the circumstances and conditions in which they were created, sometimes 
with a positive effect, sometimes with a negative one. The idea of Central 
Europe has both positive and negative effects: in the cultural sense it is 
a very positive phenomenon, but I think that in the political sense Naumann’s 
concept of Mitteleuropa, which is now being revived in some capitals, has 
a very negative side.
One more remark concerning the issue of veto. Poland has been stigma-
tized because people see the liberum veto as it was in the last period of its 
existence, when Poland was in decline (though, actually, not only because 
of the liberum veto). I want to point out, however, that for two hundred 
years the liberum veto played a similar role to that of nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War, which served as a deterrent to armed conflict. The 
liberum veto protected certain values which were not questioned, because 
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people knew that to do so could have grave consequences. I am opposed 
to the so-called ‘obstructing minority’, and I believe we should look at the 
European Union from the positive side, but no one should think that the 
liberum veto was something negative from the outset: rather, expressed 
respect for minorities. [...]
Timothy Snyder
I have dealt quite literally with the task I was set, so 
I shall talk here only about the geopolitics of the region 
extending between Germany and Russia. I would like, 
in particular, to say a few words about a country which 
has not yet been mentioned here, namely Ukraine. It is 
traditionally assumed that geopolitics is concerned with 
states. One may ask, then, about a connection between 
geopolitics and the European Union. This could spark 
off a long discussion; to cut it short, let me mention just 
one factor due to which the EU may be treated as a state: 
the EU has external borders which can be defended by 
different means – not necessarily by the army but, for 
instance, by police forces (these borders, let me add, are 
in fact tighter than the borders of the USA – it is more 
difficult to slip across them).
[…] Because the external border of the EU has moved 
east, it is now easier for the citizens of Poland and other 
states of the region to cross the internal borders of the 
EU. We seem not to notice, however, the situation on 
the Polish-Ukrainian border which has been consider-
ably tightened. I believe that for the EU this is a problem of a geostrategic 
nature. Ukraine is a traditional subject of geopolitics; two famous analysts 
of geopolitics – Jerzy Giedroyc and Zbigniew Brzezinski would claim that 
it is the key to political stability in Europe. Ukraine, however, is still a state 
44
O przyszłości Europy
45New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
in the making. Since the documents ratifying the Border Treaty between 
Russia and Ukraine were exchanged as late as April 22, 2004, only now can 
we talk about the full statehood of Ukraine. If Ukraine – in a distant future, 
of course – is to become a member of the EU, it will have to delineate its 
borders in a more precise way and give a proof of its ability to defend them. 
This claim can be generalized: in order to be admitted by the group of states 
known as the European Union, one must first shape one’s own state and 
strengthen its structures – this process has only begun in Ukraine.
Let me focus then on the time-span of one generation: within this hori-
zon the Ukrainian state will not yet be mature and the accession to the EU 
will not be possible. How should the EU treat Ukraine in this period? We may 
expect rather unusual foreign policy from Ukraine. Let me remind you that 
this country has a record of quite contradictory moves in its foreign policy. 
For instance, when George Soros had a meeting with president Kuchma, the 
latter’s press office came out with statements vilifying the former; when 
Ukrainian troops are engaged in Iraq, Radio Svoboda transmissions are 
jammed in Ukraine. Ukraine is trying to approach simultaneously both the 
EU and Russia, which is extremely difficult.
I would like to mention here some historical points of reference – some 
moments in the history of Europe which are significant for Europeans from 
the West and also for Poles and Ukrainians. I have chosen five such key 
moments. Let me start with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a nearly 
forgotten episode which marks the threshold of the system of European 
nation-states – it set off the process which is only now transformed due to 
the development of the EU. In 1648, Europe (Western Europe and Ukraine 
alike) was an arena of religious wars: in that very year Ukraine entered 
the Thirty Years War which did not result, however, in the creation of 
a state and its structures; on the contrary, Ukraine virtually disappeared 
as a subject of history. In 1648, Ukraine belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. Afterwards, it was partitioned between Poland and Russia 
to remain dismembered throughout the Modern Age.
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The French Revolution, or more broadly the Enlightenment, is the sec-
ond historical moment I would like to mention here. In Europe, it led to 
the emergence of the idea of a universal nation-state, the first such being 
France; other states would adopt this model, too. In Eastern Europe, the 
Enlightenment was also very important but it ran its rather unusual course 
in the conditions of absolutism. For Catherine the Great, the Empress of 
Russia, the Enlightenment served as an intellectual weapon, as an argu-
ment for a homogeneous empire. Having acquired Ukraine and a large 
part of Poland, the Russian Empire had become heterogeneous, but under 
Catherine’s rule underwent a process of homogenization. What are the ef-
fects of her policy in Ukraine? Ukraine, of course, was now predominantly 
in the Russian hands but this period remains very ambivalent in the history 
of the nation. On the one hand, the Enlightenment Project of Catherine 
required Ukrainians to visit St. Petersburg, and St. Petersburg was Russia’s 
window on Europe. Ukrainians move from Kiev to St. Petersburg, and so 
take part in this project. On the other hand, Catherine II extended serfdom 
in Ukraine: under Russian rule Ukrainian peasants became serfs, while 
their lords – aristocracy, nobles, landowners – were predominantly Polish. 
Hence, the Enlightenment was an attractive, European project, while at the 
same time, for the majority of the Ukrainian population, it meant serfdom 
– these developments, however, were not linked with the West, but only 
with Poland and social stratification.
The year 1848 and the Spring of Nations in Europe is the third moment 
to be noted. The surge of liberal nationalism and the revival of great hopes 
reached Ukraine but, of course, only its Western part – properly speaking, 
Eastern Galicia without Lodomeria. This part of Ukraine did not belong to 
the Russian Empire but to Austria-Hungary: the Ukrainians, like other na-
tions of this dual state, took part in the process of national rebirth. After 
1848, the process accelerated due to the introduction of the freedom of 
press and the extension of franchise. As a result of Austrian liberalism, the 
Ukrainian national movement developed quite vigorously in Galicia. At the 
same time, the Polish nobility in Galicia, which was the ruling stratum, was 
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granted political autonomy. This meant that the Ukrainian liberation move-
ment was in practice directed against the Polish nobility. […]
The Great Depression in the year 1930 is the fourth historical moment. 
In Europe, this event translated into a crisis of capitalism and at the same 
time provided an opportunity – grabbed by Hitler – to seize power. Hitler 
could also use the German trade policy to subordinate some countries of 
East and Central Europe. In Ukraine, some developments were parallel, 
while some were unique. In that year, most of Ukraine belonged to the USSR 
which at that time was an arena of Stalin’s efforts to consolidate his power. 
For Stalin fast modernization meant the collectivization of agriculture. It 
was a critical moment in the history of Ukraine: millions of peasants, who 
dreamed about their own land for centuries and were made landowners 
not long before, were deprived of their property. Forceful collectivization 
sparked off a million acts of resistance. In the early thirties, the Ukrainian 
society – like the Russian – suffered a great deal. Their ordeal reached this 
extreme also because Stalin linked the problems encountered in Ukraine 
with the influence of Poland. This may sound strange today, but in the year 
1930 Poland was perceived as a threat to the USSR. Stalin believed, or at least 
pretended to believe, that Ukraine’s problems were political – not economic 
– and that they were instigated by Poland and its allies in Ukraine, who 
should be crushed. As we all know, Stalin used hunger as a weapon: in the 
years 1932–1933, during the Ukrainian famine that followed the collectiviza-
tion, some five million people died of hunger. The collectivization marked 
an end of private property in Ukraine. It also coincided with a campaign 
against the Ukrainian intelligentsia which emerged in the Soviet Ukraine in 
the twenties; its representatives were sent to labour camps or killed because 
they dared to talk, for instance, about the return to Europe.
World War II is the last point of reference and, surely, the one of great-
est significance for the history of Central Europe. The sufferings in this 
region during WW2 defy description. Let me just mention that at that 
time Ukraine was in the very centre of the Eastern Front, which was the 
arena of a catastrophe incomparably greater than whatever happened 
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on the Western Front. Poland is, of course, the only country belonging 
to the EU at this moment which suffered a similar fate during WW2. One 
can show another point of convergence. Both in Western Europe and in 
the USSR, which held on to Ukraine after the war, there was a myth of 
a reunification and reintegration after WW2. In Western Europe, we have 
been told the optimistic story that after the tragic cataclysm, Germany and 
France made peace and started economic co-operation again, which resulted 
in political co-operation.
The story of Soviet-led integration is, perhaps, not so well-known but 
it sounds very convincing: Stalin had foreseen the Nazi attack, the cruelty 
unleashed by Germany and he came to the conclusion that the only way 
to guarantee the safety of the Soviet Union was to consolidate a group of 
satellite states. The safety of Ukraine, in turn, was to be bought at the price 
of some Polish territories, which were to be incorporated into Ukraine. 
Stalin completed this task in 1945. The whole plan […] involved a shift of 
frontiers. In the Cold War period, Moscow tried to convince Poles that Ger-
mans could be back and claim the ‘Recovered Territories’. Ukrainians were 
persuaded that in the case Poles left the Soviet Camp, they would claim 
Lviv and Vilnius. This perspective, which cast doubts on Polish intentions, 
survived virtually till 1991. Since that year the Polish and Ukrainian elites 
have been trying hard to give support to one another and to find a com-
mon ground; one should also mention important debates about the events 
dating back to WW2 – in this context, one should first of all congratulate 
president Kwaśniewski on several important initiatives. We must note, 
however, that all those extremely important developments started only 
in 1991. Hence, the reconciliation in the East began much later than in the 
West – for obvious reasons.
A few conclusions of a general nature: first of all, Ukraine does lie 
between the East and the West – this claim is not just political rhetoric of 
the current Ukrainian leadership. […] The state of suspension between the 
East and the West is of relevance – this point of reference in geopolitics 
may be important. It is possible that Ukrainians will become pro-Western; 
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I have already mentioned that such an orientation could be detected on 
a limited scale in the year 1648, 1848, and also 1930. Such aspirations, 
however, cannot be fulfilled if people remain passive.
Now, some conclusions concerning the significance of the historical 
points of reference in the context of the EU. First of all, to draw the lesson 
from the experiences of the year 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, as well 
as the making of the European system of nation-states: every state system 
tends to include the excluded. […] Poland fell prey to the system started in 
1648 precisely because it could not solve the Ukrainian question. Pope John 
Paul II talked about the passage from the Union of Lublin to the European 
Union. One should remember that Ukraine was a liability of the Union of 
Lublin and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
Second, the year 1789 and the Enlightenment: it is obvious that the 
pursuit of universal standards and reform – whether they should be effects 
of the French Revolution or a program for the European integration – at-
tract elites. There has always been an elite in Ukraine which is attracted 
by Europe. Universalising reforms, however, pose the risk of alienating the 
majority of the society, for instance, when Catherine the Great summoned 
the Ukrainian elite to St. Petersburg, and at the same time extended the 
serfdom of the Ukrainian peasantry. At present, the Ukrainian elite may 
travel to the EU, while the Treaty of Schengen limits the contact with Eu-
rope for a large part of the population. I hope that Europeans will soon 
realize that the borders delineated in Schengen overlap with the borders 
between rich and poor countries, between Western and Eastern Christian-
ity, between the countries belonging to the NATO and non-members. An 
attempt should be made to blur such divisions, rather than to pronounce 
them ever more vigorously. 
My third conclusion refers to the year 1848, Galicia and the Spring of 
Nations: it is institutions that make a nation; the survival of a national 
movement depends on the strength of its institutional structure. There are 
good reasons for the fact that the Ukrainian national movement was born 
and developed in Galicia. We could compare that situation of a few millions 
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of Ukrainians in Austrian Galicia to the situation of only several hundred 
thousands of Ukrainian in Poland: it is possible that Ukraine will not be 
a member of the EU for many years to come (if at all), but the Ukrainians 
who are Polish citizens already live in the European Union.
My fourth conclusion concerns the year 1930 and the collectivization: 
a large group of the Ukrainian population used to know the market econo-
my; unfortunately, this tradition was forcibly ended. Still, when Ukrainians 
travel to Poland to work there, they adapt to a market society very fast. At 
long range, the EU will face the problem of labour shortage, while Ukraine 
will have to deal with unemployment. Perhaps we should already think 
about a way to solve both problems at one stroke.
Finally, the year 1945 and World War II which rightly opens the narra-
tive culminating with the EU: the European Union is a successful postwar 
project. Since WW2 was conducted mostly on the fronts in Eastern Europe 
and it was won there, the Polish narrative about the war – as resulting in 
Communism, and not peace and prosperity – should now circulate in the 
EU and enrich European thinking on this subject. The Ukrainian perspective 
on WW2 is also valid. If the EU is to overcome the legacy of WW2, there 
remains much to be done in this domain.
Adam D. Rotfeld
It is important to underline the influence of the situation in Austria on 
the chances of Ukrainians in the 19th and the early 20th century. Austria, like 
Prussia, was not a democratic state, but it was a country under the rule of 
law. Today, the advocates of extending democracy to this or that state simply 
forget that there is a difference between the two. It is clear, however, that 
the rule of law must be established first, if democracy is to survive. Now, 
both Austria and Prussia, as opposed to the Russian Empire, were under the 
rule of law and this certainly helped Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia to forge 
their modern identity. [...]
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Discussion
Jerzy Jedlicki (Polish Academy of Science)
I will start with an anecdote. At the end of my stay at Wilson Center, 
I went to the bank where I had my account. The bank was situated in the 
very centre of Washington, the political heart of America. I asked to have 
the contents of my account transferred to my bank in Poland. The bank clerk 
started to search frantically in the bank’s address book where countries were 
listed alphabetically. After a while she gave me a resigned look and said: 
‘There is no such country as Poland, there is nothing between the Philippines 
and Portugal’. So when I hear people talking about the American perception 
of Eastern Europe or Poland, I always remember this story.
I had a feeling of discomfort while listening to my friends Aleksander 
Smolar and Marcin Król who were talking about America in terms of it be-
ing interested or uninterested in something, or about Europe that ‘had not 
cared about Poland’. I realise that these are mental shortcuts, but in my 
view they are above all examples of a hypostasis. States and continents do 
not think, do not feel, and do not have any attitudes. It is people who think, 
feel, and act. This language of geopolitics does not suit me. Apart from 
purely linguistic problems, there are also convictions about some stable 
arrangements, about certain objective conditions. Minister Rotfeld has said 
that today geography is losing its significance. I think that also geopolitics 
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is losing its significance, if it is understood as a constant arrangement of 
certain motivations and conditions resulting from one’s location on the map. 
We should not say that Poland has a choice between Europe and America, 
or that Poland has chosen an American policy and prefers it to a European 
policy. We should clearly say: the Poland of president Kwaśniewski, prime 
minister Miller and foreign minister Cimoszewicz, at a certain moment of 
our history made, in my view, the very bad decision of attaching itself to 
the chariot of the adventurist policies of president Bush and his associates. 
Then the situation becomes clear. [...] Let us say briefly that this Poland of 
minister Cimoszewicz, for whom I have a lot of respect, but who, I think, has 
been conducting a very bad foreign policy, this Poland has several times, 
especially during last year, disregarded the opinions of leading European 
partners, for which it should have shown much more consideration.
I am an ardent supporter of methodological indeterminism. Today’s 
speech by Tim Snyder, which I think was excellently presented and construct-
ed, demonstrated, among other things, how important good choices are 
when they are made at the right moment by people who can see far ahead. 
There was no necessity to create the European Union, and similarly there 
was no necessity for Poland to extend her hand to Ukraine and try to settle 
old feuds. It was an effort of several, perhaps a dozen, persons who had 
a political vision, could see far ahead and could influence the decision-
making processes. I would suggest that we should use the language which 
stresses that political decisions are obviously not entirely free, but neither 
are they determined and foregone.
Jerzy Holzer (Polish Academy of Science)
In today’s debate little space has been devoted to the fact that actually 
in the 19th and 20th centuries the national idea, or even simply nationalism, 
was of the utmost importance. In this respect Central and Eastern Europe was 
increasingly under the influence of Germany and Russia since the beginning 
of the 19th century. After all, it was Mickiewicz who wrote both about the 
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German hydra in Konrad Wallenrod and about the Russian danger in Dziady. 
At that time romantics from various countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
lived and breathed this national idea. But the problem was that in the 19th 
century German nationalism and the German state, which finally emerged 
in 1870, were forming simultaneously. Russian nationalism, though with 
some delay, was also rising. I think that the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe (at least some of them) which were situated between Germany and 
Russia, looked to Austria as a non-nationalist state.
It is an open question whether the two World Wars constituted the 
height of the national state and national conflicts in Europe. In the aftermath 
of these disasters, two ideas were born on how to emerge from the catas-
trophe and these were the Communist idea and the European – or Western 
European – idea, both of them supranational. Because the Communist vision 
was anti-libertarian and anti-democratic, the movements acting against it 
appealed largely to the national idea, if not to nationalism itself. With this 
awakening of nations we entered the year 1989 and found ourselves in 
a democracy. Now the problem is to what extent this national awakening 
of ours is in line with the principles of the European Union.
I think one should openly say that the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe do not want national interests to play too big a role in the European 
Union, because that would go against European solidarity, and only European 
solidarity can allow poorer countries to integrate. If at this moment anyone in 
Poland wants a European Union with national interests strongly pronounced, 
it means they do not understand that this would backfire against poorer na-
tions, and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are among the poorer 
ones. No matter what Jerzy Jedlicki was saying about current politics, the 
European and American value systems are significantly close, though not 
identical, and in this sense the United States and Europe are closer to each 
other than to anyone else in the world. However, when we talk about Euro-
pean solidarity, we must say that inside the European Union the nations of 
Central and Eastern Europe want to emphasize this relative closeness of the 
United States and Europe, but not at the expense of weakening European 
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solidarity. This means it is not a choice between the United States and Europe, 
but a question of priorities, and in fact European solidarity is given priority 
to the relationship between Europe and the United States.
Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center, 
University of Warsaw)
It has been said that geography has lost its significance. I think that 
only some kinds of geography have lost their significance. I would like 
to point out some changes which are now taking place and determining 
what kinds of geography are important. Physical geography is much less 
significant; I myself have very interesting professional experiences in this 
respect, as I operate more and more often in cyberspace and I have come 
to understand that an ever greater part of at least Western civilization lives 
in cyberspace, where every two points are adjacent, where there are no 
physical distances between Warsaw and New York, between San Francisco 
and Beijing. Does invalidation of physical distance mean that geography 
has lost its significance? My answer is no. All the more important are other 
kinds of geography, above all a cultural geography and demography. The 
world is divided into communities of values, communities of behaviour; 
two points in cyberspace are close to each other, two persons or two com-
munities in cyberspace are close to each other if they are culturally and 
socially compatible, but they can be totally alien and isolated even though 
the physical distance is merely the width of a street. This is why modern 
geopolitics, which takes into account an anthropological geography, or 
a cultural geography, the geopolitics of civilisations, is important and should 
accompany us in our further debates.
Adam D. Rotfeld
I have two remarks. The first one is connected with the fact that we 
rightly speak about states and nations, because – as it has been mentioned 
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several times – since the time of the Treaty of Westphalia, when the post-
medieval universalistic system in Europe started to disappear, initially the 
only agents in international politics were states, and later nations in the 
modern sense of the word. In my view, today there is a certain tension 
between the status of states and nations on one hand, and of societies and 
communities on the other. Often, we do not fully realise to what extent 
this new reality affects the shaping of relations in the world. The influence 
of a community, including the European Community, is more and more 
important. I would say that our inability to define and use terms which 
are adequate to the new situation results in the fact that, for example, 
in many countries of the world, especially in Western Europe and in the 
United States, Russia is still perceived as an empire. This is due to a par-
ticular fascination with Russia. In effect this perception is in a way more 
important than the actual reality.
To illustrate my thesis I will tell you an anecdote: in 1975 at the time of 
Easter I visited a place called Horyniec in the area close to the Eastern border 
of Poland; I wanted to see some small Ukrainian Orthodox churches still 
remaining in this region. I met a very old peasant, asked for information, 
and we started talking. I realised that he was actually speaking Ukrainian, 
not Polish. He confirmed that he was Ukrainian. I asked him: ‘You had a 
choice – so why didn’t you leave for Ukraine, instead of staying here on the 
Polish side?’ – ‘You know – said the peasant – this was because I knew that 
in Poland there would be no collective farms, kolhoz’. – ‘And how did you 
know that there would be no collective farms?’ – ‘You will not understand 
this, but the point is that France would never have allowed this’. Still unsure, 
I said: ‘France?’ – ‘Yes, Mister, but you will not understand this’. So the peas-
ant’s awareness stayed at World War I, his world was shaped at that time 
and has not changed since. Now, whenever I meet French ambassadors, in 
Warsaw too, I suggest they should go to Horyniec to see that France is still 
playing an important role in the consciousness and world-view of Poles 
from the elder generation.
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Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)
At the beginning of this session it was suggested that no one in Europe 
supported the independence of Poland. Well, Napoleon did support Polish 
independence, and we have even written the project of Poland in Europe 
being united by Napoleon into our Polish national anthem, ‘Bonaparte has 
shown us ways to victory’. Another example is the German liberals and 
triumphant march of Polish emigrants after 1830 through Germany and 
France, when Germans used to sing the famous ‘Polenlieder’, knowing that 
the independence of Poland is needed for the German national conscious-
ness: after all, initially the German revolution supported the creation of 
Polish army units in the Poznań region so that the resurrected Poland could 
be a shield against Russian interventionism.
My second remark refers to the opinion that the United States has never 
done any harm to us. Well, no harm apart from such trifles as Yalta and the 
Yalta order in the years 1945–1989.
The third issue concerns the historical identities of Poland in Europe. 
The archbishop Życiński says that we should build a Polish patriotism 
which would be combined with love for Europe. It seems that it is enough 
to reach back to Polish Romanticism, which has been mentioned also by 
professor Król: the Polish romantics, especially Józef Hoene-Wroński, saw 
the future and freedom of Poland in a European federation. Mickiewicz 
was the father of Polish Romanticism, which combines love for Poland as 
a political organisation, the Polish Republic, and love for Europe – ‘by one 
word you’ll betray that you used to live on the Niemen river, that you are 
a Pole, a resident of Europe’.
Zdzisław Najder (University of Opole)
[...] My remark refers to the image of Europe in Polish thinking about the 
world, and in European thinking about the world, which has been presented 
by professor Marcin Król. I am not a historian of ideas, but I have doubts 
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about this image. Up to the time of the emergence of the European Commu-
nity, Europe, if it ever defined itself, was in contrast to something/someone 
else (when Franks were fighting Saracens, for the first time the concept of 
‘Europeans fighting someone’ was used, similarly when later the battle of 
Vienna was fought). The French, the English and the Dutch did not really 
need this concept, but it was needed by the Italians, the Poles, the Czechs 
and the Germans. That is why there was the movement, a quite significant 
one, of the ‘Young Europe’ in the 1830s and 1840s. I want to remind you 
that Mickiewicz was writing about a European federalism, and the father 
of Joseph Conrad, Apollo Korzeniowski in his text Poland and Moscow used 
the concept of Europe, and he blamed Europe that it is not up to its task: the 
concept was just a postulate. I was surprised by the complete overlooking of 
the ‘Young Europe’ movement active in the middle of 19th century, in which 
Poles also participated. The aims of this movement have been realised only 
now, before our very eyes.
Krzysztof Iszkowski (Krytyka Polityczna quarterly)
I would like to thank professor Snyder for one point he made in his 
speech, which is often overlooked in Polish historiography, namely his re-
mark that the Polish inability to manage the ‘Ukrainian issue’ was the factor 
which determined, in the second half of the 17th century, the collapse of the 
Polish state as one of the European states. However, I would draw different 
conclusions from the ones that you did in the subsequent part of your pres-
entation. Namely, if our engagement in Ukraine once led to the collapse of 
our state, then why should we now engage ourselves there again?
Leszek Moczulski
I would like to add something to the speech delivered by professor 
Król. The first point is that modern Europe is a Europe built differently from 
a geopolitical point of view. This is a Europe which since the 16th century 
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has been divided into two very distinct parts with different orientations, 
and traces of this division are visible to this day. So there is Western Europe 
which has Atlantic and global orientation, and Eastern Europe which is 
a buffer zone shielding Western Europe from Turkey, Russia and Asia. This 
geopolitical divide has had a significant impact on our understanding of the 
concept of Europe. In this sense, events such as the Treaty of Westphalia in 
1648 undoubtedly had a weaker influence on Eastern Europe than on West-
ern Europe, in both the conceptual and the institutional way. This division 
of Europe is very clearly visible in the 20th century and only the events of 
the second half of the 20th century have evoked in Western Europe a real 
interest in the lands on the Vistula river, on the lower Danube, and on the 
Dnieper river.
The second issue is that of Poland between Russia and Germany. It has 
been rightly pointed out that Germany emerged only in 1870, and this was 
not the emergence of an empire, but of Germany, for the first time since the 
Hohenstaufs. In the meantime there were the Luxemburgs, the Hapsburgs, 
the Hohenzollerns, and the emperor, but there was no Germany. Treating 
Germany as a permanent phenomenon is formally unfounded. It is more 
justified factually than formally because starting from the second half of 
the 18th century, from the time of Frederick Wilhelm II’s failed attempts to 
integrate Eastern Germany, the perception of Poland’s position as ‘between 
Prussia and Russia’ began to emerge and it continued through the 19th 
and 20th century (in the second half of the 20th century it was artificially 
maintained, because the country was, in terms of choice rather than the 
actual political position, between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
but surely not between Germany and Russia). However the old stereotype 
is remarkably strong. [...]
Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Warsaw University)
A month ago the Institute of History at Warsaw University hosted 
professor Maurice Aymard from Maison des Sciences de l’Homme in Paris. 
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One of the interesting theses presented in his lecture, which was not re-
ceived with full understanding, was the conception that America obviously 
does not belong to Europe, whereas Russia (at least the areas extending 
to Irkutsk) does. This is the problem of perceiving the borders of Europe. 
To an average Frenchman, Russia is a part of Europe; this has not been 
questioned since the mid-19th century, but the United States surely is not 
a part of Europe. To an average Pole, Russia may not be a part of Europe, 
whereas the United States in some strange way is. I would like to remind 
you of a particular fact: in 1790 Ottoman Turkey signed, along with the 
Republic of Poland, an offensive treaty against Russia, a treaty which was 
not, in the end, ratified. In this treaty, written in French and in Turkish, 
we find a statement that the excessive growth of Russia had upset the 
European balance, so Warsaw and Istanbul decided to save the European 
balance.
The second problem is a question which we, as new members of the 
European Union, must address at a school textbook level: can we create 
a new European identity without negative stereotypes and without using 
xenophobic themes? Can we be Europeans and at the same time, subcon-
sciously, not demonstrate our superiority towards others?
Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Institute of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope in Lublin)
It seems to me that in the 19th century, as you have mentioned here, 
but also in the 20th century, there was a Polish European thinking (we can 
illustrate this with a number of examples, for instance, the activity of Józef 
Retinger, the initiatives of the Polish government in exile, and the initiatives 
of Polish federalists), but its realisation was rather difficult. This was because 
the realisation of the fundamental postulate of regaining independence 
in the 19th century, and later of regaining sovereignty in the 20th century, 
encountered serious problems as a result of the international situation. So 
I think that we should modify the thesis which has been formulated here: 
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there was a political thought in Poland, we wanted to be in Europe, but our 
options to act were very limited.
Timothy Snyder
I want to reply to the very boldly formulated question about Ukraine 
and why one Poland should want to get involved there. As a matter of 
fact, the argument in my speech was that from the European perspective, 
and all the more from the Polish perspective, it is impossible not to get 
involved there. When a European state system is forming, it influences 
the neighbouring countries, so the choice is not if but how to be involved 
– wittingly or unwittingly.
Replying in more detail – it is true that in the Chmielnicki’s period Poles 
had their problems in Ukraine and their apprehension of being involved 
there is natural; that is how the situation was perceived by Roman Dmowski, 
for example. But I would say: as Poland was unable to solve the Ukrainian 
question, it was done by Russia instead, and that is how Poland actually 
lost its sovereignty.
I belong to Giedroyc’s tradition of thinking or (in a slightly different 
way) to Brzezinski’s tradition: they believed that it was in the interest of 
Poland to have a buffer zone of stable states between Moscow and Warsaw. 
From this perspective, Poland should be keenly interested in supporting the 
state-building processes in Ukraine or Belarus.
If we look to the future – Poland has joined the European Union now 
that the EU is trying to create its own foreign policy. This is an urgent issue, 
and not only because of Iraq. And Poles are being asked: what contribu-
tion can they offer to the new foreign policy of the EU? What will be the 
Eastern dimension of this policy? And Poles may have something to say in 
this respect. 
This brings me to a general remark on geopolitics and I will refer here 
to professor Jerzy Jedlicki’s deliberations. I do not particularly like the term 
‘geopolitics’, because it can encourage a passive attitude. This is a situation 
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which is now present in Ukraine, where unfortunately it is believed that ‘as 
we occupy a place which is very important from the perspective of geopoli-
tics, we do not need to do anything’. Of course it is just the opposite – to 
integrate with Europe one needs to act, instead of waiting passively. This 
passive style is sadly associated with the term ‘geopolitics’.
My second remark about geopolitics, or rather geography, is that in my 
view geography (even simple physical geography) still plays an enormous 
role. Does anyone here really believe that it is not important for the United 
States, or for Europe, where oil deposits are located in the world? Of course 
this is an issue of the utmost importance for all of us, and it concerns among 
other things European-Polish-Ukrainian relations. Because the question of 
whether oil will be delivered through Ukrainian territory or not is a very 
important one for Poland and Europe.
Finally, I would like to say something about a different kind of geography, 
namely the geography of experience. What is our experience of geography? 
In my view such concepts as ‘globalisation’, or ‘European integration’, appeal 
to those who easily move around the world. If I do not need a visa to go to 
Warsaw, in a sense, Warsaw is close to me. If I need a visa to go to Ukraine 
then, in a sense, Ukraine is somewhat further away. And for example, to 
a Mexican citizen who wants to work in the US, America is far away because 
of visa requirements. So there is the geography of experience. When some-
one needs to move around and encounters problems, then they will have 
a different view on globalisation and European integration. Perhaps this 
geography is very modern, but it is still a kind of geography and should be 
taken into account.
Jacques Rupnik
Timothy Snyder has just said that geography is important, and I would 
say that the mental geography is as important as the real, physical geogra-
phy. And that is why the discussion we have had this morning is so useful, 
but it can also lead to some traps of a political nature, as I have tried to 
Discussion
62
O przyszłości Europy
63
demonstrate. The dilemma of Central and Eastern Europe is completely 
different from the dilemmas in the 19th century. The categories which were 
employed to elaborate on geopolitics, on international issues, and on the 
place of nations in Europe, are obsolete, out of date. But these categories 
have shaped our political thinking and still influence our perceptions. We 
could have avoided some misunderstandings in Europe over the last several 
years, if these issues of the geography of experience – the mental geography 
– were taken into consideration. […]
Marcin Król
I agree with Jerzy Jedlicki that one should say that it was the Poland of 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller which entered the war in Iraq. 
Nevertheless, history will judge it differently: simply that Poland entered 
the war. People who have written on these topics did not use personalized 
terms. If we look at the authors, from Kamieński to Bocheński, they spoke 
about Poland being situated between Russia and Germany, similarly as 
Krasiński wrote in his memorials: Europe, Poland, France. This tradition is 
a fact. Moreover, whether one likes the government or not, this is our Polish 
government and in history this event will be recorded as Poland entering 
the war in Iraq on the side of the US.
I would like to remind you that my statement concerned exclusively Polish 
political attitudes, and the beautiful passage from Mickiewicz quoted here 
concerns cultural, social and religious attitudes. Polish political attitudes 
were different. One can refer to the Polish debate on federalism, which 
started during the Second World War in Great Britain and was carried on 
later in the pages of Kultura (and not only there). This very interesting 
moment of history had little consequences in Western Europe, but very 
important consequences in shaping our attitudes towards Eastern Europe. 
Jerzy Giedroyc and his school played an enormous role (and I think president 
Kwaśniewski has been under his influence).
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So Polish European thinking started then. I will remind you that one of 
the fundamental texts on Europe, in which by the way Poland is mentioned, 
‘Pan-Europe’ by Richard de Coudenhove Kalergi, has never been published 
in Poland. The Polish pan-European movement had around 20 members, 
moreover, some of them joined it on ambiguous grounds, because in fact 
they were anti-European: they were pro-Greek and thus pro-German, for 
example, professor Tadeusz Zieliński, a great but not very famous historian, 
and unfortunately an advocate of Nazism (not an active participant).
My third remark: the categories of memory are very important, and the 
public memory stores various things, it is like a rubbish bin; even if one does 
not look into this bin, that does not mean it is empty. Some day someone 
will find what is in there. That is why one should be very careful; it is better 
to remember more than less.
Aleksander Smolar
I am not going to defend the term ‘geopolitics’. We have used it here 
– as I explained in my introduction – fully aware of its provocative nature, 
but also because this term has a certain tradition in the Polish political 
language. We wanted to make an attempt to define basic determinants of 
Central European and Polish politics.
In this session, a historical and not a geographical dimension has been 
the most crucial. In debates on ‘Europe and America’ history is usually hardly 
ever present. We live in times when a synchronic, and not a diachronic per-
spective is dominating. The past is hardly ever mentioned, as if there were 
some radical discontinuity in history and the current world was created by 
the events of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. In organising this session, our objec-
tive was to regain the memory of historical debates and problems as well as 
of fundamental factors which determined previous political choices in our 
region, and to see what their influence is on our thinking today.
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David P. Calleo
Our instructions for this panel – ‘Europe and US policy’ asked us to 
ponder the following question: Is the United States interested in further 
European integration? We need of course to define what we mean by further 
European integration: further ‘widening’, adding more countries? or further 
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‘deepening’, strengthening the economic, diplomatic, 
military dimensions? If we mean ‘widening’, then the US 
is generally in favour, sometimes – it seems – because 
more ‘widening’ appears to mean less ‘deepening’. But 
what about ‘deepening’ itself, building a stronger, more 
cohesive European Union? The honest answer, I imagine, 
is no. The United States is not interested in further Euro-
pean ‘deepening’.
The US is not interested in European integration in two 
senses of the word ‘interest’. To begin with, European in-
tegration does not attract the administration’s attention, 
let alone its admiration. In this, I fear, the administration 
mirrors the country as a whole. The sustained and very 
significant transformation that has taken place in the EU 
since Maastricht and the introduction of Euro has excited 
little attention in America. Neither in the government, nor 
in the media, nor among American political elites. As for 
the general public, it is abysmally uninformed.
The word ‘interest’ of course has another meaning. 
Having an interest can also mean having a share in some 
venture and therefore wishing it to succeed. Probably a significant portion of 
the political elites, in particular those that identify themselves most closely 
with the Bush administration, do not really favour that deepening which 
has been taking place in Europe since Maastricht because they fear it is not 
in the interest of the United States, in this second sense of the word. I am 
not speaking of course about earlier American attitudes when Americans 
sometimes seemed more enthusiastic about European integration than 
Europeans themselves and American support was probably critical for Eu-
rope’s success. But even by the late 1960s this early enthusiasm was on the 
wane. As Europe grew more integrated, it also grew more Gaullist. Europe’s 
combined economic strength made it a more formidable competitor and 
forced us into arduous negotiations where we did not always prevail. Indeed 
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the roots of the Euro can be traced to the monetary quarrels of the Carter 
administration with the Franco-German partnership of that era – Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. 
But until a decade ago these economic antagonisms were safely con-
tained within an over-arching geopolitical framework created by the Cold 
War. Indeed, that geopolitical framework, pitting the US and the Soviet Un-
ion against each other, goes a long way to explain America’s early patronage 
of the nascent European Community, as well as American sustained tolerance 
for the economic rival that has emerged out of that Community. Western 
Europe was, after all, the great prize of the Cold War, a prize that the United 
States could not afford to lose. The Soviet threat to the Western Alliance 
was not only military, it was also political, economic, and cultural. West 
Germany had powerful neutralist inclinations. France and Italy had strong 
Communist parties, widely supported among intellectuals. The integrating 
European Community was probably the West’s best answer to that threat. 
At the same time, of course, the development of that Community created 
an ever more powerful rival to the United States within the West.
Thus the Cold War system, which was so terrible for Eastern Europe, 
had numerous advantages for Western Europe. We used to call that Cold 
War system bipolar. Arguably, it was really tripolar. The integrating West 
Europeans were free riders on two horses, so to speak – on the American 
forces that protected them against the Soviets, and on the Soviet forces that 
balanced the Americans – that made Americans solicitous of West European 
governments and publics.
It was, I suppose, this general comfort all around in the West that made 
so many Western analysts blind to the growing weaknesses of the Cold War 
system and so reluctant intellectually to come to terms with its demise. With 
the retreat and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and the 
European Union and, in particular, the major continental states of the Euro-
pean Union have been nursing different, indeed contradictory, geopolitical 
models for the future. As we saw things in America, the Soviet collapse left 
the US the great winner of the Cold War. Not only was America now the 
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greatest military power by far, but it also began enjoying an unprecedented 
economic boom. Under the circumstances the American triumphalism of the 
1990s was only natural and that triumphalism provided the psychological 
and cultural environment within which American elites began formulating 
their unipolar vision of the future: an integrated world system with the 
United States as the single, hegemonic superpower. 
But Europe too saw itself as a great winner from the Soviet collapse. 
With the Soviet empire gone, Europe no longer depended militarily on the 
US. Europeans finally felt restored to their own geopolitical space. They 
regained not only the captive states of Eastern Europe, but the way seemed 
open for a new and productive relationship with Russia itself. Of course the 
new opportunities also meant new dangers. A reunited Germany with weak 
states all along its Eastern border, together with an enfeebled Russia, raised 
the spectre of a resurrected German problem. It was widely accepted, above 
all among the Germans themselves, that Europe that did not go forward to 
greater unity risked falling back to its traditional murderous disunity. Moreo-
ver with the Soviets gone, the Europeans had lost their external balancer of 
American power within the West. Hence, the need they felt to balance the 
Americans themselves, to restore the lost transatlantic equilibrium, by creat-
ing a strong European Union. The result was Maastricht, as you remember 
signed in February 1992, where Western Europe, led by France and Germany, 
dedicated itself to a much strengthened European Union, striving for com-
mon money, common foreign and security policy, and common defence. 
That was followed by Copenhagen, in the fall of 1993, where the EU also 
committed itself to further enlargement toward the East.
With Maastricht and Copenhagen, the EU asserted its determination 
to make itself the dominant institution in the new pan-Europe. This Euro-
pean perspective implies a radically different world order from America’s 
triumphalist, unipolar vision. Europe’s perspective points not to America’s 
unipolar world, but to a pluralist world, with several regional great pow-
ers, hopefully Europe, perhaps Russia, Japan, India, certainly China. And as 
old Europeans tend to see things, the ideal arrangement for such a plural 
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world in the making is not the hegemony of a hyperpower but a multilateral 
concert of all the major powers. In effect, you might say, Old Europeans 
prefer a world that is their own European system writ large.
Between the American unipolar vision – hegemonic and unilateral – and 
the European pluralist vision – plural and multilateral – there is a great 
potential for conflict. Both visions, in their own ways, are radical. It is not 
surprising therefore that there has been little American admiration or sym-
pathy for the formidable challenges that the Europeans set for themselves 
at Maastricht. Instead, there has been a distinct tendency to use NATO as 
a rival pole of attraction – a rival Westernizer, and thereby to create a pro-
American East European block inside the enlarged Union.
These rival transatlantic visions have now had more than a decade to 
work themselves out. Europe has achieved the Euro, enlarged in the East, 
and after stumbling badly in the Balkans is seeking more and more insist-
ently its own diplomatic and military cohesion. But many obstacles obviously 
remain – above all, accommodating the new members is likely to prove 
a long and arduous process.
Meanwhile America’s unipolar project has appeared in two models 
– Clinton’s model for an economic superpower and Bush’s model for 
a military superpower. Despite America’s manifest strength, each model 
has revealed severe vulnerabilities. Clinton’s aim was to make the US the 
world’s economic superpower, the global champion of advanced industry 
and services of all kinds. But all along Clinton’s boom depended on mas-
sive infusions of foreign credit. Today, with an even bigger current account 
deficit, our need for foreign credit is greater than ever. Ominously it now 
comes less and less in the form of investments in our real economy and 
increasingly from selling short term treasury instruments to Japanese and 
Chinese central banks. In effect, it is the Chinese and, above all, the Japa-
nese, supporting the dollar in order to hang on to their trade surpluses, 
who now finance American prosperity. This seems a rather fragile economic 
foundation for a unipolar superpower. Absorbing more than we produce 
is not of course a new habit for the American economy, but now that the 
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Cold War is over, and the Euro is rivalling the dollar, our insatiable need 
for foreign credit seems more and more likely to impose limits on what 
we can borrow, on what we can spend, on what we can do, particularly on 
what we can do by ourselves.
Since September 11, as we all know, the Bush administration has defined 
the American global project in military terms. President Bush sees himself 
as a war time president conducting a global war on terrorism that appears 
to legitimate American interference anywhere in the world. A vigorous 
posture is bolstered by even more aggressive doctrines: preventive war 
against anyone seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction or otherwise 
developing a potential threat to American security or, in some formulations, 
a threat to American predominance.
This expansive redefinition of American security is accompanied by 
what seems a radical change in America’s attitude towards its alliances. 
The administration often finds its traditional allies a hindrance rather than 
an addition to national power, and proclaims that such allies can and should 
be ignored.
America’s heightened assertiveness naturally triggers reactions among 
its transatlantic allies, particularly since they are themselves acutely inter-
ested in the principal regions where the US is most active, that is to say, the 
Arab world, and the Middle East in general, including Turkey and Iran, or 
the great ring of former Soviet states that border Russia. Europe’s interest 
in these regions is not voluntary or elective: these are Europe’s near abroad. 
Their stability and prosperity inevitably bear on Europe’s own security. Not 
unlike Americans, Europeans are increasingly inclined to doubt the value 
of the transatlantic alliance. Many Europeans see today’s hyperactive US as 
less a contributor to Europe’s security than a problem for it. In the Middle 
East, for example, many Europeans see US policy as a constant irritant that 
threatens to goad Europe’s Muslim neighbours into a real war of civilisations, 
a war that Europeans know would be disastrous for them and would like 
to believe is unnecessary. Many also fear hyperactive America extending 
its military reach all along Russia’s near abroad as a major complication 
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for Europe’s long term relations with Russia. Using NATO to legitimise the 
encircling American forces but without really taking Russia into the alliance 
pre-empts any new co-operative pan-European security system. Building 
such a system, and enlisting Russia within it as a partner rather than a cap-
tive, is surely one of Europe’s major long-term interests.
Given the perennial disharmony between Europe’s basic geopolitical 
interests and America’s current policies, it is not surprising that European 
states reacted so strongly to America’s determination to invade Iraq. The 
European reactions, of course, were not similar or even complementary. 
The divergences make the European geopolitical vision at least as prob-
lematic as the American. To start with Western Europe’s big three – France, 
Great Britain and Germany: when America’s invasion finally brought the 
transatlantic break into the open, each of the three responded in a more 
or less predictable fashion. France took the lead in asserting a European 
position, distinct, that is, from the United States; Britain sided with the 
Americans. More surprising was the resolutely European position of the 
Germans. Germany threw away its balancing act and became, if anything, 
more vehemently opposed to the Americans in Iraq than the French them-
selves. And the Bush administration’s initial reaction was also predictable: to 
heap vitriolic scorn on the French, while trying to play on America’s special 
relationship with the Germans.
The American strategy, however, got nowhere – not with the French 
who are hardened and impervious to transatlantic tempests, and not with 
the Germans, neither with the Schroeder government, nor indeed with the 
most of the CDU opposition. America’s initial policy was soon overtaken 
by what seemed a more fundamental shift: a definite American turning 
against European integration, Franco-German style. And this manoeuvre 
did reveal the great influence that the US could still exercise in European 
affairs. The US, it seemed, could count not only on the British, together 
with habitual trimmers like the Dutch, Irish, Swedes, Danes, and so on, but 
also on the Italians and Spaniards or, at least, on the Berlusconi and Aznar 
governments.
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From the Franco-German perspective, what was perhaps even more 
disheartening was the vigorous support for the US position from the EU’s 
candidate members, above all Poland, where at first even public opinion 
appeared to support the Americans. For a time, at least, it looked that the 
Franco-German vision of Europe was being revealed as, at best, a fragile 
dream sustainable only when tolerated by America. America’s unipolar vi-
sion seemed confirmed and vindicated.
By now things have evolved somewhat differently. Iraq seems less 
a quick and easy American victory than a quagmire. The war has split not 
only Europe but also America. With an election coming on in November, the 
Bush administration is under severe attack from the Democrats and there 
seems considerable unease among rank-and-file Republicans. Its critics fault 
the administration not only for having made a fundamental strategic error 
but also for having then compounded it by arrogantly rejecting the advice 
of major allies and in the process forfeiting their support.
As The Financial Times quoted Senator Kerry in mid March, ‘We are still 
bogged down in Iraq and the administration stubbornly holds to the failed 
unilateral policies that drive our allies away’. Nobody, of course, can now 
predict how the presidential campaign will unfold or what will happen in 
Iraq or in Europe, including Britain, before this year is finished. Neverthe-
less, the transatlantic conflict over Iraq suggests a great danger for us all: 
that the dreams of Europe and America will end up defeating each other 
– a fatal tragedy for the West, and for the world in general.
Views like these have not been very popular with Bush administration, 
arguably they were not very popular with its predecessor either. America’s 
obsession with its own unipolar fantasy has crowded out America’s interest 
in Europe’s own grand vision. Perhaps Iraq is now giving us an expensive 
education. In any event, with restless Muslim societies from Indonesia to 
Morocco, with the rapid rise of China, and perhaps India, with a unifying 
and increasingly independent Europe, not to mention Russia and Japan, the 
vision of a unipolar world grows more and more implausible. Possibly the 
Washington unipolar consensus has begun to crumble. With this crumbling 
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has perhaps come a certain rebirth in the US of the old idea that a strong 
Europe with a mind and will of its own is in America’s own interest.
There is, I believe and certainly want to believe, a considerable uneasi-
ness among Americans that the US has grown too powerful for its own good; 
a realisation that the Soviet collapse, which left us the unique superpower, 
is in some senses a victory too far. By favoring triumphalist rhetoric and 
a unilateral disposition, it generates its own security problem, making us 
more and more a target of dislike around the world. And perhaps worst 
of all, a victory that so concentrates military and financial power in the 
American government threatens to overwhelm our old-fashioned system 
of domestic checks and balances.
A global power, it seems, requires a global as well as a national constitu-
tion – global checks and balances, as well as national checks and balances. 
Obviously no one should lament the passing of the Soviet Union, certainly 
not in Poland, nor in Western Europe, nor indeed in Russia itself. But the 
Soviet passing does create an urgent need to rebalance the international 
system. The more powerful the United States becomes, the more a strong 
and friendly Europe, with a mind of its own, becomes essential. A friendly 
balance is needed not only to limit and refine the exercise of American power 
in the world but also to keep it within constitutional channels at home.
Any nascent American awareness of limits could, I suppose, be dismissed 
as a revival of isolationism – a sign of a naive desire to run away from re-
sponsibilities that history has imposed on the US. I myself prefer to see it 
as a rejuvenation of American constitutionalism, a tradition at least as old 
as American imperialism. A renewed respect for the restraining of power 
through multilateral practices obviously has implications for transatlantic 
relationships. It points, I should like to think, toward a different kind of 
Western alliance – one that reflects a still friendly but now genuinely bal-
anced relationship. We should not, I think, blame the present lack of such 
a balance on America’s deficient interest in it. Creating a balanced relation-
ship will finally depend heavily on Europeans themselves. Before there can 
be a genuine special relationship between Europe and America, there must 
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be a special relationship amongst Europeans. This is Europe’s own great 
challenge. It represents, you might say, the debt that Europe owes to the 
world, to America, and of course to itself. 
Pierre Hassner
[...] As usual, I agree with David Calleo, with the 
nuance that he is usually more optimistic about Europe 
and I am more pessimistic. So I will circle around the 
actual policies because, in a way, there are not so many 
policies towards Europe as Europe is no longer central to 
American policy, a distance has occurred. So I distinguish 
the objective situation and interest, the subjective views 
and attitudes and only at the end I come to the policies 
and strategies [...].
In the present situation the distance between the 
United States and Europe has increased very much. Henry 
Kissinger said that ‘ours is the last generation who feels 
sentimental about Europe’. Now the memories of World 
War II and the struggle against Communism are rapidly 
fading. The demographic changes, the Asian and Hispanic 
population, the military gap with United States shooting 
up with such a great superiority to Europe and, on the 
other hand, Europe becoming a trade and economy com-
petitor and raising fears that it can resist the United States 
in the WTO and elsewhere – these are objective situations and evolutions 
which would exist whatever the administration and which explain why, as 
David Calleo said, the United States, which almost invented European unity 
and helped it very powerfully (certainly until Kennedy), has become more 
ambiguous. Henry Kissinger again said that Kennedy administration had 
had it all wrong as it had encouraged European economic unity, allowing 
Europe to become a competitor, and had discouraged European military 
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independence, which could otherwise alleviate the burden for the United 
States. Richard Haass, one of the more moderate members of the adminis-
tration, who is now the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, said 
‘we must disaggregate the European unity by opting for bilateralism: it is 
much better to talk to different capitals than to Brussels’. This change makes 
even very moderate Americans find that Europe is too passive militarily and 
too active politically. The Americans are less attached to Europe and also 
their problems are less connected with Europe. This is not necessarily the 
case for their interests because, although there is a contradiction between 
the two plans of the old Europe and the United States, there are still many 
basic common points of interests, like terrorism or the predictable rise of 
China, the interest in a viable capitalist system; out of necessity both are 
interested in the Middle East, in oil, in Iran and in non-proliferation. On 
the other hand, there are different priorities and, as David Calleo said, 
sometimes different visions.
It brings me to the second point about views and attitudes. Here I will 
borrow from a former student and present friend and colleague, John 
Harper, who has formulated an interesting thesis about the three basic 
views of the United States on Europe: the Roosevelt’s one, the Kennan’s 
and Eisenhower’s one and the Acheson’s one. The unexpected thing is that 
John Harper finds in the Bush administration a revival of Roosevelt’s policy. 
Roosevelt was not for European unity, but rather for being a policemen for 
the continental Europe: he stressed that Germany should be supervised by 
Britain and Russia and more distantly by America, while his main idea was 
that Europe is finished and it has to be managed from the outside or from 
above. Kennan and Eisenhower thought that one has to rebuild Europe and 
then let it be a power on its own. And Acheson’s idea was that one should 
encourage European unity but only as long as it is in an Atlantic framework, 
under benevolent leadership of the United States; it should not be allowed 
to compete.
As John Harper notices, in the present administration there are very few 
people who have the Kennan’s view (which was presented here by David 
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Calleo), there are a few people who have the Acheson’s view but who are 
on the defensive, while the prevalent view is the unipolar one. And this is 
linked to the psychological thing, to the idea which has been popularised 
by a current American author Robert Kagan, that Americans are from Mars 
and Europeans are from Venus. The Europeans are weak, spoiled by not 
being threatened and by being protected by the Americans. America is in 
the real world and fights the real enemies, while the Europeans know only 
negotiation and integration. This was made worse by the conflict in Iraq, 
which revived an old American view of the simple, good-hearted Ameri-
can and the wily, cynical, sophisticated and treacherous European, which 
usually means, Frenchman. This background is expressed in the political 
divergences.
Now to the policies themselves, America is no longer for European 
integration in the sense of Europe becoming a power or an actor [...]. An 
American author, David Gompert, makes a useful distinction saying that 
Americans are for Europe’s integration as a region but they are not for 
European integration as an actor. I think that is true and that was always 
true to some extent. The idea of integration of the region is important 
here and I would think it is the Americans who have the more lucid view 
that European integration cannot stop there [...]: one cannot leave outside 
countries which are very important both for Europe and the United States, 
which are at the margins – above all Turkey where the United States wages 
a very active campaign; Ukraine where the United States is not very active, 
and does not give it much priority but still more than West Europeans; 
the Caucasus where France has a new secret weapon, which is selling our 
French diplomat of Georgian origin to the Georgian government as the 
foreign minister.
So there is a view that the great problem is what Zbigniew Brzezinski 
calls global Balkans or the arc of crisis, namely the Middle East and the 
European side of the former Soviet Union. This is an area that Europe and 
the United States should care about, and where European integration can 
be a very important and powerful tool, since this is the main tool of Europe 
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as empire, as Robert Cooper would say – a co-operative empire through 
extension.
This view clashes with the ideal of federal Europe, because the more 
Europe is extended the less it can deepen. There is a difference of visions 
between the US and Europe as to the relations with the countries on the 
threshold of Europe which are politically very important for the United 
States. There are differences, for example, on how to settle the Israeli-Pal-
estinian issue, whether to let Turkey in. So Europe still has a positive place 
in American policy but as a tool for integrating, as pacifying the extended 
periphery, whereas the Europeans don’t seem to be very active or very 
interested in that [...].
Ken Jowitt
I am going to present you with a caricaturisation, not 
characterisation, of one scenario involving the United 
States and its relationship with Europe.
Suppose that under a second Bush administration the 
United States becomes a ‘successful North Korea’.
The United States re-emphasises the centrality of an 
ABM shield and makes credible gains in its development. 
We join a long list of historical examples of countries who, 
when faced with a threat, created a barricade – the Great 
Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Berlin Wall, the Israeli 
Wall... In this case a wall along the American-Mexican 
border and a Canadian curtain. Additionally, we would 
go nuclear, i. e. energy-wise, thereby copying, God for-
bid, the French. And we prepare to militarily occupy the 
oil producing areas of Saudi Arabia, i. e. deny them the 
status of being the world’s most successful family run 
gas station. With these moves we would outdo the North 
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Korean effort at Chuche and create a neo-Aristotelian situation of near 
autarchy.
If during a second Bush administration the US ‘withdraws’ from the 
world, initially there would be enormous relief in many sectors in Europe. 
Rather than a nasty relationship between ‘Mars’ and ‘Venus’, it would be as 
if ‘Mars’ had left the galaxy and from the perspective of some Europeans 
international politics would resemble the Age of Aquarius. In response to 
America’s North Korean-like withdrawal, Europe could revel even more in 
its South Korean-like antipathy towards the US.
However, I suspect that quite quickly European euphoria would be re-
placed by confusion, given how substantial, even definitive, the American 
presence in Europe has been for sixty years. And after the confusion some 
hard choices would have to be made. Particularly, by the UK which has put 
in play the most successful foreign policy in Europe. Ridiculous some say. 
Playing ‘Tonto’ to an American ‘Lone Ranger!’ Still, UK foreign policy has 
prevented a genuine rupture between the US and the UK. A ‘bridge over trou-
bled [Atlantic] waters’ if you will. And enjoying, or at least benefiting from 
an ambivalent but effective relationship with both the US and the EU.
A Bush administration demand of the UK that it ‘choose’ either Europe or 
America would more than complicate international relations. If the choice 
were for America, those in the US fearful of a Mexican immigrant takeover 
would be delighted as would the UKIP. Still, it’s one thing no longer be-
ing an Empire but to accept the position of becoming America’s ‘Austria’ 
(particularly when Canada already holds that position) might be a bit too 
insulting to both English soccer fans and OxBridge graduates (a formidable 
political coalition).
An ‘exclusive’ choice by the UK for America and withdrawal from the EU 
would also add to American cultural and psychological isolationism. Not 
a positive development in a culture whose Achilles heel has always been 
hysteria. The French regularly suffer from malaise, the Germans from angst, 
the Japanese from the need to apologize for things they are not sorry for, 
and we Americans from hysteria: over witches, fluoride, commies, AIDS and 
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other lethal invisible contaminants. A ‘purely’ Anglo community would only 
add to the ‘contamination’ hysteria.
On the other hand, let us consider a UK choice for Europe. Would that 
improve US-EU relations? Hardly! The character of contemporary American 
military, technological, scientific and economic power allows America to be-
come a ‘Christian’ nation, that is to say, ‘in’ but not ‘of’ this world. A national 
power ‘able’ through regime change, i.e. ‘the imposition of’, not ‘the transi-
tion to’ democracy, to proselytise the world, and simultaneously sterilise 
itself from the violent weakness characteristic of third world conflicts and 
even attack by movement of rage, á la Al Qaeda. In short, an America that 
could simultaneously be national hermit and international missionary.
An America without the UK would be even more withdrawn and 
suspicious/angry at the world. It would also be an America that establishes 
close relations with a Russia understandably afraid of being a ghettoed 
nation next to a gated EU. There would in the first place be a more toler-
ant attitude on America’s part towards Russian authoritarianism and a less 
utopian demand for digital democracy in Russia. Russia would also prove 
a useful and growing counterweight to China. However, a closer Russian-
-American relationship would ‘contribute’ towards a weakening of Poland’s 
democracy and the Polish Republic’s ability to dear with Russia, the EU, 
Ukraine, Germany and the US.
Insofar, as Poland is the most important addition to the democratic world 
since World War II, that, to me, is an unacceptable development.
And what of the French-German relationship. I doubt the French want the 
UK fully in. The reason is simple, the number of political coalitions dealing 
with a growing variety of issues will grow. The current clarity, manageability, 
and thus far non-biodegradability of the Franco-German will dissolve.
The Germans would probably welcome a Britain closer to Europe if only 
because it would provide them with more leverage in relation to both the 
French and Americans.
But what if Kerry wins? Won’t all these problems disappear in the face of 
a French speaking president with a Mozambican, South African, American 
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wife. Won’t a shift from Toby Keith [see American country music] to Edith 
Piaf [no reference needed for this audience]; from parochial Crawford to 
cosmopolitan California, where movie stars are the ‘real American’ end all 
problems – if not history? No.
First, the obvious. Movements of rage, á la Al Qaeda will persist. Disin-
tegrating states will still define the international landscape. Nuclear prolif-
eration will proceed. America’s indiscriminate support of Israel will have to 
be addressed, and so will Iran’s development of nuclear weapons – perhaps 
on Israel’s own initiative and then what? The UN is pathetically ineffectual. 
And while the Bush Doctrine is fatally flawed by its eschatological belief in 
global democracy, its analysis of novel dangers in the world is spot on (a 
phrase I have always wanted to use).
Second, and perhaps less obvious. If the Bush administration is a ship 
with a dogmatically stuck rudder, then a Kerry administration will be rud-
derless. I don’t consider that an improvement. To substitute a President 
with blurred vision for one with tunnel vision is again not something to 
celebrate about.
As for Europe, it is essential that the EU develop a practical ideo-
logical sense of what it is. Specifically, a practical ideology of social 
democracy to complement America’s capitalist democracy. The EU has 
successfully avoided the ‘I’ (ideology) word, and has developed since 
World War II in good measure due to that fact. But today in radically 
changed circumstances, a categorical division of labour between a Don 
Quijote America and a Sancho Panza Europe acts to the detriment of 
both. Europe must become a ‘Protestant’ complement to a triumphalist 
‘Roman Catholic’ America, a ‘Democratic party’ competing with an 
American ‘Republican’ one.
In fact without the development of a new democratic ideology in Eu-
rope, space is created for the development of nativist mentalities and new 
malignant anti-democratic ideologies.
Europe doesn’t need military power equivalent to the US; it needs 
a level of political and ideological coherence that its previous success based 
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on avoidance of such makes all the more difficult to arrive at or even ap-
preciate.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
It is a particular pleasure to be here this week, imme-
diately after May 1. It’s also an odd and even sad experi-
ence. I’m half Belgian. I grew up moving back and forth 
between the United States and Brussels countless times. 
Yet never in coming to Europe have I felt ashamed when 
I showed my passport at the airport. I do now. I wonder if 
historians will look back and mark last week as the week 
in which Europe extended from fifteen to twenty-five, 
and in so doing, demonstrated that it was not simply 
a Western European experiment or a Western European 
response to World War II, but rather a model for global 
governance for a new century in the same week that the 
utter bankruptcy of the US policy in Iraq was demon-
strated. It is a telling coincidence and I say that about the 
US policy in Iraq regardless of what happens on June 30. 
Because regardless of what happens in Iraq in terms of 
the future of the Iraqi people, U.S. interests have clearly 
been harmed. The conflict has clearly made our security 
much, much worse. We will now have to spend much 
more time repairing the damage we have done to ourselves in Iraq than we 
would have even in the situation we were in right before we went.
When we talk about United States policy in Europe, I start from the 
proposition that, although an expanded Europe is no panacea – we are not 
going to see a gloriously integrated twenty-five countries anytime soon 
– it will be a turning point for the United States. For the United States, 
anti-Americanism is going to become itself a threat that the United States 
has to face at a time when Europe offers a much more attractive model. 
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Let me offer three reasons why I think the widening of Europe, the expan-
sion from fifteen to twenty-five, will in fact make the United States have 
to focus much more on Europe, have to take the EU much more seriously 
than it does now.
I absolutely agree with much of what David Calleo said. [...] Above all, 
I think it is very important to realise that most educated Americans (who 
would fill a conference hall like this one), who know something about 
foreign policy, are incredibly ignorant with respect to the EU. Not with 
respect to Europe – they speak European languages, many of them have 
European ties, many of them have spent a lot of time in different parts of 
Europe – but they know almost nothing about the EU as an entity. If you 
ask them how it is governed, how it makes decisions, how the EU defines 
itself, as opposed to the images that Americans project onto it, it is quite 
astonishing how little they know. I remember talking about the enlargement 
of NATO, not so long ago, sitting at the Council on Foreign Relations and 
hearing a quite noteworthy foreign policy expert in the United States say, 
‘Oh, NATO shouldn’t enlarge, the EU should just take all those countries’, 
as if it could be done tomorrow, as if it was something that the EU could 
simply decide, with again no appreciation of what it meant economically 
or what the governance policies were.
However, now that the EU has widened, the United States will look to 
Europe and see in the first instance a number of friends that it is going to 
increasingly need. Let’s hope they remain friends. For all the clumsiness 
of Rumsfeld’s comment on the old Europe and the new Europe, there was 
something there in the sense of attitude towards the United States. Without 
question we saw that over Iraq, but it wasn’t just over Iraq. You can see it in 
virtually any meeting of Europeans – East, West or Central. Obviously the 
image of the United States was a different one during the Cold War and 
while the Western Europeans and the Americans were certainly close allies, 
they had the luxury of fighting with one another routinely over just about 
everything except the need to stay together as long as the Soviet Union 
remains the principle threat.
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Now the United States looks at Europe, sees a tremendous amount of 
anti-Americanism in Western Europe and will look increasingly to Central 
and Eastern Europe to find countries that are at least willing to engage (I’m 
leaving out Britain). I think it will become increasingly important to find 
countries willing to support US policy, as indeed it has already happened 
in Iraq. The axis of evil, and the policies associated with it, have made anti-
Americanism an axis of enmity. The United States is thus going to spend 
a great deal of its time trying to address anti-Americanism, not only in 
Islamic world, but elsewhere. And there again Eastern and Central Europe 
will become increasingly important.
The second reason that the expansion of the EU will raise the salience 
of the EU in American politics is not a reason of geopolitics but of good 
old-fashioned American domestic politics. I started my academic career in 
Chicago. It will not come as a big surprise in Warsaw that there is a large 
part of Chicago in which there is almost no English, either spoken or on the 
street signs. There is a large Polish community – something true for many 
cities across the mid-west – and it is not just limited to Poland. And we have 
seen this before, we saw this with NATO expansion, where part of the US 
willingness to expand NATO was driven by very strong domestic interest 
groups. These were interest groups, of course, that had a strong base during 
the Cold War and that now will see the EU differently because their families, 
their ethnic ties are now to countries that are also members of the EU. So 
I predict that American domestic politics will increase the impact of the EU 
with the addition of the Central European countries.
The third reason that the expansion of the EU will raise the importance 
of the EU is because having moved from 15 to 25, the EU becomes an entity 
that is very hard, even with wilful ignorance, for Americans to say: ‘Oh this 
is going to be an entity like us.’ With 25 countries, and the prospect of 30 
countries, this is a new entity, it is a new form of regional governance, 
and, as I said, a model for global governance. The United States typically 
has looked at Western Europe and the EU and said, ‘Oh yes, it is going to 
become a United States of Europe’. And many people who know a lot about 
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the EU have said ‘No, it is not going to be a United States of Europe; it is 
going to be something different; it is going to be a European version of an 
integrated entity.’ It is going to be one which retains the autonomy of nation 
states far, far more than the original states of the United States.
The debate was always this: ‘Oh yes, the states of the United States were 
much more autonomous before the civil war, it took two hundred years, 
Europe too will head that way.’ I have no doubt that Europe will become 
more integrated but I would stake my own academic reputation on the 
proposition that however it develops it is not going to look like the United 
States, it is not going to become a federal system (federal in United States 
sense of that). Once you look at twenty five states and the prospect of ad-
ditional states including possibly Turkey, the United States has to realise that 
this is big enough and powerful enough for us to take note. And I strongly 
agree with David Calleo’s economic analysis: most of the economists I know 
don’t talk about ‘if the dollar is going to crash’ but ‘when the dollar is going 
to crash’. And I mean really crash.
But at this point what you see is that the EU has a different model not 
only of how to organise itself, but also of how to stabilise and democratise 
other countries, thereby creating a greater zone of both security and pros-
perity. And it is a model that frankly has done more in the 1990s to enhance 
the security of the entire West, and I use this in the broadest sense, than 
anything the United States has managed to do. Even if we manage to get 
out of Iraq with a reasonably stable rights-regarding government, what 
are we going to do with respect to other Middle Eastern countries in the 
coming decades? I am fairly certain that the US will not be sending in its 
troops. What the US will do is urge the EU to take in Turkey. Why? Because 
they are going to say ‘we desperately need to stabilise Islamic democracy 
and the best way to do that is for you to embrace Turkey as a role model 
for other Islamic countries’. And beyond Turkey, the United States will be 
saying, what about some partnership status with Iran, with Syria, with 
countries that will start to be on the periphery of the EU? Those countries 
are not likely to enter the EU any more than Russia will, and even some of 
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the other countries that are now between the EU and Russia, but they will 
undoubtedly be assimilated into some kind of relationship with the EU 
that looks like NATO’s partnership for peace program. That will once again 
be a political approach to trying to address security problems, economic 
problems, immigration problems.
Here I have to credit my husband, Andrew Moravcsik, professor of politics 
at Harvard, and now at Princeton. He has written extensively on European, 
and by that he means the EU’s, civilian power. What the EU stands for, to 
respond to Ken Jowitt’s point, is in large part the power of civilian power, 
of economic incentives, but more than just economic incentives – the power 
of having a club that other countries want to join, having an entire set of 
political carrots that you can use as inducements to strengthen particular 
domestic political developments in other countries. In other words, saying ‘if 
you want to be in the EU or even if you want to be in a partnership relation-
ship with the EU, you must meet the following standards’. I submit that this 
civilian power is certainly as important if not more important than military 
power, in actually creating beneficial conditions in other countries.
But finally, I think the EU also has developed. I realise that this sounds 
very utopian; I am well aware of many of the EU’s problems. Nevertheless, 
the EU has developed a model of governance that is going to be the model 
for a new generation of global institutions. It is the model of networked 
governance. If you think about how the EU works, there are obviously some 
quite powerful supra-national institutions, although, as my husband likes 
to point out, the entire size of the bureaucracy in Brussels, by the standards 
of the US federal government, is nothing. It’s a very small supra-national 
entity. You have the Commission and the Court – both are obviously impor-
tant. But most of the work in the EU is done through networks of national 
officials, the Council of Ministers, all the different ministers in all the dif-
ferent areas, networks of national judges, and increasingly networks of 
national parliamentarians. These networks are important in part because 
they allow nations to maintain a good measure of national independence 
and autonomy while participating in some larger structure. But they are 
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also critical because they allow us to penetrate below the surface of the 
traditional sovereign state when we are trying to implement the traditional 
goals of foreign policy. What do I mean? If you are trying to face any of the 
threats we face, whether they are economic, environmental or security, 
you cannot do it through traditional diplomacy where a country commits 
to do something, passes a treaty and then supposedly implements it. You 
have to actually operate at the level of the government officials who are in 
charge of a particular area. So if you are talking about regulating the global 
economy, you need to be talking to the finance ministers, and if you are 
talking about terrorism, you need to be talking, not only to the financial 
regulators, but to the entire criminal justice apparatus, the border officials, 
and ultimately, of course, in some cases, the military.
What the EU has is a structure that involves networks of all those offi-
cials. It socialises new members, so when as here with new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe, a large part of joining the EU will be essentially 
integrating government officials from all the new countries into these EU 
networks. These networks support these officials, allow them to exchange 
information, and foster the implementation of a general policy at the level 
of the officials that actually have power. Ironically, that is a model that the 
US likes globally: the US pushes for global networks of competition officials 
and environmental officials. But the US has been very slow to realise that 
the place that has really pioneered this approach to governance is the EU.
So in closing, I want to come back to where I started, that we face 
a historic moment. If President Bush is re-elected I think much of what Ken 
Jowitt said could well come to pass. This would make Europe even that 
much more attractive in the rest of the world. But I think what we see is 
a period in which the bankruptcy of a unipolar, hegemonic policy has be-
come clear and a moment when the EU has demonstrated for all its faults 
that it is actually pioneering, not only economic integration, but also modes 
of political governance.
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Adrian Pop (University of Bucarest)
I would like to draw your attention a little bit further East and to touch 
upon a subject which I think is relevant both for the geopolitics of the EU 
enlargement and for the concept of near abroad referred to by David Calleo. 
In April 2003 the EU launched a new initiative, which is called ‘Wider Europe. 
New Neighbourhood Initiative’. Out of the fourteen nations covered by this 
concept, only two will have a direct border with the future EU enlarged after 
2007, with Romania and Bulgaria in. And amongst the two countries which 
are going to have the direct border with the enlarged Europe, Ukraine and 
Moldova, only Moldova has an unsolved conflict on its territory, which is the 
frozen conflict of Transdnistria. Apparently EU has realised the importance 
of having an unsolved conflict in its backyard and it is more committed than 
in the past to be involved in the process of the resolution of this conflict. 
This is obvious for different reasons, I will only recall the alluding to send-
ing peace-keeping troops there by the former Dutch Foreign Minister, who 
used to be the former OSCE chairman and now is NATO Secretary General 
[...]. Now it is not so clear if the US is also interested in being as involved as 
in the past in this conflict. Some would say that the US is not interested in 
jeopardising a new co-operative relation with Russia after September 11 
for a distant territory which is not among its priorities.
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I would like to ask the panel about the following possible scenario. The 
democratic opposition in the Republic of Moldova and the civil society 
have repeatedly asked the international community to get involved in the 
mechanism of conflict resolution and they specifically asked for the EU, 
US and Romania to become members of this mechanism. Do you think 
a co-operative relationship is possible between US and EU [...] on putting 
an end to the Transdnistria issue?
Robert Cooper
David Calleo spoke of Europe wanting a plural world and then Ken Jowitt 
said that Europe needed an ideology. I think I have a slightly different view. 
It seems to me that there is a kind of ideology in Europe, at least about in-
ternational relations, and at the heart of that is the idea that Europe would 
like to see the world governed by law, and that is visible in its enthusiastic 
espousal of things to the International Criminal Court, it is visible in they way 
it organises its relations with other countries, in terms of legal instruments 
and contractual agreements. And it is after all what Europe itself is: Europe 
is a community of law and it is not unnatural that it should wish to create 
a world of law in which it will feel comfortable. And I don’t think that it is 
an unattractive vision of the world, but it is very different from the vision of 
a world of power, which, at least some, in the US seem to favour.
Timothy Garton Ash
I have an appeal and a question. The appeal is: can we please stop talk-
ing about old and new Europe. I mean it is bad enough that we spent more 
than a year characterising European-American relations on the basis of an 
amusing but fairly simplistic caricature by Robert Kagan. But it is a whole 
lot worse that Europeans are talking about their own differences in terms 
invented by that great intellectual Donald Rumsfeld in a crude, off the cuff, 
instrumental remark at a press conference. And I stress instrumental. And 
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now for more than a year Europeans have been going around at a thousand 
conferences clacking about old and new Europe as if Donald Rumsfeld was 
some Michelet or Lelevel, some great authority on European history. All 
our countries are a mixture of old and new, you only have to look out of 
the window to see that here.
The crudeness of this distinction should have been apparent to us at the 
latest at the moment of the last Spanish elections, when with the election 
of Zapatero suddenly Spain from being new Europe becomes old Europe, 
which is absurd. There is a great argument about America dividing Europe. 
Simply put, it is an argument between Euro-Gaullists and Euro-Atlanticists. 
This is an argument that goes within countries as much as between coun-
tries. There is no solid block of Euro-Atlanticist countries, nor a solid block 
of Euro-Gaullist countries. Of course there are more Euro-Atlanticists in 
Poland and Britain but in Britain too we have Euro-Gaullist, believe it or 
not, and there are even Euro-Atlanticists in Paris. I think one may be sitting 
on the panel.
And if we want to talk, and we should be talking, seriously about Eu-
rope’s argument about America, let’s abandon this absurd cross notion 
of old and new Europe and let’s start talking about the real argument 
between Euro-Atlanticists and Euro-Gaullists. My question is a question of 
information to the panel. We know that America is much less interested in 
Europe than it was during the Cold War, we agree on that. We know that 
most of the American elites are increasingly ambivalent, to say the least, 
about further steps of European integration, as David Calleo said. But there 
is also something more pro-active of which Rumsfeld’s remark about old 
and new Europe was actually an example, namely, an active policy of divide 
and rule. What Richard Haass rather politely calls disaggregation or even 
more politely multilateralism a’ la carte, an elegant formulation, what oth-
ers call more crudely ‘cherry-picking’, is actually among some, certainly in 
the Bush administration, a conscious policy. The Wall Street Journal Europe 
had a leader who said that if France goes on behaving as it is, the time 
will come when we should regard the Atlantic alliance itself as a coalition 
O przyszłości Europy
91New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe90
of the willing. And in this Poland, by the way, plays a very important part. 
My question to you is, how widespread that active, conscious tendency of 
divide et impera is. Do you think it is confined to a few neo-conservatist and 
people within the Bush administration or is it a much wider view within 
American foreign policy elite, possibly, extending even into a new demo-
cratic administration?
Heather Grabbe
I wanted to try and link this panel and the one we had this morning 
in which there was so much discussion about Russia. Because – although 
I agree very much with Timothy Garton Ash that old versus new Europe is 
a distinction that perhaps should have got a few days, perhaps a couple 
of weeks of comment and it has not really justified a whole year’s worth 
– nevertheless, one area where it is clear that the new members of the EU 
will have rather different views from the old members is on the question 
of Russia. At the moment we see the big countries in the EU – Paris, Berlin, 
London and Rome – vying with one another to offer Russia favours and 
undermining EU foreign policy in many respects. In Central and Eastern 
Europe there is much more of the attitude of ‘get tough, let’s put more 
conditions on Russia, let’s make sure Russia is contained’. I would be very 
interested in the panel’s view, given that you have been talking so much 
about US attitudes, how is the US going to view in the future the tension 
between Russia’s resurgent interest in what it sees as its natural sphere of 
influence and the European Union’s concern about what it sees as its near 
abroad, its neighbourhood. We are already starting to see some tension, 
certainly not conflict yet, about issues like that Adrian Pop raised, ques-
tion of Transdnistria, Moldova, also the question of Georgia and whether 
or not Russian troops should withdraw, as well as other frozen conflicts in 
this region. Now what is the US attitude going to be? We have seen some 
hints of a change in the Bush administration’s view of Vladimir Putin as an 
individual, but what will be the reaction of the US in the longer term? Will 
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it be encouraging the EU to accept Georgia, for example, as an EU member, 
perhaps to accept all of the Caucasus as a means of stabilising them and how 
will that square with US policy on Russia and what it regards as its sphere 
of influence? This seems to me a very important question for Central and 
Eastern Europeans, who have so often felt themselves to be caught between 
big powers. It is not something that worries the old members of the EU 
very much. But it is something which is absolutely central to the EU’s future 
relationships with Russia.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Let me start with Robert Cooper’s question. I have been very hard on 
the United States and as I said, I think we are at an extraordinary low point 
for the United States. I want to begin by clarifying something and then 
I will turn to this question of law versus power. I said I was ashamed to 
show my passport not because of what has happened in Iraq. I actually 
think no country has completely virtuous armed forces or police authori-
ties. We all have our problems in this regard. Certainly we have had them 
in the United States in our cities. We have no monopoly on virtue but 
neither has any other country. What makes me ashamed is the response, 
is the failure to acknowledge how devastating this is, the failure to have 
any action instantly in terms of a government response, particularly with 
high-level resignations and a public willingness to admit that we could 
actually be wrong. So I just wanted to clarify that I am not ashamed of my 
country, but that I am very ashamed of my government at the moment. 
But having said that, I don’t think it is right to say Europe stands for law 
and the United States stands for power because a large part of the mess 
that we got ourselves into over Iraq, and when I say ‘we’ I mean both 
sides of the American political scene, was born of the experience of the 
1990s when many Americans (not on the right, not the neo-conservata-
tives but many liberals from the Clinton administration) had lived through 
a series of devastating internal conflicts in which the solution was more force 
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not less, applied sooner not later. From their perspective, the Europeans 
simply would not do what was necessary. The experience of the people on 
the ground in Bosnia in the Clinton administration was one that left them 
despairing of the rhetoric of the rule of law in the European Union and the 
unwillingness to recognise that there is evil in the world and sometimes 
you do need to use force.
That is why when Bush started his campaign to invade Iraq it divided 
the American left, because most people were very opposed to the way he 
was purporting to do it but many people thought, well if you can do this 
multilaterally, maybe indeed if Saddam Hussein does have weapons of 
mass destruction, we also know that he is a hideous tyrant, and this may 
be a case where we do in fact need to use force. I think those of us who 
may have thought that have at least been reinforced in our point that if 
you were going to use force you had to use it multilaterally and maybe it 
would have been better not to use it at all. But my overriding point is that 
in the end you need both. You do need a community of law and you do 
need international institutions. These institutions must have impact, but 
they are not ever going to be enough without real power behind them. Law 
and power must work together.
So let me turn just briefly to Timothy Garton Ash’s point; I stand chas-
tened and corrected on the old and new Europe. And I welcome the correc-
tion about Euro-Gaullists and Euro-Atlanticists. I think that is a far better way 
to talk about it but I am going to just reformulate my point in those terms. 
I think the addition of the ten new members, many of whom are probably 
more reflexively Euro-Atlanticist, is going to be valuable for the United 
States. The consequences of the Euro-Gaullist versus Euro-Atlanticist debate 
within the EU is going to be much greater for the US as the US formulates 
its economic and the security policy, regardless who is elected.
Quickly on how conscious is it a ‘divide and conquer’ policy. I think that 
is a very important point. Right now I would say it is limited to neo-conserva-
tives. But I think Europe has a lot to say about whether it continues. If Europe 
is seen increasingly in the United States as anti-American, it will become 
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increasingly legitimate to argue against increased European integration. 
So I think there is a danger there.
Finally I just want to conclude on a more positive note. I do not think of 
the world in poles. I think effectively what we are starting to look at is, as 
I said, networks of different government officials – financial officials of all 
kinds, economic officials, judges, and national leaders. Maybe David Calleo 
is right that we need the EU as a constitutional check on the US. But if that 
were to work I can very much see a world in which the US and the EU of 
course have very strong common interests, not only economic interests but 
also security interests and ultimately the interest in spreading the values 
that are our – meaning from the EU to California and beyond – our common 
heritage. I think there is a way to promote that worldwide. I simply suggest 
that the form of co-operation in other regions of the world is more likely to 
resemble the organisation of the EU than it is any notion of a federal state. 
If you would like to hear more, I have just published a new book called 
‘A New World Order’ that makes all these points.
Ken Jowitt
Indeed, law can play a central ideological role. The problem is you don’t 
get effective law without power. Canon law was backed up by, based on, 
a quite powerful Catholic Church. Similarly, Roman law rested on a powerful 
French state. And then of course there is the more recent example of law 
combined with power in the role of the Supreme Court in the US election 
of 2000.
Next, the issue of America’s attempt to invidiously distinguish between 
new and old Europe in an imperial effort to divide and conquer. There are 
those in and around the Bush administration who do NOT want to divide 
and conquer. Divide and conquer is too complicated and suspect. Theirs 
is an ‘either-or’ attitude towards everything. It is a bit like reading Stalin. 
Either you are for Paris or you are for Washington. Either you are for Israel 
or you are for the Palestinians. For them – the Wolfowitzes and Perles, 
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Ledeens and many others, the world is Manichean. It is the US, the UK and 
Israel. and then the rest. It is as if you were reading a lecture by Zhdanov 
in 1948. This attitude is radical in the extreme. I am conservative, I find 
nothing conservative about this group. They are happier with Paine than 
Burke. Their idea of America forming alliances with some members of the 
EU against other members both new and old is desirable. The issue is not 
whether America lines up with or favours some EU members on some issues 
against other EU members. Nor is the issue whether or not there is a regular 
tendency to favor some over others – that is called partisanship and makes 
for democracy. The issue is whether these are shifting alliances within the 
Western community and favor toleration or mutually exclusive antagonistic 
alliances that favor European fragmentation with American help.
Should the US get involved in the Transdinistria issue? No. Since the 
end of the Cold War, Germany has reunited on Western terms, the EU and 
NATO have moved to the Russian border. The US has a base in Uzbekistan, 
and expressed a ‘democratic’ interest in Georgia. Kennan once observed it 
is right/incumbent to defeat an enemy, but gratuitous to insult one, even 
a former one, if as in the case of Russia it has the potential to become great 
again. So given the fact that Transdinistria is not of any strategic value 
I would leave it alone.
Pierre Hassner
I think I disagree with Ken Jowitt on Transdnistria but after all I am 
a Romanian by origin so anything which eats away the Russian empire is 
good for me and I think that in Georgia it is good that it is an improvement. 
And in fact, in Haiti too. It’s one of the few parts in the world where France 
and the United States are co-operating for the good.
To Robert Cooper’s point and I agree with what Anne Marie Slaughter 
said. But there is, it seems to me, an ambiguity in the European stand which 
is expressed when Dominique de Villepin says we want a more unipolar 
world and we want a more multilateral world. It’s not the same. After all the 
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League of Nations was made against the policies of the balance of power, 
of the three against five. It’s not obvious what the Europeans want. Kagan, 
in his post scriptum to his article, which I think is an improvement, says it is 
not so much the Europeans who want the law, I don’t think the French are 
converted to the Security Council on which they were pouring scorn but 
they don’t like the United States deciding without consulting the Europeans 
because they would like Europe to be part of the constellation more or less 
equal with the United States. Others really want to eliminate power out of 
international relations. There was always this ambiguity among Europeans: 
do you want Europe to become a great power or do you want to eliminate 
great power calculations and make the world peace through world law which 
was more of an American idea in fact.? So there is this ambiguity and it is well 
founded because, it seems to me, you will have the inequalities of power. 
The idea of multipolarity depends on what you call that. In a way the world 
is multipolar. Fidel Castro is a pole, Ben Laden is a pole and George Soros. 
There are all sorts of centres of power and of resistance but if one means 
to have a constellation of five or seven great powers which would be more 
or less equivalent in power and more or less equidistant – no, the United 
States is obviously much stronger than the others and there are some ties, 
whether economic or ideological with them, and, as has been said, there are 
many other actors and ties in the economy than those between the states. 
So it is a complex world but where it remains true that it is not healthy to 
have one hegemonic power which doesn’t admit any kind of reciprocity, 
which is ultra-sovereignist for itself and ultra interventionist for others. 
International relations are made of the compromise between inequality 
and reciprocity and both are imperfect, there will be stronger and weaker. 
But if the strong don’t admit some kind of legitimacy which goes beyond 
their own, beyond the American constitution and electorate, then you can’t 
have any order. The Europeans are, I think, divided in the priority they give 
to the balance of power factor or to the rule of law factor.
As for Tim, yes – I completely agree, I was using ‘old and new’ ironically 
at the beginning. It remains true, especially in connection with Russia that 
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the East-Central Europeans and the Balkans have a special sensitivity, well 
founded, on Russia and on the danger which can always be recurrent and the 
behaviour towards the small states, especially those from the former union 
being very arrogant. And that’s why they want a counter from the West.
The interesting thing, and I link it with Heather’s question, is that the 
difference is above all between the so called new Europeans, the East Cen-
tral ones and the Westerners because we [the Westerners] have all been 
competing for Putin’s favours: Bush in the name of the struggle with ter-
rorism, abandoning the Chechens; Chirac saying that Russia is progressing 
courageously towards democracy just at the time when it is becoming more 
autocratic every day. But I must say that recently the Americans seem less 
intent of not displeasing the Russians as shown with these policies which are 
a mixture of balance of power thinking and of using the terrorist thing and 
all that to be present in Central Asia. On Georgia, as I was saying, there was 
an agreement between France and United States to support the Georgians. 
I am on the side of the West, so if a country becomes more Western I will 
not shed tears upon Russia, although I know one must reach an arrange-
ment with it. But one must also show Russia that it cannot have any type 
of behaviour it wants against its smaller neighbours.
David P. Calleo
I will focus on a group of related points: Robert Cooper noted that Europe 
does have its own global ideology, which provides it with strong views on 
how the world system should be organized. Anne Marie Slaughter, I believe, 
said Europe itself is a model for how the international system should be 
structured and governed. What kind of model? It is multilateral but is it ‘bal-
anced’ in the old fashioned sense of having a ‘balance of power’? And does 
that make it susceptible to the old-fashioned policy of ‘divide and conquer’, 
Timothy Garton Ash’s point? Pierre Hassner distinguished between a con-
tentious balance of power system and a co-operative multilateral system – 
a perfectly sensible point and everybody knows what he means. But, in my 
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view, the issue needs to be qualified further. Every healthy constitutional 
system, national or international, combines the two. It requires not only 
multilateral institutions that guide the interactions of competing elements, 
but also an underlying balance of power that prevents any one element 
or combination from regularly dominating the constitutional machinery. 
Thus, in a proper liberal and democratic system, loyalty to the constitution 
is maintained because the dice do not seem permanently loaded against 
one group or another. An underlying balance compels respect for the rules 
of the game. In other words, I don’t think multilateralism can persist unless 
underlying it is a certain balance of power. I don’t mean by this a caricature of 
the balance of power, as in some 18th century system where everyone wakes 
up in the morning and calculates who’s got what overnight and decides 
whether or not to go to war in the afternoon. By the balance of power I mean 
a system, domestic or international, where there is a sufficient balance of 
force, whatever form that force may take – electoral or military, so that no 
one is inclined to behave too badly, because the penalties for behaving badly 
are evident and quickly invoked. I think that’s what Samuel T. Coleridge, 
that great student of the British Constitution once described as ‘potential 
power’. Coleridge argued that you cannot really have liberty and stability 
in a constitutional system without a certain underlying balance, capable 
of being summoned effectively in defense of balance itself. In that sense 
balance of power and multilateralism are not incompatible, but really are 
complementary. It helps, of course, if politics is not regarded as a zero-sum 
game, where every gain for one is automatically regarded as a loss for the 
others. This is not, of course, how the EU has worked in the past. Its now 
long history suggests a more hopeful view of interstate relations.
Timothy Garton Ash distinguished between Euro-Atlanticists and Euro-
Gaullists. Again, everybody knows this division. But while we are at it, we 
should also note that de Gaulle himself always favored a close connection 
between Europe and the United States. He differed with Churchill because 
he thought Europe would not have a serious voice in American policy un-
less there were, first, a special relation among Europeans. Otherwise, the 
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tremendous imbalance of power would make close ties with America diasad-
vantageous and uncomfortable for Europeans. Of course, many Europeans 
besides the British believe themselves to have their own national ‘special 
relations’ with the US and are thereby inclined to play their own hands at 
the expense of European solidarity.
Poles, for example, are good at this. But having observed these special 
relationships from the other end, so to speak, I suspect Europe’s interests, 
and indeed America’s, are better served by de Gaulle’s position. This leads 
me to suspect that the real differences between the Euro-Atlanticist and 
Euro-Gaullist positions are probably not as great as it might seem. To have 
an effective and durable Euro-Atlanticism probably does require a major 
strengthening of European solidarity. In that sense I think de Gaulle was 
and is right and Churchill was and is wrong. Another question raised: Do 
we try to divide and rule? Yes, of course. You cannot expect Americans to 
respect European unity if Europeans themselves do not respect it.
Finally Iraq. Pierre Hassner talked about Kagan’s idea – the American 
view – that Europeans come in after the meal to do the dishes. For obvious 
reasons, Europeans are not terribly interested. But it is not easy to imagine 
any scenario where conditions in Iraq do not get worse. In Washinton, sim-
ply getting out is gradually growing acceptable as the alternate strategy. It 
obviously has great appeal. But can we? Vietnam is perhaps a misleading 
parallel. There, a serious government did exist in the north – not very nice 
perhaps, but serious. We were not leaving the country in chaos. There is 
no such regime in Iraq. We will leave behind a civil war that seems likely to 
engage Iraq’s major neighbours – a real catastrophe, not just for the United 
States but even more for Europe. This asymmetrical vulnerability may be 
the basis for a transatlantic bargain of mutual interest. It will require an 
American government intelligent and skillful enough to manage it – obvi-
ously nothing to be taken for granted. To pull it off we would have to go to 
Europe, Russia and China, and to try to create some kind of international 
authority, presumably using the Security Council, to bless an international 
occupation for a sufficient time to give some chance for stability. Everybody 
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would have to contribute forces and the deal would have to include a serious 
settlement for the Palestine question. This sounds utopian and no doubt it 
is. But given the difficulty of our either staying or leaving, there may not be 
another solution that is not a tragedy whose consequences may well engulf 
Europe. Whatever happens in the election, we will still be in a mess, and 
the same real options may well remain.
To close: These challenges are coming on rather thick and fast. Mean-
while Europe has a lot to do, to deal with its own affairs. But the rest of the 
world does not wait. And Europe has got into some bad procrastinating 
habits during the Cold War, when nothing fundamental changed and Eu-
rope began to look upon its problems and choices with a certain leisurely 
complacency. Common defense and diplomacy, but not just now. That frame 
of mind may be growing increasingly dysfunctional. Old issues are now 
perhaps more pressing than Europeans are accustomed to think.
Christoph Bertram
I have two points, one concerning the issue of ideology which I thought 
deserves some more thinking from us Europeans. Not so much in terms of 
being different from the United States but in terms of uniting all those that 
are going to live in Europe. We are going to have, perhaps not in Poland, 
but in rest of the Union, a growing Muslim population. What kind of values 
do we have that we call European which are capable of bringing in people 
from other parts of the world into a sense of being a citizen of the society 
we are creating? I think that is where a certain degree of ideology has to 
come in.
My second point and question to the panel is on what David Calleo has 
referred to already and I very much agree with him on the need to try and 
get ready for the possibility that disaster looms in Iraq. We Europeans may 
have to think of doing something about it. And unfortunately we are very 
far away from that. The question is this: in all the presentations we have 
had from the panel there was a view of the United States that is basically 
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going to be what it is now, in the future. How would the panel think that 
the experience of failure, if not defeat, in this grandiose, neo-conservative 
strategy will affect the United States and American policy in the future? 
Will it mean that there is going to be an increasing finger pointing at the 
Europeans ‘you weren’t there when we were in trouble’ and the Europeans 
saying ‘you have got us into the mess’? Are we going to enter a whole dif-
ferent kind of Atlantic relationship, are we going to have an America, which 
says perhaps one of the problems that the neo-cons didn’t see was precisely 
that they didn’t have a view of the real world, so we have to get back to 
the real world. Is there going to be some kind of post-Vietnam syndrome 
of withdrawal? I think this is a question which will be rather important to 
address ourselves to. America has after all this extraordinary ability of self-
correction, sometimes faster than Europeans fathom.
Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)
My question refers to Ken Jowitt’s prediction that during Bush’s second 
term there will be a new alliance or a new coming closer between US and 
Russia. Is it because the Eastern barrier, or the new Europe, failed to bal-
ance the old Europe, as we have seen in Spain when they decided to leave 
the new Europe arrangement? Or is it because the US wants to balance? 
Another question, is Russia enough to balance both Europe and China at 
the same time?
Krzysztof Iszkowski (Krytyka Polityczna quarterly)
Anne-Marie Slaughter said it would be beneficial for the United States 
that Turkey joins the European Union and that the United States would 
press for it. My question is: would it be beneficial for the European Union 
to admit Turkey as a Member State? And because I expect to get an answer, 
‘yes it would be beneficial because more stability in Turkey means more 
stability and more safety for Europe’, I would also ask another question, if 
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it was not so that while accepting Poland and Slovakia and Hungary, Europe 
is pushing Ukraine away because those countries are more interested and 
involved in inter-European politics than in good relationships with Ukraine. 
Wouldn’t the same happen in the Middle East where Turkey would be more 
engaged in Europe, and taking care less of its neighbours that need to be 
taken care of, namely Iraq and Syria?
Aleksander Smolar
Ken Jowitt raised a fundamental issue when he mentioned that this pe-
riod is shapeless, nameless. You can say that this is an intellectual problem 
but the real problem is how to manage the world order and what could be 
the dangers of the Iraqi war and of the possible US defeat or withdrawal, 
with Europe behaving as it is? What is the real global danger? To say that 
US should be punished certainly is not enough. This is Schadenfreude which 
intellectually can be satisfying but politically is extremely dangerous.
Pierre Hassner
I just think aloud because, of course, I don’t have the answer to Christoph 
Bertram’s question and it is linked also with Timothy Garton Ash’s remark 
on the policy of dividing Europe. Personally I have always stressed, perhaps 
excessively, that there are two Americas, Bush is not America. If you take the 
period 1999/2000, ideology in America seemed to be political correctness, 
compassion and repentance, you couldn’t be in the CIA if you had a criminal 
record, etc. The Europeans were making fun of American legalism and of 
American masochism as against the old wisdom of diplomatic, military 
thinking. Now it is completely different, there is a revolution in America 
itself and September 11 gave a great advantage to that other America. But 
is it permanent? I don’t know, Bush seemed to me discredited by the Iraq 
war but his polls have grown. There seems to be for the time being a ral-
lying around the president based on the idea that at least he knows what 
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he wants. I still would expect that at one point things reverse themselves 
and there is a Vietnam syndrome which was replaced by the September 11 
one, but where it goes from there is a question. Whether it is withdrawal 
or resentment, everybody blaming everybody else, as my pessimistic view 
would tend to be; or whether everybody is converted to balance, I really 
don’t know.
This is also the answer about attempting to divide the West. I am very 
afraid of the psychological consequences on both sides of the coming disas-
ter in Iraq. Because I agree that the Europeans should come in, and yet my 
gut feeling is that they will not come in and hence there will be a disaster 
and the disaster will be of mutual resentment.
Anne-Marie Slaughter answered Tim’s question by saying that for the 
time being the only active opposition to European unity are some neo-
conservatists. But recently everybody, including Madeleine Allbright, has 
had Brzezinski’s notion that we should be nice to the Europeans, we should 
encourage them, but as long as they don’t challenge American primacy. 
I am afraid that the aftermath of Iraq will mean mutual recrimination, which 
will make the kind of balance, which David described very well, very dif-
ficult for both sides.
David P. Calleo
Who knows what the ultimate reaction to Iraq will be in the United States 
or elsewhere. The only thing I can say is that I am more optimistic, I guess, 
than Pierre Hassner. But who knows? Americans are, I think, in the process 
of learning something about how disfunctional the unipolar world view 
can be. But the lesson is very painful and who knows what the psychologi-
cal reaction will be? It does seem to me that whatever scenario prevails in 
the end – a United States which is suddenly much easier to get on with and 
interested in serious co-operation, or an ill-tempered United States inclined 
to withdraw – a strong Europe is highly desirable. If the United States is in 
a mood to co-operate, which I very much hope will be the outcome of Iraq, 
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it is important that there be a Europe with a mind of its own to co-operate 
with and not merely a group of states where it is easy to play one off against 
the other. If the United States withdraws in ill-temper, and leaves behind 
a great mess, Europeans are likely to be vulnerable to the consequences 
and it will be important for Europe to have the machinery to be able to 
act militarily to protect its vital interests. This doesn’t mean spending half 
a trillion dollars annually on defence, like the US, but it does mean seriously 
coordinated defence capabilities which can function. Nobody can do that for 
the Europeans except themselves. Meanwhile, I suppose you can say that the 
Bush administration has done as much as is humanly possible to unite Europe. 
But the rest will still have to be done by the Europeans themselves.
It seems to me that for Americans the fundamental issue is the unipolar 
view of things that has become so pervasive among us. Having dwelt so long 
in a bipolar world, now that the Soviet pole is gone, we habitually assume 
only one superpower remains, and we are it. This is a vision where we play 
the role of God. We have all God’s problems. If we are omnipotent, and yet 
there is evil in the world, how come? It must be because we are not doing 
our job as God. Without too much exaggeration, that seems to me the view 
of some main thinkers in the Bush administration. Until we get rid of the 
unipolar view, we will not be very good partners. But we have created by 
now for ourselves ample incentives to learn a new way of looking at things, 
and that may be what follows.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
I think that the impulse to withdraw, the isolationist impulse, is going 
to be very strong. In the first place, if Bush is re-elected that is what he said 
he was going to do when he was elected the first time. It is the move that 
Reagan made with the marines in Lebanon: ‘We really don’t know what we 
are doing. Let’s get out.’ And of course there is always the argument that we 
ought to be focussing on homeland security and the fortress idea. I agree 
with Ken Jowitt that it is going to have a great appeal.
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I don’t think it is going to work for a number of reasons. One is that 
George Bush’s politics and his religion run the same way. The Israel factor 
is very important here. Right now it is his base and he must satisfy his base 
and he has to stay engaged in the Middle East. He can’t pull out. I also think 
that he personally thinks that after September 11 he has a religious mandate. 
This is what he is intended to do. So I think those two things will remain even 
if he is re-elected. I also think terrorism is not going away, and indeed it is 
likely to get worse. There is this notion, which is very politically appealing 
in the United States, that at least we are fighting the terrorists ‘there not 
here.’ Because of course the backlash of September 11 is for ‘God’s sake 
we’ll fight them but let’s not have it happen here.’ That is why I don’t think 
we can pull out completely and then I think there is simply no alternative 
to eating whatever crow we’ve got to eat. We simply cannot afford to keep 
bearing the burden. Forget the military side, just economically our deficits 
are going to be through the roof. That’s the one thing you have to see. The 
US economy is a mess and we are not going to get intra-American trade, 
I will predict, certainly for a decade if not longer. So I think you are going to 
have to create some kind of multilateral structures for the simple economic 
and political reasons that you cannot pull out completely as much as you 
would like to.
Ken Jowitt
First, Christoph Bertram’s question: what’s going to happen in the 
United States? The Bush Administration is in Maginot Line mode. And we 
know what happened to that strategy. To survive, Ashcroft, Rice and Wol-
fowitz must announce they are leaving for missionary work, the National 
Football League and reality testing. Wolfowitz actually thought Gus Dur 
would bring democracy to Indonesia (and Wolfowitz was our Ambassador 
to Indonesia).
The Bush Administration is defensive and unfortunately inadaptable. 
Cheney is a liability both politically and policy wise. He should resign and be 
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replaced by the best bet the Republicans have now and in the near future, 
the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist. Rumsfeld is a decided asset as is Powell 
who is not so much a racial as a status token. In fact given his treatment and 
position he should have resigned. His one genuine fault.
Point: the Republican party is severely conflicted at both the elite and 
citizen level.
The Democrats. Obviously, Hilary wants George to win so she can be 
President (Oprah would be her perfect vice-President; Dr. Phil. Secretary of 
State. Al Sharpton Presidential press secretary. Commerce is easy – Ralph 
Nader. And Defense – who needs it?).
But take the Kerry team.
Blacks, Jews, University towns, Hollywood and people scared of Bush 
will vote for Kerry. You might ask then, how could he win? Bush scares 
a lot of people, including a lot of Republicans.
Face it, if the Bush Administration is dogmatic, defensive, and likely to 
be defeated; the Kerry ‘team’ is elitist, vague, and therapeutic.
What a choice!
The most serous development in American politics today is NOT the 
polarisation of the electorate – check the data. It is the absence of liberal 
Republicans and conservative Democrats: the visceral polarisation between 
political elites.
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Christoph Bertram
My first point is that, although European – American relations are of 
course shaped by the events we are all living through at the moment, 
I think it is important to say at the outset that the Iraq issue has really been 
a very exceptional one. This is not the normal way in which the United States 
deals with its allies. It is exceptional that the leading power in the Atlantic 
relationship, the Atlantic Alliance, decides to go to war on a basis which is 
spurious (and it turns out to be even more so in the process); that it does 
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so regardless of trying to get its allies to join it; that it 
declares it is going to do what it wants to do anyway; and 
that it itself is going to decide who is part of the alliance 
and who is not. I think that this exceptional situation is un-
likely to repeat itself. So we should not, in our analysis of 
American – European relations in the future, take this as 
the most obvious and the most reliable precedent. Having 
said that, the kind of divisions we have seen among the 
members of the European Union (both those that already 
were in before May 1, 2004 and those who joined on that 
date) are likely to remain at least temporarily. Amazingly, 
divisions are unlikely to appear on issues of money and 
trade and competition, all areas in which the European 
Union has acquired a degree of supranationality and 
a sovereignty of its own. But in security matters it is still 
the states that decide. And as far as security is concerned, 
the twenty-five Member States of the European Commu-
nity don’t see eye to eye with each other on all issues.
My second point is that this situation is likely to 
change over time. Enlargement has a number of conse-
quences for foreign policy of the European Union and security policy in the 
Union. One consequence is that a number of countries who join the Union, 
not least out of security concerns, are going to have a much stronger voice 
within that Union. Today it is interesting to see that when Finland joined 
the European Union a few years ago, and it did so primarily out of security 
concerns rather than economic ones, the Finns succeeded in shaping the 
policy of the Union in one important respect – the Northern Dimension. 
I think that now with the accession of a number of countries bordering 
on Russia, and with a particular history of relations with Russia, the new 
members will influence much more strongly the policy of the Union as such, 
vis-à-vis its new neighbours. They will have a much stronger voice, and the 
kind of display of dissent and disunity we have seen recently over relations 
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with Russia, on whether the Baltic states should or should not behave dif-
ferently towards Russia, will be matters of the past. We are going to see 
the Baltic states, Poland and other states playing a much greater role in 
shaping the common European position.
The other consequence of enlargement is of course that enlargement 
moves the Union more and more towards troubled parts of the world. 
When it started with six, it was nicely surrounded by the Atlantic Alliance, 
protected in a way by the Cold War from all those nasty parts of the world 
beyond. Now the Union, expanding to twenty five members and more, is 
moving towards areas which will force it to take common positions. This 
has already been very clear on the Balkans: remember how disunited the 
European Union members were at the beginning of the Balkan tragedy, and 
how united they are today. These challenges will push us together. I think 
that over time the differences that have been so marked in an exceptional 
case like Iraq, are likely to be less pronounced. In relationship with the 
United States they are also going to be less pronounced because the over-
all interest of the European Union members is to have and retain a close 
relationship with the United States. We have, in contrast to practically all 
other countries in the world, the extraordinary advantage of having a special 
relationship with Number One and that makes a lot of sense in strategic 
terms for all of us. The differences that are likely to arise are not going to 
be stronger than what unites us, namely the need, the desire, the strong 
strategic interest in having a close relationship with the United States, even 
when the United States is unilateral and may not always behave according 
to our wishes. Do not forget that we have experienced extraordinary four 
years of an extraordinary administration and still the Atlantic relationship 
has survived.
Now what is it that really links us together in the new era which we all 
are beginning? It is, I think, a common interest in international order. Inter-
national order will not be possible without an Atlantic union. The Atlantic 
union is, I think, the basis for formulating rules and institutions that are 
relevant way beyond the Atlantic union; it is the only institution which can, 
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not least through its mixture of Europe and America, define rules which 
are acceptable and regarded as fair by a much larger number of countries. 
The common interest in an international order of rules and institutions is 
what effectively ties us together even when our security concerns are no 
longer identical (and even in security terms, there are enough issues that 
unite us).
A final remark is an observation that perhaps many of you have shared 
in the last few years when governments have not been really dealing with 
each other in the same harmonious manner we were used to in the Atlantic 
relationship: it is the civil society that has been extraordinarily active and 
has held the West together. The desire of Europeans to talk to Americans 
and of Americans to talk to Europeans in these last few years has been 
extraordinary, supported, no doubt, by wise foundations, by people who 
actually realise the necessity of this relationship. The civil society links across 
the Atlantic have proven remarkably resilient, and therefore we have this 
double assurance: that interests across the Atlantic are going to link us, 
but also that civil society is going to link us because the US and Europe are 
natural partners and they mutually regard themselves as natural partners.
Robert Cooper
First point – the enormous similarity of Europe and the United States. 
Margaret Thatcher, a lady who I don’t necessarily agree with on absolutely 
every point, spoke of ‘that other Europe across the Atlantic Ocean’, and 
there is some truth in that story. And there is some truth in the enormous 
intermeshing of the two economies, particularly of investment. There is 
a lot of trade across the Pacific, but as far as investment is concerned, Europe 
and the USA are more or less one community, one pool of capital. And there 
is an enormous similarity of the way in which Europeans and Americans 
view the world: fears of terrorism, fears of weapons of mass destruction, 
concerns about global warming (that is the position of the US population 
rather than the US government); support for the United Nations (that again 
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is the position of the US population rather than the US 
government).
There are two big differences between most European 
countries and the USA. One is that the United States is 
much more patriotic. When you ask the question in most 
European countries: ‘Are you proud to be French, German, 
British?’, people answering ‘Yes’ are less than fifty per 
cent. The second difference is that the US is much more 
religious (I suspect that both of those characteristics are 
probably not true in Poland).
And there are two big policy differences between US 
and Europe at the moment. One is how people think of 
George Bush: all the opinion polls show that European 
publics are not on the whole anti-American, indeed they 
remain rather pro-American, but they are not pro-Bush. 
That remarkably is true even of the Conservative Party in 
Britain at the moment. The second difference of course is 
about Iraq, and I will come back to that in a moment.
If you look at the US national security strategy, and if 
you look at the European security strategy that the Euro-
pean Council signed off a few months ago, you find that basically they are 
very, very similar (only some differences of language and nuances, but not 
much more). Also, I wanted to say something on a contrast in attitudes be-
tween law and power. I think that there is an enormous emphasis underlying 
European thinking, almost an ideology of law. Europeans like treaties, they 
like contracts, they like international law, which is not surprising because 
the European Union is essentially a community of law. And therefore the 
attitude of the US administration, and not just the Bush administration, to 
treaties, to the CTBT, to Kyoto, to the additional to the protocol for the bio-
logical weapons convention, to the international criminal court, to the ABM 
Treaty, is something where there is a systematic difference of view between 
Europe and the USA. You can see that again in the letter of George W. Bush 
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to Ariel Sharon about recognising reality (that is to say the settlements): that 
is about recognising facts rather than the legal position. The law is there to 
protect the weak, and the powerful do not need it. Similarly, you can see it 
in the attitude, for example, to targeted assassination in Israel, which again 
is universally condemned in Europe and not in the USA. And you can see 
it again in the attitude to the Guantanamo Bay. Of course there are many 
Americas, and there are many Americans who probably feel in these issues 
more European, but there does seem to be a systematic difference there.
The problem is that law depends on power and while the Europeans 
like the idea of the world governed by international law, they know that 
the power is owned by the United States. And sometimes it seems that 
European policy or the main thrust of European policy is to influence the 
United States because the Europeans know that actually it is the United 
States who organises things. What is the Europe’s policy on the Middle East? 
Actually it is to influence the United States, and that is not a stupid policy 
because the US is a powerful player there and everywhere. It does not work 
but that does not mean that it is not the right policy. There is a recogni-
tion that if you want to get anything done, you cannot do it against the 
USA, and doing it without the United States is probably extremely dubious. 
And yet, there is another difference here, and that is that sometimes you 
get impression that the US conceives the world primarily in military terms 
and the Europeans certainly do not. I think they see the world primarily in 
political and legal terms.
I definitely want to say one word about NATO, it seems to me always 
strange that NATO (as is frequently written in declarations by everybody) 
is the main forum for transatlantic consultation. I ask myself if that really 
remains true on either side of the Atlantic now. For example Afghanistan 
after September 11 (the number one foreign policy issue), is not really 
discussed in NATO. When I went to Washington shortly after that to try 
and persuade the USA inter alia that NATO ought to take over ISAF, nobody 
was interested at all. So NATO, far from being the place of first resort for 
dealing with problems, is not in the game at all. Even less in Iraq. So I ask 
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myself if NATO does retain that function at all now. In fact there is a famous 
quotation on Iraq from Rumsfeld, somebody asked: ‘Did you think of using 
NATO?’ and he said: ‘It didn’t even cross my mind’. If that is the primary 
forum for transatlantic consultation, then it is in a bad way. At the same 
time there is European ambivalence, because they again really do not see 
military matters as central.
US – European relations have been exposed to two shocks. The first one 
was the Balkan shock and it was just as divisive in the nineties as is Iraq 
now. The striking thing about the solutions in the Balkans, although they 
are still some way off, is that they are joint European – American solutions. 
Europe is united in the Balkans, but united with the United States. And 
I don’t believe there is any possibility of Europe on a serious issue being 
united against the United States. And secondly Iraq, and there, I think, the 
question was put best by German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, who 
asked at one point ‘What do you do, when your principal ally embarks 
on a policy that you consider extremely dangerous?’ And that represents 
exactly the European dilemma, one of enormous dependence on the US, 
an increasing question mark about its actions, a dependence which means 
that you have to accept their policies, even if you do not like them. So this 
is a highly asymmetrical relation.
One last remark, I don’t agree with Christoph Bertram, I think there is 
some serious damage to the fabric of the relationship, and it is being vis-
ible in the language.
Timothy Garton Ash
Just to answer the question about whether the differences on patriotism 
and religion between Europeans and Americans do not apply to Poland. The 
figures from the World Value Survey indicate that 72 per cent of Americans 
say they are very proud of their country, just pipping the Poles: 71 per cent 
of Poles say they are very proud of their country. This is way above the 
West European figures: the Britons, the Germans are under fifty per cent; 
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the noble Dutch – only twenty per cent say they are very proud of their 
country; there is one European country which is even more patriotic than 
the Americans, and that is the Irish – seventy four per cent of them say they 
are proud of their country.
Ivan Krastev
I will try to answer two questions that were flying 
around yesterday. The first came from Timothy Garton 
Ash who asked: ‘Do you believe that in the United States 
now there is a policy trying to divide Europe?’ I will try to 
answer the question: ‘Is really Central Europe a resource 
for dividing Europe?’ The second problem was about the 
ideology of united Europe: one of the projects was to 
create European Union very much around anti-American-
ism, trying to repeat, au rebours, what Americans did in 
the 19th century; trying to create a united Europe being 
very much the alternative of the United States. This came 
very much after the famous Habermas – Derrida plus five 
fathers letter. I will try to answer these questions, and 
I will try to answer them trying to argue that there are two 
great illusions which both Western Europe and the United 
States are facing with respect to Central Europe.
The first is the American illusion of the Iraq case. 
I believe that the United States misread the support they 
have got over Iraq. The coalition of the willing was much 
more the coalition of the reluctant and I will try to give five or six arguments 
that have been much more critical than the ‘value talk’ and the ‘history 
arguments’ that are usually used.
They are the following: first of all, there is something which the United 
States share with Eastern Europe, and that is a feeling of insecurity. I believe 
that Western Europe for the first time is much more secure and feels much 
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more secure than the United States, while Eastern Europeans, for many 
reasons, have this feeling of insecurity which is not simply the fear of war 
and of military conflict but the fact that the world is very vulnerable and 
the status quo is very fragile.
The other important thing is that there is a major sensitivity gap. If you 
see the major value issues on which America and Europe disagree, you 
can see that they are not big issues in Central Europe. Kyoto? Kyoto is not 
a huge problem for our publics. Death penalty? I am sorry to say but if there 
is going to be a referendum in Bulgaria, we are going to ‘go Texas’, and we 
are going to have much more support for the American position than for 
European position.
The third problem is the welfare state. What have we learned about 
welfare state in Eastern Europe for the last fifteen years? In a certain way 
there is no sense of identity with the welfare state because welfare state 
has never visited Eastern Europe for the last fifteen years.
Then the issue of religion, very strange because on the one hand in 
Central and Eastern Europe you have some religious countries like Poland 
and on the other hand you have such secular places like Bulgaria where 
we cannot even believe that Bush is talking seriously about God; for us it is 
simply rhetoric. So this major divide in values between Europe and America 
does not play a role in Central and Eastern Europe.
The next issue is the lack of Muslim minorities; I am saying this despite 
of the fact that there is a Muslim minority in Bulgaria but this is an ethnic 
group that has been with us for the last five hundred years. But we are not 
the place where people go, we are not receiving immigrants, we are send-
ing emigrants. So from this point of view when the Iraqi conflict for certain 
countries, for example France, was also a problem of how it is going to affect 
their Muslim minorities, for our part of the world it was not an issue.
Then of course you have ‘the Russia factor’, but ‘the Russia factor’ is not 
related to the fact that we are afraid that Russia is going to attack any of 
our countries. In Central Europe there has always been the fear that West 
Europeans are ready once again to talk to Moscow on behalf of Warsaw, 
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Prague and Budapest, and this despite of the fact that these countries are 
now in the European Union. When it comes to important decisions, Mr. 
Schroeder and Mr. Chirac are going to invite Mr. Putin, but they are not 
going to invite their European allies.
I think that all this (plus the fact that I would call ‘a Blair factor’), when 
Europe was divided on Iraq, made the decision not so difficult for Eastern 
Europeans, in spite of the fact that the public opinion in our countries was 
anti-war. Actually, if you see the public opinion polls in most of the Central 
and Eastern European countries, they are not very different from what you 
see in Western Europe, with one exception – West European anti-war ma-
jorities have been active, you could see them on the streets, while in the 
case of Eastern Europeans you could see them only in the polls.
I think that if the United States perceives the Iraq case as a potential for 
splitting Europe, this is going to be a huge misreading. And the International 
Criminal Court discussion showed it very clearly. First of all, when there is 
a united European position, Central and Eastern European countries are 
much more tending to go with the European Union. Secondly, there are three 
other factors which have been critical for shaping the position of Eastern 
Europe, and here the tendency is negative to the United States.
United States has invested for the last fifteen years a lot in the civil society 
and in the military. As a result of this, the opinion makers and the military 
in Central and Eastern Europe understand much better the American debate 
than the European debate. That is why the think tank communities, some 
of the leading journalists and the generals have been much closer to the 
American position on Iraq. However, with the accession to the European 
Union and with the membership, the role of the administrative elites, of 
the bureaucracies, is growing up. And these bureaucracies are going to 
be much more pro-European because this is their career. The second is 
the education pattern: ten years ago most of the students in Central and 
Eastern Europe would go to the American universities. In the last five years, 
we have seen a huge shift, and now they would rather decide to go to the 
West-European universities, because of many reasons, one of them being the 
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fellowship policies, but also the visa policies of the American government 
after September 11. This is critical and from this point of view I believe that 
the neo-conservatives are going to make a huge mistake believing that the 
Iraq case can be repeated.
There is also an illusion in some European circles which believe that 
Central and Eastern Europe is just another Spain, and it is enough to change 
the government, and because you have the public which is not supportive 
of the war, you can have the anti-American identity. My point is very simple 
– I believe that Eastern and Central Europe is not so much pro-American, 
but rather it is strongly anti-anti-American because of several reasons. 
Eastern Europe is afraid of anti-Americanism because anti-Americanism 
is becoming the key ideology of some of the populist and anti-democratic 
movements in our countries. We have polls from the Balkans that show 
that anti-American constituencies are also the most anti-European ones, 
anti-market ones and anti-democratic ones. The split between Europe and 
America which can be seen in some of the Western European countries, is 
not the same. Anti-Americanism has become an ideology of those who do 
not have ideology any more, but they have been trying to change the status 
quo of the last fifteen years. As a result of this, political elites and democratic 
elites in Central and Eastern Europe are not going to tolerate, for domestic 
political reasons, the anti-Americanism as the major discourse.
Another very important problem is that while for example Paris is in-
terested in having the united Europe as a check and balance mechanism or 
counterweight to the United States on the global level, many Central and 
Eastern Europeans are interested in having the United States as a European 
power to play the role of a counterbalance for possible French – German 
alliance.
There is also one important geo-strategic difference which is going 
to create problems in the relations between the USA and the Central and 
Eastern Europe. And this comes with the fact that the United States is try-
ing to convince the European Union, in my view rightly, to look very much 
to the Middle East. Central and Eastern Europe countries are going to be 
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much more interested in looking out to their neighbourhood: Ukraine and 
the Balkans are going to be much more of a priority to the post-communist 
countries, rather than the Middle East where we do not believe that we 
have a part in this war.
I believe that the most healthy thing for the US – European relations is 
going to be to try and view the Iraqi crisis and the fact that the Central and 
Eastern Europe sided with the US as an isolated case on the basis of which 
you cannot make conclusions (just like the Spanish case where the change 
of the government meant the change of the policy).
The last paradox I want to mention: Mr. Prodi was interviewed just 
after the enlargement and to the question ‘Do you believe that the Italian 
troops should leave Iraq?’ his answer was: ‘No’. It may seem strange, but 
while it was the United States that invited Eastern and Central Europeans 
to go to Iraq, now I believe that now it is the European Union that is very 
much interested in convincing us to stay.
Dominique Moïsi
Let me start with an anecdote and my personal experience. Yesterday 
I entered Poland only with my identity card, and I felt extremely happy and 
proud of it: that was the success of my generation. Full of joy, I rush to my 
hotel, open my television, and what do I see? – the US Secretary of State 
Donald Rumsfeld in front of the Senate hearing. So at the same time I was 
celebrating, the country that had made that celebration possible more than 
any other country in the world, the United States of America, was in the 
midst of a very, very deep mess.
The second anecdote: two days ago we had at IFRI, the French Institute 
for International Relations, the former Prime Minister of South Korea who 
said: ‘Well, yesterday to be anti-American in the world was a French spe-
cificity, part of France’s exceptionalism. Today, if you are not slightly anti-
American, or definitely anti-Bush, people start wondering what’s wrong with 
you. It has become an anomaly not to be anti-Bush’. And I think this is the 
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issue we have to discuss. And this is where I believe the 
role of Central Europeans can be fundamental. As much 
as we will gain, I hope, from the hunger of young Poles, 
young Hungarians, who want to catch up their lost time 
in economic matters, we, in Europe, may need Central 
and Eastern Europe very much as a remainder of sanity 
in our relations with the United States and of the fact 
that we need to be together much more than in previous 
times, for Americans have lost the peace in Iraq. And the 
consequences of that failure are for the entire West.
Yesterday we were frustrated by the American strat-
egy; at the same time we had no strategy of ours. Today 
we are confronted with the consequences of the failure 
of the American strategy. And we have to realise that 
‘Schadenfreude’, a kind of silent satisfaction, expressions 
of the kind: ‘we warned you, we told you, now look where 
you are’, cannot represent a policy. For if the American 
boat is sinking in Iraq, it is the entire Western strategy 
that is sinking in the world.
What could be the role of Europe today? First to 
contribute to an awareness of what the challenge is. 
I mean, there is a war which is going on, not a war between Islam and the 
West, but a war of fundamentalist Muslims against the West and against 
the modern Arab world. And what the Americans have been doing in Iraq 
has been playing largely of course to the ends of the fundamentalists. In 
fact the true challenge for the West, Europe and the United States together, 
is not to lose moderate Islam, is to make sure that – as a result of what the 
Americans are doing in Iraq, as a result of the American benign neglect, 
if not encouragement, of Ariel Sharon’s policy in Israel – the majority of 
Muslims, the entire Arab, Islamic world will not move in the direction of 
the fundamentalists. And this is, I believe, the role of Europe. We have 
a greater understanding of the nationalism of others than Americans do, 
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because of our own experience. The paradox of what has happened in 
Iraq is that the most patriotic country in the world, the United States, has 
completely failed to integrate the nationalism of others. For probably two 
major reasons, the first one being that America, like France, as it considers 
itself a universal country, carrying a universal model, could not conceive 
that Iraqis would not wish to become, as quickly as possible, Americans. 
The goal of democratising the Middle East, starting with Baghdad, was very 
noble but in retrospect completely absurd.
The second reason for which the Americans were wrong in Iraq was that, 
because of the fact America is such a melting pot of all nationalities (includ-
ing ‘American Iraqis’), they believed that, thanks to some local Shalabys, 
they understood the Iraqi situation. Of course it did not work, it led to the 
situation in which we are. The paradox today is that Europeans are nearly 
begging Americans to stay in Iraq, ‘please do not leave’, for short-term po-
litical consideration, because it would be catastrophic. And the problem is 
of course for us to define together (and the fact that we are together, new 
Europe and old Europe, is fundamental) the best way to make sure that the 
ship of the West does not sink in the Middle East at large. In this context, 
I believe that it is important that we have a new Europe, in which there are 
not only France, Great Britain, and Germany, who are leading Europe, but that 
there are also new countries who are bringing in not military or economic 
possibilities, but the sense that it is essential to maintain a Western cohesive-
ness, at the worst of times, because this is precisely what is needed.
So from that point of view – what do we need? First we need to remain 
ourselves, the challenge to democratic nation can only be answered by the 
more democracy. This is why the disgrace that is taking place in Iraqi jail 
is a threat for all of us, because it is a moral failure not only for the Bush 
administration, not only for the United States of America, but globally for 
the West and the democratic model. We came with the vision that we were 
better and we have been as bad as others. The second message is that apart 
from more democracy we need more Europe. And apart from more Europe 
we need more West, because if there is no more Europe, and no more West, 
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we lose together. And this is the most important challenge we have been 
facing, and we will be facing for a very long time to go, this is a real war, 
and we may be losing it right now.
Timothy Garton Ash
I think many of us probably stayed last night watching these quite ex-
traordinary hearings before the American Congress. I heard one congress-
man saying: ‘This moment is a political and public relations Pearl Harbour’, 
which is a pretty striking remark.
There is a slightly alarming degree of agreement between all our panel-
lists. I suggest that we should try and focus specifically on Vladimir I. Lenin’s 
question: ‘What is to be done?’ And what is to be done specifically by Europe, 
not by the United States. We all know much better than the Americans what 
the Americans should do, but let’s think about what we should do.
On the analysis, it seems to me that the essential question here is ‘the 
structural versus the contingent’. That is to say: was Iraq, as Christoph 
Bertram said, just an exceptional moment (I heard Robert Cooper slightly 
disagreeing)? To what extent is it anti-Bushism? Anti-Bushism, as Domin-
ique Moïsi and Ivan Krastev said, unites most people in Europe and beyond 
Europe. But what is the relation between anti-Bushism and anti-American-
ism? And this phenomenon of anti-anti-Americanism, which we find, I think 
Dominique Moïsi will agree, for example in Bernard-Henri Lévy in France, 
is not so much pro-Americanism as anti-anti-Americanism, and partly it is 
because people sense in anti-Americanism certain other things, sentiments 
about ourselves, about our own societies, about Europe, that they do not 
like. So my question is: ‘structural versus contingent’. If John Kerry is elected, 
how much of what we are talking about, disappears? What is changed in 
America that will not change back if Kerry is elected?
For example – international law; Europeans are proud of it, but histori-
cally, I would say, Americans have even more than Europeans to do with 
introducing respect for international law into the international order after 
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1945. Do we feel that the people around Kerry would come back to that 
great American tradition? On the other side – what is changed in Europe 
over these few years that we feel will not change back even with a new 
administration in Washington and a new administration in Brussels and 
even a few new leaders in national capitals in Europe?
Christoph Bertram
Let me try and emphasise my point. Since 1945 we have had a predomi-
nant America, we have had an America which produced an extraordinary 
group of people, who were able to manage the relationship of Number One 
with a lot of much smaller allies. And did it extremely skilfully, much more 
skilfully than any of the so-called big European countries are managing 
their relationships with the middle or smaller countries of the European 
Union. An extraordinary success story. We have become used to accepting 
America’s predominance because of the way in which Americans themselves 
were able to make their predominance acceptable. And what we have seen 
for the last four years is a real departure, not just from ten or fifteen years 
of American policy since the fall of the European walls and the fall of the 
Soviet Union, but from fifty years of American diplomacy. And I think this 
is what makes me confident that whoever is going to win the elections, is 
going to realise that: A) it is not going to be that simple to produce regime 
change, and B) that there are limits to military force. If you see now the 
Americans running around and saying ‘Can you please provide us with some 
military force so that we can stay in Iraq’, it gives witness to the limitations 
of military force. And then it seems to me that the American public which 
was willing to go into this war, because they believed that what their lead-
ers told them was true, are going to be much more sceptical next time. So 
I think it is very unlikely that we have some more Iraqs in the future, while 
it is much more likely that whoever is going to sit in the White House from 
January 21, will again learn the ability, the tricks, the quality, the talent of 
dealing with countries one wants to have on one’s side. It does not mean 
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that our interests are going to be the same, quite often they were not in the 
past, but we found ways in which to deal with that. And if only the language 
of Number One becomes more accommodating, a lot of anti-Americanism 
will also fall by the wayside.
Robert Cooper
The first reason why I think it is not just contingent, but I think that 
there is something structural, is that I am not sure that George Bush is an 
exception. I think that George Bush in some ways is more American than 
many presidents. I think he represents a very strong stream of American 
thought. And I must say I am not sure if I would put my hand up to say I am 
anti-Bush because there are many things that I rather admire about this 
government: willingness to act – I mean when they see a problem, they do 
not just sit around and talk about it, they do something, which very differ-
ent from Europe. This great American optimism has gone too far in Iraq, 
but nevertheless that has been the driving force in the world, in the world 
economy as well as in the world politics. So I think that in some ways when 
you look at Bush you see the real thing, that is the real America, and that 
is what is underlying America and will always be there like that. But on the 
other hand I agree with Christoph Bertram that a bit of consultation will 
fix a lot of things. It does not need very much to bring Europeans along 
and it could be done.
Another big reason why I think that what we have at the moment is 
a structural problem, and we will see whether we can fix it or not, is the fact 
that we are dealing with something completely new, something we have 
not really dealt with before, the Islamic world, the Middle East. Previously 
we were dealing with the Soviet Union. We knew what it was, we spent 
a lot of time studying it, we understood it pretty well because it was after 
all invented in the British Museum and various other European capitals, 
that was a part of our culture. We are now dealing with a culture that we 
do not understand, and I am not even sure that I agree with Dominique 
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Moïsi, that what we need to find is non-fundamentalists. I suspect that 
fundamentalism is what we will have to be dealing with. I suspect the idea 
that you can somehow work with the Islamic world by supporting secular 
government in Turkey, may not be the answer either. Actually the answer in 
the Islamic world may be fundamentalism. After all, America was founded 
on Protestant fundamentalism. So I am not even sure that we understand 
the categories. And that means that there is a completely new problem, 
which is above all a problem for Europe, but it is a problem for the USA as 
well, that we do not know how to understand it, how to deal with, and it 
is an area where the US’s global responsibilities and interests in things like 
oil, bump against the European wish to live in a peaceful neighbourhood 
and not have troubles among the populations here. So there is something 
very big indeed we need to work out and I will tell you in a few years time 
whether we manage it.
Timothy Garton Ash
Something I did not expect to hear this morning was a praise of funda-
mentalism. One could say of course that it is interesting to find out that Iran 
is now the most pro-American country in the Middle East, so that twenty 
years of Islamic fundamentalism is a pretty good cure, and you just have to 
wait twenty years, that is the only trouble.
Robert Cooper
France is fundamentalist; banning head scarves – that is fundamental-
ism.
Dominique Moïsi
Laïcité (secularism) is a French specificity, but I am not sure you can 
equate it with fundamentalism.
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Three quick things – on Bush and anti-Americanism – I am torn between 
two contradictory statements. The first one would be to say (as most people 
do) that if John Kerry is elected (although that does not seem to be likely 
today but it may change tomorrow), American diplomacy will not be fun-
damentally modified. The style will be different, but the trends are there, 
and they are structural and fundamental. At the same time one may say 
that the elections that are about to come might be seen in historical light 
as the third most important elections in American history. Abraham Lincoln 
in 1860, Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, and George W. Bush re-elected or 
defeated in 2004, because somehow if Bush is re-elected I sense that the 
cultural gap that exists between the US and Europe will be reinforced, and 
if he is defeated it does not mean that Europe and America will close the 
gap, but there is a possibility that the structural difference might be slowly 
being reduced. So from that point of view, of society, of culture, and not 
of diplomacy, I believe that for the relationship between Europe and the 
United States the next elections are decisive.
I will end up with one remark, which follows what Robert Cooper said, 
and I am not sure I agree or disagree with him: it is true that the paradox is 
that the West, Europe and the United States, was much more united against 
the threat that came from within – Soviet totalitarianism, than against the 
threat that comes from outside. And you may have two interpretations 
– the first one is that it is we who have changed. Yesterday you had two 
Europes and one West, today you have one Europe and two Wests, as 
a result of the fact that America has deeply changed and that Europe has as 
well. But the other interpretation is that somehow we do not understand 
at all the challenge that comes from outside. And because we understand 
so little, we are defining extremely different answers. When Robert Cooper 
says: ‘maybe fundamentalism is the only way’, I cannot accept it, because 
somehow I would be resigning myself to the worst scenario. No, I don’t 
think you can accept that, it is too passive.
126
O przyszłości Europy
127New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
Session III 
European attitudes towards US and 
transatlantic relations
Robert Cooper
Just to say that all our lives, at least when Britain was a colonial power, 
we were dealing with colonies and we spent all our attempts trying to find 
moderates rather than extreme nationalists. Actually it always turned out 
that nationalists were the authentic representatives of the people, and 
not moderates. And therefore I always distrust people when they say that 
we must look for moderates, because normally those are not authentic 
representatives. I think that within what we call fundamentalism there is 
a whole range of different people, some of whom want violence, some of 
whom want Islam, and they do not see that as violent. Fundamentalism is 
not equal violence. You know, Dominique, the reason why you believe that 
George W. Bush is going to win (all the opinion polls actually show John 
Kerry ahead at the moment) is because in your heart you know that Bush 
is more representative of America than Kerry.
Timothy Garton Ash
I was thinking about Dominique Moïsi’s equations – two Europes, one 
West, and now one Europe and two Wests – which I don’t think I quite 
agree with. I think I would say: one Europe, two Americas, and no West, 
which is our problem.
I just want to underline the importance of what Dominique Moïsi said: 
the European elections are in June, but in a way the European elections are 
also on November 2, in the US, in the sense that the most important single 
determinant and influence in this formative period of Europe building (after 
the enlargement, with the constitutional debate when we are really asking 
ourselves: What is Europe? Where is Europe? Why Europe, what is Europe 
for?) will be the policy and approach and language of the United States. 
That is why it is an election of fundamental importance to us: if Bush wins, 
and they continue as they are having the first term, then the overwhelm-
ing temptation for Europe will be to define itself as the not-America, not 
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necessarily as the anti-America, but as the not-America, to define being 
European by our differences from America, which I think would be actually 
a very bad thing for both parts of the divided West.
Ivan Krastev
I just want to make three simple points. Bulgaria does not have a colonial 
history, but I tend to agree to some extent that looking for moderates means 
that the only acceptable regime which we have in mind in the Middle East 
is a secular regime. Is it realistic? And this is coming to the problem of Tur-
key. What kind of Turkey do we want in the European Union in order to be 
a model for the others? Secular Turkey? Does it mean that European Union 
is going to save the Atatürk’s model, when there are no domestic resources 
for this any more? Or are we talking about Islamist democracy which means 
that these ‘bad guys’ are going to win elections? From this point of view 
I believe it is going to be a critical question because if there is going to be 
a secular Turkey in the European Union, it means getting Turkey out of the 
Middle East; but then you cannot have any example because the secular 
model is not going to be an example for anybody in the Middle East.
The second problem is that I believe that we have reached the critical 
point, namely that the American hard power is in decline – they cannot 
control territories. Of course American soft power is in decline, but I believe 
that also the European soft power in a way is in decline. In my view, the 
European Union is the best embodiment of what Joseph Nye called ‘soft 
power’, because, on the fact that it exists, it managed to convince twelve 
countries around itself to change their legislation, to change their identity. 
This is soft power: to have the others want what you want. This is what hap-
pened in this century in Eastern Europe. But the essence of the soft power 
of the European Union was offering membership. How are you going to 
be influential with countries to which you cannot offer membership? Eu-
ropean Union is not in a position to easily offer a membership any more, 
not because of financial reasons, but in my opinion because of political 
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reasons and structural reasons. If this is the case, while the American hard 
power appears to be overestimated, the European soft power is also slightly 
overestimated, we are going to see this in the Balkans. Because European 
integration is fine, but you should have functioning states in order to inte-
grate them. You cannot integrate failed states or weak states because you 
cannot put conditionality on them.
So here I am going to my third problem, and this is anti-Bushism and 
anti-Americanism. That is a nice division for European elites who do not 
want to say that there is anti-Americanism. But nobody is going to convince 
me that all these people as shown in the opinion polls in Brazil and some 
other countries, I am not even talking of the Middle East, are making this 
distinction. Anti-Americanism is not simply the reaction to the American 
foreign policies, anti-Americanism is the representation of something else: 
it is where anti-capitalist sentiments are sheltered now. How are you going 
to talk against globalization in a popular language? How are you going 
to talk against the elites, your own but also global elites? All this sense of 
dissatisfaction in my view is very much consolidated in anti-Americanism, 
so from this point of view, even if John Kerry wins, I don’t believe that 
the public opinion polls are going to change very much. Kerry’s victory is 
important because it would give a window of opportunity for European 
elites and some other democratic and reform elites; for the general public 
outside of the United States and in my view especially outside of Europe, 
it is not going to make a huge difference.
Timothy Garton Ash
I would just say that the research centres in their polls which showed high 
level of anti-Americanism did ask a question: Is the problem America or is 
it Bush? And in Europe at least, the overwhelming majority, as I remember 
above seventy per cent in most European countries, said: ‘The problem is 
Bush, not America’. Now, that may be partly because people do not like to 
admit to being anti-American so they say ‘of course the problem is Bush’, but 
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nonetheless it is a striking result. I hope we will come back to the important 
question which Ivan Krastev raised: what can Europe do for its neighbours 
if it is not offering them membership ? Because, as he rightly said, all our 
European soft power is based on what I call ‘the politics of induction’, 
a magnetic appeal which ends with the induction into the club.
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Discussion
Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center, 
University of Warsaw) 
I think there are two Americas, there is the conservative, Republican 
America which now is much more visible, and there is the liberal and 
Democrat America which also exists. None of these is truer than the other. 
And there is an equilibrium, roughly, between them. Bush did not gain the 
majority of the votes in November 2000. With a different electoral system 
he would have never become a president, Al Gore would have won. Our 
discussion is too focused on the current situation, on the current administra-
tion which may no longer be there in half a year from now.
One more thing: it is the other America that is much closer culturally 
to Europe, and to Europe’s vision of international relations, the United 
Nations for example is mainly an invention of the United States, but not 
of the conservative, Republican and unilateralist, but of the other liberal, 
Democrat and multilateralist United States which is not less true than what 
we have now.
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Heather Grabbe
I have got two questions to the panel about NATO’s role. Robert Cooper 
raised the question of what is NATO’s role going to be in practical terms. 
And it seems to me that the new Member States, new members of both 
NATO and the European Union could well change their views over the next 
few years. They have had a great shock in coming into NATO and finding 
that it is not an insurance policy but a fire brigade in which they have to go 
out and do lots of peace keeping. On the whole I think they have reasoned 
to that challenge remarkably well and impressively.
The fact is that NATO’s role is changed not just militarily but also politi-
cally (Robert Cooper talked about it being no longer the pre-eminent secu-
rity forum), and it also changed as an identity organisation. NATO does not 
embody the West and Western values in quite the way it used to, because it 
is less important as a political forum, and because essentially the expansion 
of NATO’s membership knows no limits. It is actually quite easy for NATO 
to expand. We have discovered it is rather harder for the EU to do so. So 
what does this mean for NATO? We can argue a lot about what it should be 
doing in practical terms, for example: should it go into Iraq? Is it part of the 
solution to re-unify the West? Or is that role simply gone forever?
The second question is, as an embodiment of values, does NATO have 
a role perhaps in defining these values? And Ivan talked very interestingly 
about the fact that Western values are still Western values, there aren’t 
huge differences actually between European and American values. This is 
rather important also for the soft power of the Western alliance. If we do 
not know what our values are, if we cannot define them, is there any point 
in trying to find more and more subtle distinctions between American and 
European values? Or should we be re-thinking the whole concept of Western 
values? And thinking actually about what we have more in common, the 
fact that our credibility as a source of values for the whole West is being 
massively damaged not just by Iraq, but also I think by the disagreements 
across the Atlantic.
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Marcin Król
I just want to answer Timothy Garton Ash’s question: what Europe is 
supposed to do? And I have one answer, a short one – I think we should start 
with stopping pretending that we are not at war. Dominique Moïsi said that 
very openly. We are at war, wars are not always wars where military power 
is used. There are cold wars, half cold wars, less and more cold wars. We 
are at war, and if we pretend that we are an oasis of peace, we are going 
to lose that war, actually I think we have already started losing it. I am very 
afraid that Europe is going to lose more than the United States because of 
being naïve and pretending that nothing is happening when the house is 
practically getting down on our heads.
Stanisław Zapaśnik (University of Warsaw)
It so happens that I specialise in Muslim fundamentalism, I am a cultural 
anthropologist who does field studies. After September 11, I spent over six 
months among the Muslim fundamentalists. My area of research is primarily 
Central Asia, but I am also familiar with the situation in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Now I would like to say that in those societies I don’t encounter hostil-
ity towards Western values. On the contrary, there is a sympathy which is 
not to say that they accept all the values of the West. I would confirm the 
conclusions arrived at by the Gallup Institute that there is no basic enmity 
or hostility towards the West, but what there is, it is the lack of trust, the 
suspicion of the West intentions. My research, and this is confirmed by 
other researches, shows that there is not a Muslim who would believe that 
behind the events of September 11 there is Osama Ben Laden. In fact the 
common belief is that it was done by Bush or by people from within Bush 
administration as a pretext to declare war on Islam.
Now I understand why the people I speak to take this view. This would 
be the fault of American pop culture where Hollywood equates Islam and 
terrorism, by American preachers, reverends. I don’t know which Evangelist 
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called the Koran ‘a handbook of terrorism’; somebody compared the prophet 
Mohammed to Hitler; then came the statements by Bush himself and by 
Lt. General William Boykin, Rumsfeld’s second in command (US Deputy 
Under-Secretary of Defence), who is in charge of the war on terrorism. 
If I recall correctly Boykin said that ‘they hate us because we fight under 
the banner of Christ’. And one could conclude that the Americans are the 
army of God, whereas the Muslims worship false idols and are generally 
the army of the devil. So this is an argument to the effect that under the 
cover of the war on terrorism there is a war on religion and there is a clash 
of fundamentalisms.
As a researcher I can confirm one thing: there is only one cause for terror-
ism, and that is political. When I ask why – they always say: ‘Palestine’, then 
they refer to the local regimes, the local authorities. It usually happens that 
the local regime enjoys the support of the US, is a close ally of the US. And 
this leads me to another conclusion: Al Qaeda in Arabic means ‘a method’. 
The entity we hear about in the media doesn’t really exist in a real life. The 
two things these people have in common is their attitude towards the US 
and the fact that they have usually been trained in camps run Osama Ben 
Laden or in other training camps. So if that is really the case, if that is the 
true nature of Al Qaeda, then the threat would be driven not from Islam. 
When I hear the panellists, I believe that we misunderstand, misconstrue 
Islam. We transpose our view of religion onto something which doesn’t 
resemble religion as we know it, here in the West. If it is truly the case that 
Al Qaeda is a myth, in the way it is presented, as a bugbear, the danger has 
to do with attitudes and convictions, and I am not surprised that we hear 
increasingly often that in the US libraries there is a surveillance of what 
students read and that the academia is also under scrutiny.
I don’t believe that the threats stemming from the Islamic terrorism will 
go away once Kerry assumes power. Even if Kerry is elected, it is a problem 
we will have to face for at least another generation. And this is why I am 
a pessimist because I believe that the main victim, which is most threatened 
by Islamic terrorism, is Western democracy. And when we observe what 
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the Europeans are doing, compared to what the Americans are, I believe 
that the battlefield, the source of ideology which Europe needs, as one of 
the panellists mentioned, is the attitude towards democracy. I believe that 
Europe can survive, democracy can survive, and it will be more robust than 
the democracy in the US if Bush is re-elected, but I am concerned that the 
logic around which Europe will be united will be human rights and the issue 
of values and democratic procedures which we are opposing the US with.
Dominique Moïsi
The question of Heather Grabbe, what can we do in Iraq now? In ret-
rospect (it is so much easier to be wiser after one year): if the Americans 
just after the fall of the statue of Saddam Hussein had handed over the 
responsibilities to the UN, and if the UN had called upon, let’s say, part of 
NATO to come and help, the situation would be of course extraordinarily 
different. And Rumsfeld wouldn’t be in a position today to become a new 
McNamara in the eyes of history. But you cannot re-write history, and what 
they have done so far after that great moment of joy, was an accumulation 
of mistakes, one after the other, some of them were maybe inevitable, most 
of them were not.
The second statement – yes, there is a discrepancy between the American 
feeling of still being at war and the European reaction. We had our Sep-
tember 11, which was March 11 in Madrid. Somehow it was not integrated 
by most Europeans as a sign that Europe was also at war. I have two inter-
pretations for that discrepancy. The first one is that there is no Europe in 
emotional terms. And what took place in Madrid, for most Europeans took 
place in a different country. Madrid is not to Europe what Washington and 
New York were to the United States of America. The other interpretation 
is even more negative: that we don’t want to see the reality which we are 
in, collectively. And the two interpretations, you may combine them with 
one another. But there is a great gap between what happened and the way 
we reacted to it.
Discussion
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Ivan Krastev
Just two points. One is the opinion, now shared by everybody, that it 
is enough if the UN goes to Iraq and NATO takes the military part and the 
problem is over. I don’t believe this. We are talking about legitimacy, but 
we are talking about legitimacy through the eyes of the lawyers. What is 
really going to change on the ground, from the point of view of the Iraqis? 
Not much. The troops are going to be the same. You are going to have a UN 
flag, Al Sistani is going to talk to Ibrahimi, and not to Bremer, but I believe 
that the level of political radicalisation is so high that nothing is going to 
change with one exception. There is going to be West there, especially if 
NATO takes over. Maybe NATO does not represent West to the Westerners, 
but NATO very much represents the West to the foreigners.
The second problem is Al Qaeda. This is now also a commonplace, but the 
issue of the war on terrorism is at the root of the problem. When you have 
a war, you first look for the enemies. Al Qaeda was modelled by our media, 
as a kind of an army, with different battalions from different countries, so 
in a certain way we have invented Al Qaeda, and we have decided we were 
going to destroy it. But because it was really difficult we turned to the idea 
from the 1980s, of state sponsored terrorism and we went to Iraq. I am say-
ing this because maybe the most important thing would be to stop talking 
about Al Qaeda. I totally agree that terrorism is a local phenomenon, very 
contextual, very political, it has a lot to do with local tensions, with local 
elites, and if we decentralise totally the response to terrorism, we have a 
much greater chance to succeed.
And here we are coming to my last point, which is a major problem 
– we have irrelevant knowledge concerning terrorism. We should really try 
to understand communities, because what is the victory going to be? The 
victory is supposed to be a reduction of the political influence of the terror-
ist groups; you can arrest terrorists, but if this is going to result in having 
three times more new terrorists, to what extent it is going to be a victory? 
I am very much afraid of this military understanding of the problem, I am 
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concerned about the fact that even the European Union is creating a com-
mission on terrorism and is trying to centralise the response. And in my view 
it should be totally decentralised, and we should look for anthropologists 
and sociologists who are dealing very much with local communities; not 
specialists on terrorism, but specialists on different suburbs in European 
cities, in American cities, so that we gain this new type of knowledge, 
which is very soft and cultural. And here we have the legacy of the cultural 
wars in America, and the fact that the government, especially the current 
administration, does not trust universities and especially the cultural studies 
departments. It does not trust sociologists, it does not trust anthropolo-
gists. I believe that the reconciliation between the soft knowledge and the 
security studies might be a huge problem.
Robert Cooper
I am delighted to find that we have here somebody who actually re-
ally knows something about fundamentalism, Islamic communities, and is 
studying them, and I think that is something that we really need to do much 
more often in the future. I wanted actually to come back to the questions 
about NATO. One of the things that strikes me very forcibly about the Iraq 
story was this strange episode in NATO, when the United States (not Turkey!) 
insisted on NATO’s action to help Turkey. Later on the Turks agreed that 
they would like to be helped, but initially it was the US that wanted NATO to 
help them. It was completely unnecessary, it could have been done without 
any debate in NATO at all, it could have been done bilaterally. Actually it 
was the US raising the stakes in the debate with France and Germany, and 
the point about this story is that the USA would never have done this in the 
Cold War. It would have fixed it behind the scenes before having a debating 
NATO. And if it had thought there was going to be a disagreement, it would 
never have had the debate. And the point is that the US was prepared to 
gamble NATO. Now that to me represents a fundamentally different attitude 
to NATO from the attitude during the Cold War when NATO was central to 
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security. Of course France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg then headed 
straight into this trap that had been created for them and that was almost 
as bad as creating the trap. That represents a fundamental difference in 
US’s attitude to NATO, and the second point is the point Ivan Krastev made 
just now, that NATO essentially is a military organisation and the problems 
that we face now are essentially not military problems.
Christoph Bertram
Two remarks, one on NATO and one on war. Imagine for a moment that 
September 11 would have happened without people being able to pinpoint 
it to Afghanistan. To have an enemy that could be localised distinguishes 
September 11 from March 11. And here, Dominique, I am fundamentally 
in opposition to you, I think what we have seen in the European reaction 
to March 11 was the recognition that the term ‘war on terror’, while it is 
generally in use, is quite useless. It does not help us to define what is hap-
pening, it does not give us a chance to organise battalions, to define exit 
strategies, to know what victory is. The Europeans’ reaction to March 11 has 
been much sounder: they have recognised the specific nature of terrorism, 
be it organised from afar, and the need to cope with it. And every time we 
see in the news that somebody else is apprehended, and the Spanish police 
seem to work very well in these matters, and European and international 
co-operation works well in these matters, that is a small step towards what 
might be at some stage a victory. I think the European reaction to this was 
much more in tune with the challenge than the American reaction.
We saw Senator Lieberman yesterday talking about three thousand 
Americans having been killed on September 11; actually, one thousand of 
those so called ‘three thousand Americans’ were not Americans, they came 
from all over the world. But the way in which the Americans have translated 
September 11 as the model of the challenge, identifiable enemies, location 
of enemies, I think is one which we must not follow because it leads down 
the wrong road.
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On NATO, I think we would all (especially we Europeans) make an 
immense, stupid mistake, if we were to throw NATO away. It is the one 
organisation in which the Americans have contractual commitment of 
a multilateral nature, in which there is a body of people who work together 
every day and in which it is possible to make use of the institutions in order 
to develop consensus. We have not made use of these institutions to develop 
consensus, not only because the Americans didn’t want to, but because the 
Europeans didn’t use it either. And if NATO has a future, it will only have 
a future if we actually use it again. If we don’t do it but just sit there and 
wait for the Americans to take the initiative, we cannot blame Americans 
if they make use of it just when they want. It would be absolutely mad to 
forgo the chances that NATO offers and to throw it into the big waste paper 
basket of history, we would suffer most, and, I think the Americans would 
also suffer. So let’s think not of whether NATO is still in tune with the times, 
let’s make stay in tune with the times.
Timothy Garton Ash
I would like to suggest that we try to focus our thought specifically on 
what Europe, not what America should do, and I propose four particular 
questions:
Firstly: we talked a lot about attitudes, values, perception, approaches, 
can we talk a moment about interests and ask specifically the question: 
what common, specific, distinctive European interests do we identify which 
differ significantly from those of the United States?
Secondly: what could be the distinctive European contribution to the 
struggle against the threat of international terrorism? I deliberately didn’t 
say ‘war on terror’, because that ideological formula is in my view deeply 
compromised, by the way it has been used over the last few years, but 
certainly, and I agree here much with Marcin Król and others, we are in 
a kind of war.
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Thirdly: what do we Europeans want NATO to do? We complain how 
Rumsfeld treats NATO, but what do we want NATO to do?
And finally (and I think, very importantly, particularly speaking here in 
Warsaw a few days after enlargement): who else do we want to bring into 
the European Union in the next five, ten, fifteen years? I think we need to 
have an answer to that question, and secondly – for those who we feel (for 
whatever reason) we cannot bring into the European Union in the next 
ten to twenty years, what do we propose to them? What do we propose 
to Morocco, to North Africa, who are not going to become members of 
the European Union? Let’s focus our debate on those questions – what is 
to be done?
Katarzyna Żukrowska (Warsaw School of Economics)
What can be offered by the European Union? The answer was given by 
Romano Prodi on December 5, 2002. He said that Europe cannot enlarge 
endlessly. The question is – who will be in? He said that what can be offered 
to the countries interested in closer co-operation with Europe has to be as 
attractive as the membership. And he said finally that the membership in 
the European Economic Area is the goal for those countries who would like 
to co-operate with the EU, which will share everything except institutions. 
It is rather clear and then it was repeated in relations to Russia and in rela-
tions to Mediterranean countries.
I have a question to the panellists related to sovereignty. I think it is quite 
a sensitive issue if you compare the new Member States of the European 
Union and the old Member States, because the old Member States are used 
to delegating their sovereignty to the international level and we, Poland 
in that number, have just regained our sovereignty. How do you see these 
differences in the future co-operation, being members of the European 
Union, and in relations to our American partner as well?
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Maciej Kozłowski (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
The issue of Middle East conflict, the Israeli – Palestinian conflict was 
mentioned here briefly. I would like to focus on that because nowhere the 
division between the United States of America and Europe is as deep as 
there. I just recently received the results of work done by a professor from 
Vienna who analysed the voting in the UN for the last twenty years, and it 
came out that on all issues usually the difference between the United States 
and Europe (the European Union), was something like 25 per cent. On the 
security issue it was less than fifteen per cent. On the Middle Eastern issue 
that was 88 per cent difference. In the last twenty years, only 12 per cent 
of votes on this issue in the United Nations were the same between the US 
and Europe. Observing this in Israel for the last four years, I have found that 
whenever the so-called ‘peace process’ was coming to some maybe hopeful 
solution, either the Europeans were coming and supporting Palestinians in 
doing something against what was agreed or Sharon was going to Wash-
ington to get blessing for some action which was against what was decided 
between Europe and the United States. And I am wondering, and I would 
like to ask the panellists – is Middle East a suitable battleground between 
the US and Europe, or that is where the differences are so prominent that 
they cannot be reconciled?
Aleksander Smolar
I would like to answer the questions posed by Timothy Garton Ash. 
First about the attitudes, values, the differences here between Europe 
and America. Robert Cooper mentioned two major differences, concern-
ing religion and patriotism. I would add two more. First – the attitude 
to immigration which is one of the most dramatic potential problems in 
Europe. To simplify, there are two different models of dealing with im-
migrants: one of assimilation, traditional, continental, European. With 
a mass Muslim immigration it doesn’t work, it cannot work any more. In 
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France, there are now problems with the attempts to reinforce certain 
traditional elements of the secular policy of l’État laique, based on the 
assumption of possible assimilation. The consequences can be quite seri-
ous: France who refused the clash of civilisation outside (it was one of 
the major reasons why France refused to follow the United States policy 
in Iraq), now is risking the clash of civilisation inside France. But this 
is not only the problem of France. In general, Europe, maybe with the 
exception of Britain, has a problem with dealing with multiethnicity and 
multiculturalism.
The other difference between the US and Europe concerns the attitudes 
towards Israel. They are quite opposite. In the US, the Holocaust became 
an element of a national myth. In American schools, the only topic in in-
ternational history is quite often only on the Holocaust. This influenced 
very strongly the attitude of Americans towards anti-Semitism and Israel. 
There is also a very specific case of Evangelical Protestants with their literal 
interpretation of the Bible. Those ‘Christian Zionists’ are considering the 
territory of Biblical Israel as belonging, by the God’s will, to Jews. Very rigid, 
they can be an obstacle to a peace process in the Middle East. The sympathy 
and the identification with Israel in the US is also reinforced by the fact that 
it is the only democratic country in the region.
In Europe we have quite an opposite tendency. No respectable person 
would obviously put into question the Holocaust, its tragic dimension and 
its importance for the European history. But the Holocaust is increasingly 
de-historicised, detached from the past, from its sources, its origin and 
from its consequences. In Europe today there is no sense of responsibil-
ity for the fate of Israel because of the Holocaust. We could even argue 
that regarding the problem of peace in the Middle East, Europe behaves 
in a totally irresponsible way. Europe maintains that the major problem 
in the relation between the West and the Muslim world is the Israeli and 
Palestinian conflict and it is criticizing the US policy in this domain. There 
are certainly good arguments in this critique, but without any positive 
proposals whatsoever.
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And now shortly about another point – what Europe can do. There are 
certain things Europe is doing better than America, for example in the 
domain of assistance to less developed countries. But of course in order 
to be efficient, the European policy cannot be hypocritical. An example of 
hypocrisy is of course the Common Agricultural Policy, which is destruc-
tive for the Third World. US policy of subsidies for agriculture is also very 
detrimental for the poor countries. Europe can play here an important role, 
but it must have a clear policy.
Europe plays an enormously positive role in stabilizing and contributing 
to the development of the neighbour states through enlargement. Besides 
the imperial logic of US policy there is a logic of continental empire of Europe 
where stabilisation and development come through integration. The major 
question now posed in relation with the candidacy of Turkey concerns the 
limits of the expansion.
The last point about NATO. Europe needs NATO but at the same time 
the traditional formula of NATO is not very much adapted to the today’s 
world. NATO is doing now a lot of new things but without changing 
the definition of itself. NATO was about security in Europe, so here 
a change must be done. Not only here. This is a paradox that NATO is 
the only place of institutionalised relations between USA and Europe. 
The world changes, the transatlantic relations change and I do not think 
that we can limit our relations to channelling them through NATO or ad 
hoc initiatives.
Timothy Garton Ash
I am sure that you are characterising very important differences. The 
question is – are they really differences in interests, as opposed to attitudes, 
experiences, views. And my question was specifically about interests be-
cause I would argue that certainly we have at least as much an interest in 
a certain kind of settlement in the Middle East and even more of an interest 
in successful assimilation of emigration, as the United States does.
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David P. Calleo
I was a bit surprised to hear that our American Republic was founded 
by Protestant fundamentalists. I have been trying to remember the early 
Presidents, I got through several without finding an enthusiastic Christian, 
let alone a Protestant fundamentalist. May I remind everybody that the 
United States was founded in the 18th century, not the 17th century. Even in 
the 17th century, our Puritans were certainly Christians, highly sophisticated 
Calvinists, but it is a great stretch to describe them as fundamentalists. 
Maybe there is a larger point here. In our thinking about the Muslim world, 
perhaps we are too inclined to presume that the fundamentalists are the 
real representatives of that world. But Islam, after all, is not just a sect but 
a great civilization. It has been having great difficulty coming to terms with 
the modern world. So, of course, has our own Christian civilization. Assum-
ing that fundamentalism is the real voice of Muslim civilization encourages 
a condescending approach to that civilization. But the future of Islam prob-
ably does not lie with its fundamentalists any more than the future of West-
ern Christianity lies with the American fundamentalists. In any event, our 
American Republic is certainly not a creation of fundamentalist Protestants. 
Its roots lie in the enlightenment and are only elliptically Christian.
Christoph Bertram
I would like to respond to two questions: what strikes me is that there 
is always a European foreign policy when there is a prospect of an EU en-
largement. There is no foreign policy in any other respect. The moment 
we can say: ‘perhaps one day you are a member’, we have a foreign policy. 
But if that is not the case, we don’t have a foreign policy, and you can tick 
all parts of the world off where we don’t have a foreign policy precisely 
because these are people and countries which we do not regard as potential 
candidates, including the United States, for enlargement. We do not have 
a foreign policy.
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We need to stop enlarging. This is an extremely difficult decision because 
it has to be an expression of political will in that it is impossible to draw any 
objective lines. Christian Europe? Not sure. Geographic Europe? Well, we 
are already beyond that. Value Europe? Our values go much beyond that. 
So we have to get twenty five countries to commit themselves to say: stop. 
It is so difficult because it is tempting to say: if you behave properly, then 
perhaps one day you can become member of the European Union. But of 
course the converse is also true – unless we say stop, we, the Union, will 
not develop a foreign policy towards those who cannot become members. 
So, in order to make the European Union an international actor we need to 
say stop. This is an extremely difficult but necessary decision.
Timothy Garton Ash
Perhaps in responding to these question we could on the panel all say: 
A) do we think negotiations should be open with Turkey in December, which 
is an immediate issue? And B) to whom else should we definitely hold out 
the prospect of membership in the longer term?
Christoph Bertram
I think Turkey should be in, although I don’t think Turkey will be in. 
Negotiations will be started, but I don’t think that when ratification is put 
to referenda, ratification will occur, so in relation to Turkey, at some stage 
we need to think anyway of real alternatives.
It cannot just be that the Union says what you ought to do and that 
is the new relationship. There has to be some institutional involvement 
although it is very difficult. I think we should say: the Balkans – yes, com-
mitments have been made, Turkey – commitments have been made, Swit-
zerland, Norway – whenever they want, maybe Iceland, but that’s it. But 
Ukraine – no, it is very big, and has a lot of problems, and it should be an 
example where we can develop an alternative relationship, I mean, not 
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all deserving countries should be members. And the idea that we can, by 
holding out the prospect of membership to Ukraine, significantly affect 
the domestic developments in that country, seems to me quite unproven 
at the moment. So I think we should use our minds, not least in relation to 
Ukraine, to think of other types of linking Ukraine to the fate of European 
Union, but not in membership.
Robert Cooper
I just have one thing to say quickly to David Calleo. I was not thinking 
about Thomas Jefferson but more about the Pilgrim Fathers, but there is 
a point. I actually think that even the term ‘fundamentalist’ is probably 
unhelpful in the context of Islam. But what I definitely reject is the Bernard 
Lewi’s view which is that there is only one approach and that is that eve-
rybody becomes like Turkey. Because I think that it is completely to ignore 
what the Islamic world is.
I wanted to come on to the question that Christoph Bertram raised about 
the limits to enlargement and about the need to have a foreign policy other 
than enlargement, and I come back to the quotation from Catherine the 
Great that I find very powerful: ‘I have no other way to defend my borders 
except to enlarge them’. And I am not sure that I disagree with her because 
the point today is that the real heart of policy is not about alliances but 
about domestic issues. And a real foreign policy is about getting inside 
people’s domestic systems, is about agricultural subsidies, etc. And you 
cannot conduct these matters in a kind of 19th century foreign policy way, 
you can only conduct them through common membership of institutions, 
common commitment, common framework of law. And as for: ‘is there 
a limit to the growth of the European Union’ well, if it can work at twenty-
five (I think it can, it requires a bit of adjustment) and can work at thirty, 
we are committed up to there at least, what is wrong with thirty-five, 
forty? I am not sure that there is a limit. I think that this process of creat-
ing common legal space is the most important piece of foreign policy that 
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you can do. And if you think of other bits of foreign policy, Britain, which 
has had a fantastic foreign policy over the years, has achieved more or less 
nothing. The real achievement of American foreign policy was actually 
through NATO, through the creation of common institutions. Other bits 
of American foreign policy, let’s remember American policy in Ethiopia, 
Angola, the Middle East – there is almost a common institution between 
the US and Israel...
Christoph Bertram
So we should consider Iran and Iraq as members?
Robert Cooper
Well, I am not saying that. But this is the most important piece of for-
eign policy. Iran and Iraq are different, but is American foreign policy so 
successful in other areas?
By the way, Europe actually does have actually quite a lot of other bits 
of foreign policy, Iran for example is one, which is relatively successful, so 
far so good, more successful than American foreign policy. What about 
US foreign policy in Cuba, is that such a success? The European policy of 
enlargement has been a gigantic success, just like the American policy of 
NATO used to be, which was about creating a common Western identity. 
That is the only way you can have a real foreign policy that has real impact 
on people.
What about Ukraine? The answer is: if you take Turkey, and if Turkey 
makes the European standards (there is still a long way to go), then the 
answer to Ukraine must be: ‘yes’. We made so many promises, if you take 
Turkey, you cannot say ‘no’ to Ukraine. That is absolutely clear.
What about Belarus, what about the other bits that break off Russia 
– well, we look at these when they come along. What about Morocco? 
I don’t actually see that for the moment.
Discussion
148
O przyszłości Europy
149New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
Timothy Garton Ash
Robert, because you are so close to the heart of making what is intended 
to be a European foreign policy, don’t you think that Christoph Bertram has 
a point that in a sense a pre-condition for making a neighbourhood policy 
for the Maghreb (for countries like Morocco, which would have a free trade 
area and so on) is to say: ‘no, you are not going to be a member for twenty 
years, but we are going to do X, Y, Z...’.
Robert Cooper
Actually Morocco is not seeking membership, it is not even thinking 
about it. It did once, and the European Union said ‘no’, the Treaty actually 
says ‘Europe’. Today Morocco is not seeking to change that answer. But what 
I wanted to say it was the Prodi’s remark that made me think that maybe 
this is going to end at this side of Mediterranean, because ‘everything but 
institutions’ has been the European slogan all along with the European 
economic area, the Mitterand’s plan for confederation, all of these things: 
everything except membership. And it never works because what people 
want is to sit at the table, they want to be consulted, want to have the voice 
in deciding their own fate. And the more powerful the European Union 
becomes, the bigger it becomes, the more people want to join it.
Ivan Krastev
I would try to make three points, and one of them is: where is the es-
sence of the soft power? OK., membership, but why? Yesterday there was an 
interesting re-formulation here, saying that Europe is about international 
rule of law. I don’t believe that this is so attractive. I don’t see any Bulgarian 
going for the European Union because of respect for the international rule 
of law. The European Union was about the solidarity on a non-national level. 
It was about re-distribution, it was not simply about shared sovereignty, but 
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about a kind of shared identities, so from this point of view I believe that the 
problem of the European Union is to what extent it can sustain its reference 
of attraction, turning simply to a strategic community, which, I agree very 
much, is what really matters from the security point of view.
But when you have twenty five, or thirty, thirty five members, you lose 
the idea of a community to which you belong. It is becoming much more 
a kind of institutional arrangement which can work on policy level and on 
economic level, but it is very difficult to have the feeling of belonging to 
it. And this feeling of belonging, in my view, was critical for the European 
project, especially for the new generation of Europeans.
If this is the case, then there is a fundamental problem with the European 
soft power, with the EU’s soft power. If you cannot offer solidarity, I am 
going to indicate two other things that the European Union cannot offer 
beyond its borders.
One is the welfare state. Do you imagine any of the Third World countries 
trying to develop the welfare state which was created and which was part 
of the political and social identity of the European Union for the last fifty 
years? No, to the extent that when the European Union tries to assist the 
economic policies, it sells the American policies. Washington Consensus is 
not supported simply by the US, it is supported also by the European Union. 
Neither IMF, nor the World Bank are simply American institutions. I am 
saying this because this is a huge problem and it has a lot to do with what 
the European Union wants to make out of itself, when the first generation 
of soft power is totally exhausted.
The second problem goes very much with the problem of political iden-
tity of the European Union before the post-modern states. What was the 
major political export of Europe in the 19th century, in the early 20th century? 
It was the nation state. And this is critical: the European Union, in order 
to be successful, needs states. And here we have the problem of the post-
post-colonial dilemma: you cannot allow any more of this type of a failed 
state territory anarchy because of security reasons, but there is no supply 
side for any type of territorial control. From this point of view the European 
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Union is much more vulnerable than the US, because of geography, because 
of the fact that the US is a very classical nation state. US is not afraid of 
immigration because US was born out of immigration. But for the welfare 
states in Western Europe immigration is a type of biological weapon which 
is going to destroy their welfare system, their social identities and change 
their political landscape. From this point of view the immigration problem, 
I agree totally with Aleksander Smolar, is going to be critical.
If you see the demographic trends, something strange is happening: 
the US is becoming more and more European. There are more and more 
Americans being born in the United States. Europe, and especially Western 
Europe, is becoming more and more American, there are more and more 
immigrants that you are going to see there (the republican France is an in-
teresting case here). So in a strange way also the sensitivity gap results from 
the fact that the US, at least demographically, is very much europeanised, 
and Europe is very much americanised, and I do believe it matters.
Now the Israeli – Palestinian conflict – I believe it is critical because 
in a certain way it is the only problem to which nobody can really offer 
a workable solution. Is it a secret for anybody that the majority of Arabs 
want to destroy the state of Israel? No. Isn’t it obvious that the only way 
Israel is surviving is by abusing the rights of Arabs and by creating more 
and more resentment?
There is a debate in the United States now about the connection be-
tween anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, and there is an accusation of 
Europe becoming totally anti-Semitic. I believe that something different is 
happening. Now in certain parts of the world, anti-Americanism is creating 
anti-Semitism which (because of many reasons) was not there before.
The Israeli – Palestinian conflict was globalised to the extent that it 
totally lost its local character and as a result of that it is unsolvable. It could 
be solvable only as a local conflict, as a conflict very much resembling the 
Kosovo – Serbs contradictions. But for the Arab community, this conflict has 
become all about symbolism and not about decisions, and then it is a part 
of the American domestic politics.
150
O przyszłości Europy
151New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
My last point – there is one important source of the weakness of the 
European Union in its attempts to influence the US: if you want to influence 
the US, you try to mobilise your ethnic group in the US, you try to influence 
the electoral process in the United States (Poles are one of the nations who 
know this best). But while we have Europeans in Europe, but we do not 
have Europeans in the United States: we have Poles in the US, Bulgarians, 
Hungarians, Germans, but when they decide to vote in the American elec-
tions, they never take seriously the fact that they are Europeans. And this 
is critical for the weakness of the European Union versus the US, because 
being a very type of a post-modern empire, the US doesn’t have interests, 
the US has voters.
Dominique Moïsi
I want to make two remarks on the question raised by Aleksander Smolar 
and touched by you recently. The Middle East and the emotional impact of 
the Middle East on the US – Europe relations. It is clear in the issue of the 
Holocaust. While, as Aleksander Smolar said, it has become a part of the 
American curriculum, in French schools in the suburbs of Paris you cannot 
teach the subject because of the fear of reactions by the students of Maghreb 
origins. It shows the gap in emotions.
But what is the most needed thing is unfortunately the most difficult 
to do. And that is for the Americans to restore the credibility vis-à-vis the 
Muslim world, and for the Europeans to restore the credibility vis-à-vis 
Israel. By doing so, they would play a useful role and they would limit 
the extent of the transatlantic gap on the issue. Unfortunately it is nearly 
impossible to do.
And from that standpoint, the association that has been recently created 
between Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush (in which nobody knows who 
has a stronger influence on the counterpart), has had a suicidal impact on 
the way Israel and the United States, if not the Jewish world, are perceived. 
What has been most tragic in that association is that, contrary to Iraq, which 
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is an obvious failure, it may appear as a success, a short-term suicidal suc-
cess, a proof that the use of military superiority can work. I think that in 
the long run it can only fail, especially in that part of the world. So what is 
the responsibility of Europe? The responsibility of Europe is huge – given 
the history. Europe was at the creation of the problem through colonialism 
and anti-Semitism. And Europe therefore should be part to the solution of 
the problem, if there is a solution to this problem.
But the solution to the problem returns to three words: a two states 
solution. There is a tendency now among the extremists of both sides to 
go beyond the two states solution, to consider that it is no longer valid but 
this is a recipe for disaster because I don’t think in the end there will be 
a solution without a two states solution.
The second term is really a ‘restoration’ of Europe’s credibility in Israeli 
eyes. And it is all the more difficult that the prejudice, the stereotypes have 
been increased. For the Muslims the United States is anti-Muslim and for the 
Israelis the European continent is not only anti-Israeli but probably also anti-
Jewish. And this is something new, it is the return of something old, which 
in itself is new, it was not the case a few decades ago. This restoration is an 
absolute priority, and the debate on enlargement should be placed in that 
framework. If the issue is preventing a war between Islam and the West, if 
Europe has to play a role in finding a solution to that issue, then you have 
to ask yourself seriously: what is more dangerous for Europe – to take the 
risk of integrating Turkey or to take the risk of saying ‘no’ to Turkey? And 
if you take that strategic vision I do believe that the risk of saying ‘no’ to 
Turkey is a much greater negative responsibility in the eye of history. But 
it means that what we are emphasising is the geography of values above 
the value of geography. And from that standpoint I think today Turkey is 
much closer to Europe than Ukraine is. It is far, but if we look at our own 
criteria – democracy and market economy – I have no doubt that Turkey is 
closer than Ukraine. It doesn’t mean that by accepting Turkey I am closing 
the door to Ukraine. On the contrary, I am telling the Ukrainians: look, we 
have taken a country which is not European, but whose values are moving 
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towards Europe. So if you do the same, you will become European, too. The 
enticement will be even greater for them to conform.
Krzysztof Bobiński
I just want to ask briefly if the Barcelona process can play a role here, 
trying to give support for democracy and the human rights in the Middle 
East?
Krzysztof Zielke (Polish Academy of Science)
Let’s assume a totally positive scenario about transatlantic relations, 
let’s say John Kerry wins and nominates Richard Holbrook as the Secretary 
of State, and Holbrook brings again Clinton’s new transatlantic partner-
ship scenario back to the table. What will be the European answer this 
second time around? I think that, first, this time Europe should agree to 
take responsibility in building new global order and should agree to NATO 
stabilising Iraq as we did in the Balkans, and, second, that Europe should 
support NATO enlargement to Ukraine as was done in the case of Poland. 
I think these answers to a ‘new American policy’ will again unite Europe 
and the US, may help to secure and stabilise the Middle East, even can help 
to secure a new oil road from the Caspian Area.
Ireny Comaroschi (Romanian ambassador to Poland)
I would like to comment on what I think is important in the debate on 
what we want and how we want to achieve our interests. I think the key word 
of today’s world is ‘exclusion’. Many citizens, even in Western Europe, feel 
that they are excluded, just as some states feel excluded by not being part 
of the European Union or NATO, or some, like Mediterranean or the Arab 
countries – by not being some part of other organizations. It seems that 
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the basic difference between Europe and the US is that people in America 
do not feel excluded.
Jan Wróbel (Europa Weekly)
Speaking from the Bulgarian and Polish perspectives, perhaps we do 
not have to choose between the European Union and the United States, but 
rather between the alliance of Great Britain and the United States and the 
alliance of France and Germany. This alliance, of a member of the European 
Union and the United States, is just smashing the European Union.
Bartosz Cichocki (Centre for Eastern Studies)
Last year I had the pleasure to participate in a meeting of experts and 
officials of the Task Force ‘Wider Europe’, a team headed by Mr. Verheugen. 
A question was asked of the Polish participants – why Poland was so force-
fully supporting the rapprochement of the European Union and Ukraine, 
to the point of membership. And I answered I thought it was because in 
Poland people were hoping that the membership of Ukraine would raise 
the profile and the role of Poland in the EU, and one of the colleagues and 
collaborators of Mr. Verheugen, confused, said: ‘this is why Ukraine will 
not be accepted’.
I am certain that only the full membership of Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova of the EU, rather than their participation in four freedoms, is the 
precondition and a standing guarantee of the integrity and security of 
those states and a condition of the security of Poland and other countries 
of the region as well as the entire European Union, and this is why Poles 
are such avid supporters of the membership of all these countries of the 
European Union.
A brief comment concerning what you started with, on the panel: Mr. 
Bertram mentioned the impact of the new EU states on the Eastern Dimen-
sion. I think this impact will not take the Finnish form in that there will not 
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be an Eastern Dimension. When I asked in Helsinki why and how the con-
cept of the Northern Dimension was so successful, I was told that this was 
because for a long time nobody knew what it was all about, it was a great 
idea, sounded well, but nobody really went deeply under the veneer and 
this is how the Finns were able to promote the idea so well. It is different 
with the Eastern Dimension, we all know it will cost a lot of money, and it 
will have far reaching consequences. And first and foremost in the European 
Union, its old member states do not trust the new member states as for the 
relations with the East. So it is not surprising that the Task Force ‘Wider 
Europe’ basically consists of Germans and the French as well as Spaniards in 
terms of relation with Northern Africa, while I don’t think that Lithuanians 
or Poles will be numerous members of this Task Force.
Ivan Krastev
Albert Hirschman in his great book ‘Passions and Interests’ claims that 
what happened during the Enlightenment and Modernity was that certain 
passions have been domesticated as interests and I believe that in some 
other parts of the world we still should talk about passions. And this in my 
view the weakness of the European Union.
‘Interest’ makes sense when it is a domesticated passion, when it is not 
simply a strategic calculation. One of the biggest challenges the European 
Union is facing is the extremely low trust in the democratic elected govern-
ments in the European nation states. From this point of view the problem 
of the European interest is becoming very difficult. In a certain way Europe 
is very much afraid of ungovernability of other countries. But Europe itself 
is becoming ungovernable.
And here I go to the problem of pre-emptive wars and the fact that we 
are at war. It is very difficult to simply say that we are going to avoid the 
war when one of the countries in the alliance is in the state of war. The 
problem with pre-emptive wars is that they are based on a judgement. And 
if the population does not believe in the judgement of its government, or its 
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intelligence services, these wars are never going to have a popular support 
and they are going to go from crisis to crisis.
Mr. Bush’s failure with the weapons of mass destruction de-legitimised 
an otherwise very important concept of pre-emptive wars. Even if today, 
imagine for a while, the American government receives a reliable informa-
tion about something bad going on in North Korea, and they think they 
should start a pre-emptive war, can this government do this? Can the next 
government do this? Who trusts the intelligence? Who trusts the political 
leadership? If you have a crisis of political leadership I don’t believe that 
pre-emptive wars are possible.
Robert Cooper
First of all, on interests. There are no separate European interests from 
American interests. They are exactly the same, there is only one area in 
which I would have a doubt about that; it concerns the Middle East, where 
sometimes it seems to me that the United States defines itself to include 
Israel. That is a difference almost of identity rather than of interest. But 
apart from that, there are no differences of interests.
Second – a small correction I wanted to make to what I have said before. 
And that is, there is a limit to enlargement. And the limit to enlargement 
is set by the existence or non-existence of a European identity. That is why 
for the moment, at any rate, and I should think for as long as I am alive, 
Morocco is not included, but that is why Ukraine, if that is what it chooses, 
can be included. That is the choice Turkey has made as well.
Third, I just want to refer very briefly to the Barcelona process. It is 
extraordinary that Europe has a way of calling everything ‘a process’, and 
giving it a name so that nobody really understands what this is. This is 
an enormous, important activity which provides the only forum in which 
Israel and the Arab countries sit together, actually we have seen a meeting 
between Israel and Syria chaired by the Palestinians at the sub-committee 
level: it is a really important set of policies.
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The real objective of that is to re-create the Mediterranean that existed 
once, long ago. A very long project, if we were Americans we would find 
a much better way explaining how important this was.
Next point, to somebody who mentioned Britain as a destructive force 
in the European Union – no. It is absolutely essential for Britain to be in the 
European Union, it is essential for the European Union that Britain is there, 
it is essential that the European Union has a good relationship with the USA, 
to which Britain makes a contribution, but so do others.
The next point I wanted to make is the general answer to Timothy 
Garton Ash’s questions. What should Europe do? I can give particular 
answers for lots of things, but what Europe really needs to do is to get it 
act together. So that it really has something to offer to the United States 
other than endless consultations. So that it is not a Europe of committees. 
I don’t mind committees, committees are necessary, so let’s say, as well as 
being a Europe of committees, that it is also a Europe of armoured divi-
sions, and – more important for the next generation - a Europe of effective 
intelligence services, to which perhaps new members like Poland who has 
a great tradition of a highly effective intelligence services, may offer an 
important contribution there.
What we need out of that in Europe, is the clarity about our policy. We 
need better capabilities across the world, we need to be more active. If we 
do all those things, then we will have influence in the USA. They are practical 
people, if we bring something to the table, then they will listen.
Christoph Bertram
Let me make three points. One is on interests, I fully agree with Robert 
Cooper, I don’t think there is any real difference of interests between the 
United States and Europe, there are differences in method, but we must not 
translate differences in methods into differences in objectives.
I would include here the Middle East issue. We sometimes forget that 
what we have at the moment has not been the normal situation. We have 
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had an Israel after all, since the Oslo Accords, interested in creating peace 
in the Middle East in a particular way, and you didn’t have any falling out 
between Europe and the United States on this. The moment that Israelis 
themselves offer a prospect for a peace for the Middle East, many of the 
problems we are facing now in transatlantic relations will disappear.
Moreover, as Ivan Krastev has reminded us, the problem with the Middle 
East is that neither the Americans nor the Europeans have an answer to the 
Israel-Palestine problem, it must be found by the Israelis themselves, and if 
we can assist them in finding it we should do that.
The second point is on the role of France, Britain, Germany and the in-
fluence that countries like Poland can have in the European Union. I don’t 
think that the Union can be led by any duo or a triangle. That is going to 
be fundamentally counterproductive. What all these groupings indicate, is 
the fact that none of these countries has yet understood that in order to get 
what they want in the European Union they need to work through others 
before they go to Brussels. Learning how to work through the methods of 
the Union to get what you want is something that none of our countries in 
foreign policy have yet understood. And the idea that if the British, French 
and Germans get together then they can define the policy is erroneous, 
it is perfectly counterproductive and it will not work. What is necessary 
is that all countries, big and small ones alike, understand that in order to 
move the Union they first have to have an idea, they have to be willing to 
take initiative, they have to get others on board, and when that is done, 
they can go to Brussels.
The whole idea that better institutions in Brussels are going to pro-
duce better policy is erroneous. The policies will have to be thought of 
at the initiative of states, and moved in a much more intelligent way 
than any of us have done, with a possible exception of the Finns, which 
need to be mentioned here again and again, not because they hide 
their true intentions behind big formulas (it may also be a clever way of 
doing things) but basically because they knew how to work the system. 
And if Poland wants to have an impact on the way the Union defines its 
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foreign policy (and perhaps what Poland did just before it joined was 
not the best way of going about it), it will have to learn how to operate. 
Unfortunately, there are not very many successful models that others 
have developed. As for my own country, I am deeply disappointed and 
displeased by the way in which the Germans tend to think that if they 
say: ‘this is what we want’, that is already European policy – it is not, it 
will not be. And if Poland says ‘this is what we want’, it will not become 
European policy, either.
But if Poland says: ‘this is an idea that we have, we are willing to take 
the initiative, we are willing to put some efforts and resources into it, and 
these are countries that we want to have on board and win over for our 
ideas’, and then move to the Brussels institutions, then, I think, it will be 
successful.
My final point on what Europe should do in relations to the United 
States – not just think, which is always helpful, but also speak. I have been 
very struck by the way in which Americans, even in the Bush years, have 
travelled through Europe, the neo-conservatives have been trying to spread 
their Gospel. But if you look at the other side, how many Europeans actu-
ally go to America and take part in the American debate? We have been 
not very forthcoming.
America is an extraordinary place for trying to take part in the debate, 
precisely because they don’t see themselves as a traditional nation state, 
precisely because they think they have a universal vision and mission. They 
are happy to accept that others criticise them because they think they are 
part of the same universal nation that America represents, it is a unique 
chance. And Europeans have to use that chance, they have to use it imagi-
natively, they have not done that so far. So let’s not believe that the gap is 
widening just by itself; it can narrow if we make an effort, and the effort 
means not just to think, but also to talk and make our point, get our point 
across not just perhaps to the America that is sympathetic to us but also to 
the America that is sceptical about us.
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Timothy Garton Ash
I think that is a marvellous note to end on, as is, I think, the remarkable 
statement that there are really no differences of interest between Europe 
and America, something that many people in Europe and many people in 
America have not perhaps noticed.
I think that this remarkable session has shown at least two things:
One, that when the best heads thinking about foreign policy in Europe 
get together they can come up with a pretty coherent, realistic and incisive 
prescription for what Europe can do. It is not impossible, by any means, to 
design a foreign policy strategy for Europe. It is very difficult to implement 
it, but it is not impossible to design it.
Secondly, that the design of that strategy for Europe is hugely enriched, 
not just quantitatively but qualitatively, by the enlargement. I think we have 
sensed it also from the various contributions from the floor here today, 
and, of course, in that enrichment, Poland as the largest new member from 
Central Europe, plays a particularly important part as in a sense the only 
regional power among the new members.
160
O przyszłości Europy
161New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
Special Lecture:
America and Europe: 
facing new challenges
Henry A. Kissinger
former US Secretary of State
For me it really means a great deal to be here in 
Warsaw. I see here my friend and inspiration, Bronisław 
Geremek, and my old friend, Jacek Woźniakowski, who 
was a student of mine at Harvard longer ago than I dare 
admit. You cannot imagine what it meant in 1957 to hear 
from somebody who had been in the Polish resistance. 
We had not met anyone from Poland when he came to 
Harvard to speak to us. The vision of freedom this country 
represented has served as an inspiration to me through-
out the period of the Cold War, and since.
When Europeans write about me, they say, ‘He was 
born in Europe, so of course he understands Europe – he is 
a European at heart’. The fact is that I was born in Europe, 
but I cannot say the period before I emigrated from Eu-
rope was the most glorious period of my life, or one that 
would attach me indelibly to European values. In fact, my 
formative experience of Europe was in the period after 
the war, when I came back to Europe with the army of 
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occupation. I saw a Europe totally smashed and witnessed its recovery, the 
restoration of relations with Germany and with other European countries 
and the fight for freedom in Eastern Europe. That was the period in which 
my political thinking was formed.
I mention this because I am of the generation for which Atlantic relations 
were identical with American foreign policy. When I joined Richard Nixon’s 
White House, the first trip that he took was to Europe. It was a matter of 
course and the basis of our foreign policy. Since then, there have been one 
or two intervening generations on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europe 
I knew best, first as a professor and then in government, was a Europe tied 
organically to the United States by necessity and by principle. In that Europe, 
co-operation with the United States was a matter of course. It was not always 
smooth, and there were many crises in the Cold War so, from that point 
of view, one should not look at it as some romantic period. But the fact 
was that, during that period, one had the sense of a common destiny and 
a common direction. The disagreements, when they occurred, were about 
the methods with which to achieve the common objective. They were not 
about the principle of whether we should co-operate. It is this which has 
now changed fundamentally.
I understand that the basic question here this morning was: ‘Is 
America interested in a united Europe, and what kind of Europe would 
America want?’ One other question I have heard from Polish friends in 
the day and a half that I have been here – and which was inconceivable 
the last time I was here five years ago – is: ‘What are we Poles going to 
do caught as we are to some extent between our friendship for America 
and the hostility to America of France and Germany?’ That is not to say 
that France and Germany are hostile to America, but the perception of 
some of my Polish friends is that, at a minimum, there is tension between 
France and Germany on the one side, and America on the other; and that 
it presents a problem for a Poland that very much wants to be part of 
Europe but does not want to separate from America. So let me deal with 
those two issues.
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First, what kind of Europe does America want? The real question is: which 
America are you talking about? When you talk about the vast, overwhelming 
majority of Americans, they have no idea what sort of Europe they want. 
The problem you face from that America is not hostility but indifference. For 
policymakers, the big concern is how to make them interested in an Atlantic 
relationship rather than overcoming their hostility. One of the psychological 
dilemmas between Europe and America, if not on the policymaking level, 
is the amount of time policymakers in Europe spend on European identity 
versus the amount of time American policymakers do. I would be amazed, 
and I don’t want to shock you, if any top policymaker in the United States 
has read the European constitution. I would be amazed if middle-level poli-
cymakers have read the European constitution. European foreign ministers 
spend 40 percent of their time on European matters; American policymak-
ers spend very little of their time on the institutions of Europe. Therefore, 
if you ask the question ‘what kind of Europe does America want’, I cannot 
give you a positive answer. But I can tell you this: as I have said, I am of that 
post-war generation in which the people I know and have worked with all 
believe in close relations between America and Europe, so we don’t have 
to be convinced. That’s an opportunity, but it’s also a problem, because the 
Europe we are familiar with is a Europe that was connected to America by the 
necessities of the Cold War and by the needs of its own economic recovery. 
So when a Europe appears that begins to oppose the United States, we are 
perhaps irritated more than we should be, in the way a father proclaims the 
importance of his son’s independence but who can’t guarantee he will like 
it when he sees it. Still, as a general proposition, I would have to say that 
the attitude of France and Germany to the Iraq issue was shocking for many 
Americans. Disagreement as to tactics we had all experienced before, even 
disagreement as to strategy by opposition parties; but what we had not 
seen before was governments that encouraged an attack on basic American 
motivations, this independently of what one might think of America’s judg-
ment in that period. This is what created the current situation, especially 
with respect to France, though not with respect to Germany, where the late 
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night comedians on TV make jokes about France. Normally they couldn’t 
make jokes about foreign countries, because 90 percent of their audience 
would not know what they were referring to.
Back to the question: ‘what does America want?’ America, as a coun-
try, has no clear-cut idea. The challenge we face is evident in the debate, 
at least in America, between multilateralism and unilateralism. The Bush 
Administration is accused of having committed unilateral acts while Eu-
ropeans prefer multilateral policies. But that is just the surface. The real 
problem is whether there is a sense of common purpose. If there is a sense 
of common purpose, multilateral action is nearly automatic. If there is no 
sense of common purpose, you will then be driven either to stagnation or 
to unilateralism. It is inherent in the situation.
This issue is often presented as if it were a question of procedure. But 
it is not a question of procedure; it is a question of substance. And what is 
unclear is whether it is possible at this time to develop a common sense of 
Atlantic community. That is what both sides of the Atlantic must answer, 
and it is something to which I am committed. But I cannot tell you for sure 
what would emerge if we addressed it seriously, only that I do believe we 
must address it seriously.
The early model, the Cold War model, was simple: it was ‘let Europe get 
stronger; let Europe get united, and then it will share some of our burdens.’ 
That essentially implied that there was only one way of looking at things, 
which was the American way, and that the European contribution should 
be to share our own burdens. That will not happen now. Now there will 
be a European expression of a European view. But what seems to me to be 
happening is that some circles in Europe believe that European identity can 
be found largely, or importantly, in opposition to the United States. It is not 
a question of whether Europeans can criticize America or have a different 
policy view. It is a question of whether, institutionally, Europe can only or 
primarily come to know what it is by opposition to the United States. If you 
talk to Americans who think about these problems, that is what would worry 
them: a Europe that is strong enough to express its own views and that these 
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on occasion differ significantly from those of the United States, on balance 
a great benefit to the international situation. But a Europe that defines itself 
in the classical European sense, practiced through the centuries – of trying 
to cut down the eminence of whatever country is most powerful and that 
orients itself towards this goal – would be a problem for America.
In the long run, this would also become a problem for Europe and for the 
world. A great portion of my intellectual studies has been devoted to classi-
cal models of foreign policy, the relations of states among each other and 
the way peace has been achieved and preserved in an international system 
composed of sovereign states. But we now live in a world that is on some 
levels beyond sovereignty and yet is operating on the basis of principles 
of the sovereign state established in the Westphalian Treaty of 1648. The 
cardinal aspect of the new world is that there are some challenges and op-
portunities that inherently transcend sovereignty. One is the privatization 
of security. It is now possible for private groups not identical with states 
– autonomous of states but operating on state territory – to create possibly 
the most immediate security challenges we face. They cannot be dealt with 
by the principles of sovereignty and the definitions of aggression elaborated 
in the period of the nation state.
The American definition of the necessity for preemption is intellectually 
correct. The nature of the threat requires preemption. This is not a bunch 
of wild men looking for opportunities to start war. But the articulation of 
that principle was all too American: the belief that an American statement 
could be automatically universalized. It cannot be left to one nation to give 
it content for an indefinite period of time. In the immediate post-September 
11 period, there was no choice. But one of the new challenges to America 
and Europe is to answer the question of whether it is possible to define 
principles of preemption that can be recognized by at least large segments 
of humanity, and which are applicable to a world in which even crime has 
become internationalized to some extent, not to speak of terrorism.
How does one deal with non-proliferation in a world in which you cannot 
afford to wait for aggression to take place and in which you cannot wait for 
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absolute proof? But neither do you want to establish a principle by which 
every nation can, by itself, define how to deal with proliferation, except as 
an absolutely last resort. In this sense the problem is not so much whether 
I can imagine European institutions that are compatible with America. 
I do not foresee any significant American intervention in the process of 
European unification. Most high ranking Americans and most people 
with influence on foreign policy do not have a fixed view on the details of 
European institutions. They do have a view on how the relationship with 
Europe should evolve on substance. It would be worrisome to them to find 
a Europe that opposes the United States as a matter of principle and as 
a means of establishing its own identity.
There are some practical considerations. There is the question of 
a European defense identity. Again, speaking to an academic group, I would 
say I have no problem with Europe developing its own identity in defense. 
But that raises two questions. One is the institutional question – what, then, 
becomes of NATO? At NATO meetings, does that mean the European mem-
bers caucus first and then meet with the Americans? I remember when, as 
Secretary of State, I first encountered the European Community. I faced the 
following problem: when I dealt with European countries, we could talk on 
any level of the bureaucracy; when we dealt with Europe, there was nobody 
to talk to until the European Community or the European foreign ministers 
had come to an agreement; and after they had come to an agreement, there 
was no point of talking to them because they could not adjust their posi-
tion, except going through the long process that produced the decision in 
the first place. So, if NATO is operated on the basis of a European caucus 
meeting with the Americans, one needs to build some flexibility into that 
system. Last year, at the height of the European-American disagreement, 
a group of Americans who had been in high office wrote a letter criticizing 
some of the rhetoric on the American side and urging a more conciliatory 
attitude. But they put in that letter one sentence in which they said it would 
be helpful if the Europeans permitted American observers to be present 
at the deliberations of European institutions. That one sentence in a letter 
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dedicated to the Atlantic friendship evoked vocal protest led by Jacques 
Delors and a German representative. Nobody congratulated these people 
for their appeal to restore the European-American relationship. Instead, 
they chastised them for the presumption that Americans might observe 
discussions relating to European institutions. I understand many of the 
criticisms, but let us look at the problem from the point of view of those of 
us who genuinely believe in an Atlantic relationship and who would like to 
develop some common purposes.
Whatever you think of how the war in Iraq started, how the political 
phase of the war is conducted from now on is a matter of absolute first im-
portance for Europe and the United States. It is not a matter for the United 
States alone. If the war in Iraq ends under conditions in which radical Islam is 
empowered and encouraged, it will have the most serious consequences all 
over Europe and, for that matter, all over the Muslim world. It is a question 
of the tactics by which we get a UN resolution, but in terms of what we are 
trying to achieve. In the United States I have argued for the importance of 
a contact group of countries that have a stake in the moderate Islamic world. 
I could go through a whole catalogue of issues: Iraq, relations with Iran, 
Palestine (where the standard European view is that America should impose 
its preferred solution on the Israelis, regardless of the consequences). And 
these are only the immediate issues.
We are living in an extraordinary period in which the international 
system is changing and a new international system is emerging. But the 
existing international system is also fundamentally changing its balances. 
The emergence of China is an event more significant than the emergence of 
Germany was in the nineteenth century – and the dislocations the emergence 
of Germany caused to the international system of the nineteenth century 
were huge. Just behind China in entering the international system as a major 
power is India. In the Middle East, some of the issues are like those of sev-
enteenth-century Europe during the wars of religion. In Asia, the problems 
are more similar to those of the balance of power of nineteenth-century 
Europe. And then there is a world for which there is no experience whatever 
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in history, a totally new system: the globalized system of the twenty-first 
century which has emerged in the Atlantic world. In that world, the questions 
are: ‘Can Europe and America define a common destiny? Can they define 
values in the name of which they can answer this question? What are the 
two sides of the Atlantic willing to do for each other that they would not 
do anyway on the basis of national interest?
If the international system were operated entirely on the basis of na-
tional interest, we would be analogous to that before 1914. Then we would 
live in an international system like that of the European state system from 
before 1914, in which there is an America, a Europe, a China and maybe a 
Russia and India, all of them conducting relations with each other on the 
basis of immediate calculations. But if it did not work confined to Europe, 
it surely cannot work in a globalized world without catastrophe. Therefore, 
the key question becomes: is it possible for Europe and America to develop 
a special relationship? That is what America has to try to face when our 
elections are over, whoever wins. We must learn to translate power into 
consensus. And Europe should use the mechanics of its integration and the 
formal slogans of independence to deal with how America and Europe can 
shape a response to their challenges.
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Questions:
From the public:
What do you think about focusing more on prevention rather than 
preemption with regard to US foreign policy, and to what extent do you 
believe that the current state of international affairs is a product of errone-
ous foreign policy decisions made in the past with regard to Afghanistan, 
Iraq or the Middle East in general?
Henry A. Kissinger
Theoretically, I think prevention is better than preemption; in principle, 
I agree with this. On the other hand, the shocking thing about September 11 
for Americans was that, on September 10, no American would have believed 
that New York would be attacked from the Middle East, or thought of the 
Muslim world as an inherent enemy of the United States. So no amount of 
prevention theory would have prepared America of 2001 for this situation. 
Many argue that prevention consists of raising the economic level of devel-
oping countries. This has merit independent of terrorism. However, that is 
a long-term project which will not bring immediate relief from terrorism.
In my remarks I said that it is not possible to conduct policy entirely on 
the basis of the classical definition of national interest. Critics of the real-
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ist school of foreign policy assert that foreign policy cannot be separated 
from values. I agree with this. Foreign policy is unmanageable if you don’t 
have any values, but there is one practical aspect: values are universal and 
absolute; policy is contingent. Any policy act, most of the time, is incom-
plete and represents only a partial solution, therefore never fully meeting 
absolute values. How to live with the world in which values provide the 
strength to act in difficult circumstances but cannot be fulfilled completely 
in one lifetime is a key problem before our time.
Heather Grabbe
You said that the important thing about the Iraq war was not how we 
went into it but how to prevent it from empowering radical Islam. So how? 
How does the United States get out of Iraq, how do the Europeans help, 
how do we prevent things from getting worse as far as empowering radi-
cal Islam?
Henry A. Kissinger
The first thing we must do is to engage countries that have a real stake 
in this. I respect the representative of the Secretary General who is going 
around trying to assemble a government. But at an early stage, it is im-
portant to involve countries like India, Turkey, Algeria, countries that have 
experience with radical Islam and that know it. Not to send troops (that 
would be welcome, but it is not the key issue) but to deal together with 
us on how to conduct the political process that now has to take place in 
Iraq. First, so that we can learn from their knowledge and make it a more 
common project and, secondly, so that we are not in a position where we 
appear to be unilaterally trying to impose a solution. That is intellectually 
the next step that needs to be taken, but it is not a magic formula. You have 
to understand that I speak here as a private citizen, not as a representative 
of the American government.
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Aleksander Smolar
What about your project for the Middle East, because I understood from 
your speech that you had some ideas?
Henry A. Kissinger
The worst thing I could say here is that I have a solution to this problem. 
An article I recently published described what I think should be done. My 
basic point was that President Bush was fundamentally right in pointing out 
what the parameters of the solution should be but that it should be achieved 
by a combination of America, Europe and the moderate Arab states. Israel 
has not been recognized by its neighbors in its entire history and can see 
on television and read in newspapers every day that its extermination is 
the principal goal of major segments of its neighbors. Some of the security 
concerns of Israel have to be recognized but, at the same time, the dignity 
of the Arabs and especially of the Palestinians has to be recognized as well. 
My fundamental point in it was that here is a classic case of something that 
cannot be solved by America alone. Europe forever urges America, ‘go and 
bring pressure on Israel’. What we need to do is to find a position that we 
can justify to ourselves and in which America uses its influence in Israel, 
Europe uses its influence in the Arab world and, hopefully, we can get the 
moderate Arab states to co-operate with us before the situation gets totally 
out of control.
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Aleksander Smolar
During the first sessions of our conference we started with the history 
and the historical and geopolitical choices of the nations and of the elites 
of Central and Eastern Europe, then we moved to a more general problem: 
US – European relations as seen from the US side and from the European 
side. Now we are back to Central and Eastern Europe, although of course we 
do not want to limit ourselves to this region only. The question we would 
like to ask is what we think today about the new position and about the 
prospects of our region in Europe and in the world.
I would like to remind you of a sentence written by Timothy Garton 
Ash in the 1980s saying that ‘in Europe there are those who have Europe 
and those who know what Europe is’. By those who have Europe he meant 
Western Europe, by those who know what Europe is about he meant Eastern 
Europe. There are similar declarations of different people, including the 
Pope, about a more profound presence of European values in the part of 
Europe which was dominated by communism. It would be quite interesting 
to explore how far this perception is valid today.
There are a number of practical questions: what will be the role of 
East Central Europe, I would not dare using the term ‘the new Europe’, in 
the European Union? What is the model, the ideal of Europe we can read 
from the writings, from speeches, from the way of thinking of elites in our 
countries? Will our countries act on equal footing with other countries 
or are we going to see the reconstruction of Europe of different speeds, 
according to various projects we heard about stressing the need of a hard 
core of Europe? If such is a probable evolution of Europe, what will be the 
place of Eastern and Central Europe? And finally, the question that was 
discussed yesterday and today – what will be the role of our part of Europe 
in the construction of new relation between Europe and the United States, 
the transatlantic relation?
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Timothy Garton Ash
I want to talk about what we in Europe, we together 
in Europe can do. It seems to me that the best way to 
celebrate the enlargement is not to talk about the past 
but to talk about what we can do together in future. 
Henry Kissinger has given us a masterly account of what 
America can do and what perhaps the transatlantic com-
munity can do, and I want to concentrate specifically on 
Europe and the role of Central Europe.
My first comment is – in our title we have said ‘Central 
and Eastern Europe’. I want to talk only about Central Eu-
rope. Central Europe is not between the European Union 
and the United States. Central Europe is in the European 
Union and in an alliance with the United States. We could 
of course have a long discussion about where Central 
Europe ends and shifting definitions of Central Europe, 
but most of what has traditionally, by different interpre-
tations, been regarded as Central Europe, is now in the 
European Union. We might talk about Croatia later. Some 
would claim that Ukraine is now the new Central Europe. 
But I’m talking about Central Europe which is in the European Union, it is not 
anymore defined geopolitically, by the classic dilemma of being between 
Germany and Russia, it is not any more defined primarily geopolitically 
by being between East and West, nor is it defined by being between the 
European Union and the United States. It is defined, like Britain, by being 
torn between two competing versions of what should be the relationship 
between Europe and America, that is the issue.
Yesterday Jacques Rupnik reminded us that after 1848 František Palacký 
confronted the dilemma of the Czech land. He was asked to choose between 
a Russian dominated East and a German dominated West. And Palacký’s 
choice was not to choose but to find an alternative, Austroslavism (if Aus-
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tria hadn’t existed, he said, it would have been necessary to invent it). In 
my view Central Europe today would be well advised to take a leaf out of 
Palacký’s book, and I think it is in fact doing so.
Central Europe is asked to choose between a definition of Europe 
against the United States, that’s to say a version of Europe which defines 
Europe by what is not America, and seeks the future of Europe as a rival 
super-power of the United States, and on the other hand a version of Eu-
ropean – American relation in which Europe is clearly subordinate to the 
United States; what is more – in which not Europe as a whole, as a Union, 
but individual European countries compete to be the most faithful lieuten-
ants of Washington. I have to say, in all frankness, that I think in recent 
months there has been at least a temptation for Poland to become as it 
were more British than the British in this regard. I believe and I hope that 
Central Europe will refuse that choice and instead answer with a synthesis 
which has a name – and that name is Euro-Atlanticism. Now I would be 
happy to stand corrected by others in this room, but I certainly didn’t hear 
many people talking about Euro-Atlanticism as one word, with or with-
out a hyphen. Until after 1990, as far as I know, these terms were actually 
popularised by the leaders of Central Europe, by Vaclav Havel and others. 
What they meant was something different from simply Atlanticism. It’s 
no accident that it was called Euro-Atlanticism in one and the same word. 
What it meant was that Europe and America should be equal partners in 
a community in which our starting point is that we share most of the same 
values, many of the same experiences, and most of the same interests. In 
other words, Euro-Atlanticism is quite consciously an answer both to what 
I call the ‘Euro-gaullist’ definition of Europe which tries to define Europe in 
terms of a set of values that are different from those of North America, in 
terms of a social and economic model different from that of North America, 
in terms of an approach to international relations different from that of the 
United States. You all know the litany: the Americans are hyper-religious, 
we believe in the division of church and state and secularism; we believe 
in the welfare state; we have gun control; we don’t have capital punish-
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ment; we believe in multilateralism; we believe in international law. In 
other words, an attempt to give the larger Europe of twenty five member 
states, since May 1, a collective identity to hold together, this large and 
very diverse political community, in the classic fashion of European nation 
building, by constructing ‘an Other’, a constitutive ‘Other’, against which 
we define ourselves, not anymore the Soviet Union, not anymore Islam, 
but America: Europe, in short, as a not-America.
Euro-Atlanticism is, it seems to me, a Central European, but not only 
Central European answer both to that temptation and to the temptation 
of competing as individual nation states for the status of the best friend 
of George W. Bush. So if we don’t define Europe in terms of identity, how 
do we define it? And this is my last and in a sense my main point. I believe 
that when we sit around the European table together, with our new Central 
European full and equal partners in the European Union, we should look 
for a definition of Europe which is not based on any claims about European 
identity and about a distinctive set of European values, but which calmly 
analyses European interests and says clearly where they coincide with those 
of the United States and where they do not; but above all, we should look for 
a definition of Europe that is based on a strategic definition of the European 
Union, and that’s to say to define the European Union by what it aims to do 
inside its borders but above all outside its borders.
Two particular aspects of that: firstly, as Henry Kissinger already men-
tioned, the very important discussion about the criteria for intervention, 
all together. Intervention both of humanitarian kind, to prevent genocide, 
but also the new kind of intervention to pre-empt, if we cannot prevent, the 
fateful combination of failed states, international terrorism and weapons 
of mass destruction. This is a new and real security threat and the fact that 
this claim has to some extent been abused to justify the invasion of Iraq, 
does not make the threat any less real. What we Europeans need to do is 
to come up with our own proposal for how we should revise the work of 
that old European Thomas Acquinas and come up with some new criteria 
for intervention.
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There is another thing which Europe specifically has to do, and this is 
to continue our discussion this morning. Paradoxically it seems to me the 
main effect of this enlargement is to focus our attention on the necessity 
of the next enlargement. That is to say the strategic definition of the larger 
Europe comes precisely in what it does towards its neighbours, and it can 
do two kinds of things. One thing we know how to do, one thing we don’t 
know how to do. The thing we know how to do is what I call ‘the politics 
of induction’, that is to say a set of policies which lead eventually to mem-
bership of the European Union. These are the politics the European Union 
practised highly successfully towards Central Europe over the last fifteen 
years. In my view we should take a strategic decision to practise the politics 
of induction firstly towards Turkey (that is to say in December we agree to 
start negotiations for Turkish membership of the European Union), secondly 
towards the whole of the Balkans, a very difficult case for many reasons, 
but in principle a clear case for the politics of induction, and thirdly, and 
perhaps most adventurously, in my view we should take an explicit strategic 
decision that we wish to practise the politics of induction towards Ukraine 
over the next ten to twenty years.
In bringing us to make that decision, and I believe that the Polish voice 
will be very important, we can discuss subsequently why that is so impor-
tant in terms of the whole geopolitics of Eurasia and the future of Russia, 
not just of Ukraine. But I believe we should take that strategic decision 
and take it explicitly now, knowing for well that the actual process will be 
a very long one.
Finally, there will clearly be a great many of our near neighbours (and 
when I say the near neighbours I mean here for example Morocco which 
is nine miles at its closest point from Spain) to whom for one reason or 
another we are not going to make even the strategic offer of membership 
in the European Union, even in the perspective of ten to twenty years; and 
the other thing we have to do as Europeans is to start developing a neigh-
bourhood policy to those states who are not going to be members for the 
foreseeable future and to state that explicitly.
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Henry Kissinger already mentioned two very particular cases: Israel 
– Palestine on the one hand, Iraq on the other. Let me mention two 
others: Iran, vitally important, a place where a certain kind of European 
influence is already apparent, and where a kind of European politics 
which we have practised between West and Eastern Europe and which 
consists in the rather subtle encouragement of processes both of reform 
from above and of social change from below, can be practised. Second 
example – the Maghreb, an area of vital interest to Europe since the 
politics of emigration, particularly from the Muslim world, threaten to 
destabilise the whole domestic politics of the European Union. Here 
Europe has a plethora of policy instruments which the United States 
does not possess. Where is the trade? It’s with Europe much more than 
with the United States. Where are the movements of people? To Europe 
much more than to the United States. Where are the closest networks of 
cultural exchange and classical diplomacy with North Africa? They are 
with Europe much more than with United States. What I would submit 
that we together with Central Europe in the European Union should be 
doing is to develop a European strategy both for those countries which 
are candidates for membership and for those who are not going to be 
members in the foreseeable future and this should then be the offer 
that the new European Union brings to the table with the United States, 
an offer made very clearly to the new administration after November 2; 
whichever administration that is, whether it is Bush or Kerry, the offer 
should be there on the table as a European offer.
May I say my final word: in formulating that strategic policy over the 
next six months I do believe that the Polish voice, of all the new members, 
will be by far the most important. Poland is the only original power among 
the new members, it is the only country which has a foreign policy, which 
tries to think geopolitically about the whole region, particularly towards its 
Eastern members, and I think it would be a great shame if the Polish voice 
as you join us at the table in Brussels is heard, starting next month in June, 
as being a rather old Polish voice of the liberum veto on the constitution, 
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and not a new Polish voice which comes to the table with something really 
positive to offer Europe as a whole.
Bronisław Geremek
I would like to say how happy I am that Dr. Henry 
Kissinger is in Warsaw today, on this happy day for Po-
land, now that we are a member of both NATO and the 
EU. All the time, he was a sympathetic observer of the 
process of the Polish transformation and we will never 
tire of expressing our gratitude for his support for our 
membership in NATO.
I have a feeling that during the previous sessions 
everything that could be presented as a sophisticated 
analysis, has already been presented. So let me make 
some remarks concerning the simplest things, for 
sometimes the simplest things matter. The first one 
– the title of our conference ‘Central and Eastern Europe 
and Geopolitics’: Central and Eastern Europe needs 
some comment. Using this term we do not consider it 
as a Mitteleuropa. It is something else. So what is this 
Central Europe which we have a kind of nostalgia for? 
Central Europe has few common political interests. What 
Central Europe does have is a common history. One can 
say that history is the only cement of this region. Central Europe is first of 
all Europe, a Europe which is not central at all, but rather peripheral. The 
political effect of this situation is that we have this fear of being marginal-
ised. This is a fear we have had for one thousand years. It matters now and 
it will matter in the future. So, for both reasons, Central Europe is looking 
for strong structures of co-operation and solidarity, for collective guaran-
tees. It is thinking how not to fall prey to isolation and how not to have 
a feeling of being abandoned.
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My second remark is the question of whether the notion of the West is 
a completely obsolete term. Can we see that the unity of the West means 
a kind of geopolitical axiology? Sometimes this question of change in the 
geopolitics of Central Europe refers to the axiological problem of values. 
In a speech I delivered in France I spoke about the importance of values 
for the future of Europe. I was very well received. Afterwards I proposed 
to analyse the notion of the West as a union of values and I was, of course, 
considered an American Trojan horse. To me, the West still seems to be an 
important reference in a world where geographical borders matter less 
than they used to. Axiology should be considered a political fact. The West 
presents these values that we share – freedom, human dignity, individualism, 
democracy, rule of law, maybe also a Promethean inventive spirit. These 
are the values and the spiritual heritage of the West. And if we, Central 
Europeans, are attached to the notion of the West, this is also because of 
our historical experience in which we have had to prove that we do belong 
to the West. The French, the Germans, the Italians didn’t have to prove it 
– we did. So the West is something which matters for us as a reference. 
And if terrorism cannot be confined to borders, to geography, one needs to 
see that international terrorism is directed against some axiological rather 
than geographical borders. In such a situation, facing the phenomenon of 
terrorism, the concept of the West can be both useful and workable. Europe 
and America need each other but on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean this 
sentence is put in doubt. In Europe we see a search for a collective identity, 
through a process which could be called ‘a process of emancipation’. This 
need of emancipation seems to characterise the European debate on the 
America–Europe relationship. In some European debates America is con-
sidered if not as an enemy, at least as ‘the other’, as a reference giving us 
the possibility to define ourselves.
In the United States, as Henry Kissinger said, the greatest and most 
pressing danger is the indifference to European affairs. Indifference, if not 
at times – in the political elites – disdain. It was with a tremendous feeling 
of happiness that I received the famous letter of American intellectuals and 
Session IV
Central and Eastern Europe in search 
of a place in Europe and worldwide
182
O przyszłości Europy
183New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
politicians quoted by Dr. Kissinger. I read it while being in France, I spoke 
with my French friends, and their reaction was: so now Americans are 
proposing their presence in our debate on the future of Europe, but would 
they propose a European presence, a presence of European representa-
tives, in the meetings of the National Security Council? Would they accept 
a European presence in debates concerning the future of America and the 
world? It is, I think, also one of the important reasons why sometimes the 
European reaction to American proposals – and even at times expressions 
of sympathy – is received with a kind of lack of trust. It stems first of all from 
the feeling that the process of European unification, which was supported 
by the US, which was regarded with sympathy by the US, is now viewed by 
the US in a rather negative way. The question is why? Why does America, 
so deeply interested in the process of European integration, now fear that 
it will change the relationship between the two? And that is giving rise to 
this feeling of the necessity to emancipate. Europe sometimes seems to be 
treated as a pupil.
Central Europe is concerned about both these attitudes. On one side as 
well as on the other we see our interests, but also our dreams and hopes, 
put in doubt. We wanted to escape from Soviet domination and we did it. 
We wanted to obtain membership in the European Union and in NATO as 
a community of values and interests, and we did obtain it. Now, we wouldn’t 
like to see these guarantees obtained, these hopes realised, vanish. So we 
want the United Nations system reformed, but only the United States and 
the European Union can try to do it, only by working together can Europe 
and America do it. And that is a necessary condition for a multilateral, 
international policy.
We, Central Europeans, want a European Union with strong internal 
structures, with a constitution, and this Polish liberum veto was not part 
of the historical tradition of this institution. One should not forget that 
with the liberum veto Poland was able to live without problems for two 
hundred years. With the constitution without liberum veto we were un-
able to survive even for six months. I hope that now Polish policy on the 
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constitution will be defined in a definitive way. We need the European 
Union with the constitution, because only in the context of a strong 
European Union can we count on assistance policies, giving us the op-
portunity of rapid growth, but also because we want to be a member of 
a community and not only of a coalition of states. A community needs 
a common foreign and security policy, as well as a kind of European de-
fence. One cannot think about foreign policy without military and policing 
instruments. But we consider it, or we can consider it, to be a defensive 
structure complementary to NATO. That was the very sense of the Blair 
– Chirac – Schroeder declaration which proposed European defence as 
a complementary structure. And I do believe that with such an approach 
we will be able to find the notion of the common European interest. We 
will have different internal alliances inside the European Union. And I don’t 
think that Central Europe will form such an alliance in European politics. 
I do not believe that one can find a kind of complementarity between 
the Central European countries. The reference will only be historical, 
but not political. But I do believe that the Weimar Triangle, the special 
co-operation between France, Germany and Poland, can be considered 
as an interesting and intelligent instrument. I would like to see a more 
active role of the United Kingdom, but I am not sure that the policy the 
United Kingdom is proposing within the European Union could assemble 
different projects and different interests.
Central Europe can become a factor in European unification only when 
we will have a debate on the future of Europe. Unfortunately, debates like 
the one we are having in this room, and in some other rooms in Poland, are 
very rare. Still, as we are now members of the EU, we should consider the 
issue of the future of the EU as a question concerning us directly.
To my mind NATO, and that is my last point, is still relevant not only to 
Polish interests, to the future of Poland, but also to the European interest 
and to the future of Europe. Because of Article Five of the Washington 
Treaty, it is still relevant as far as peace in Europe is concerned. But it can 
also become global instrument of European – American co-operation for 
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world peace. And NATO now, changing its philosophy of action, think-
ing on out of area operations, is becoming such an instrument of global 
politics. And in a sense, it is an expression of the unity of the West, the 
expression of this tradition formed during the 20th century. It is a political 
and military tool which we still need, and which can be of tremendous 
importance. Do we need an independent defence structure? I do believe 
that Europe needs a defence structure but it should not to be considered 
as being in competition with NATO. Some European countries are unable 
to increase their military expenditures. Some European countries do not 
want to increase military expenditures. Pacifist Germany would not obtain 
democratic approval for such a policy. Neogaullist France does not want 
to pay for European defence. In terms of expenditure, Europe is not ready 
to accept military defence as one of its objectives. So maybe we should 
consider NATO as a European defence alliance and for us, Central Europe-
ans, I would say it was from the beginning a European alliance with the 
participation of North America. Let’s consider that the European Union is a 
very special superpower (because it is a superpower) but only in the sense 
of soft power. But this weakness can become a virtue, for it means that 
human rights issues and democracy are in the centre of European activity. 
And it is a programme, but still it is very difficult to obtain a unity of mean-
ings in Europe, a unity of policy, concerning these traditional structures 
of European soft power. How to understand the fact that in the year 2000, 
the Warsaw Conference on democracy could obtain a consensus among 
more than one hundred countries, but France, one of the homelands of 
democracy and freedom, was not part of this document? So in my view we 
should not think that the conflict which appeared between America and 
Europe is rooted in cultural values. One can be critical of neoconserva-
tive doctrine, of a concrete policy, but I don’t see a reason for seeing it as 
a cultural gap between America and Europe, rooted in culture. Thinking 
on the future of this relationship: perhaps this reference to the unity of 
the West may be a good argument.
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Heather Grabbe
I am going to speak primarily about the question of 
how enlargement will change the European Union, what 
kind of Europe will emerge, now that Central Europe is 
fully a part of the European Union. In a sense all of us 
in Europe today are now asking ourselves the old Polish 
question: Europa tak, ale jaka? [Europe – yes! But what 
kind of Europe?] We don’t really know what kind of Eu-
rope will emerge. But in some ways we have had a rather 
distorted vision of it because of enlargement coinciding 
with the question of Iraq. The issue of the war in Iraq has 
confirmed the prejudices of many people, especially in 
the fifteen old Member States, I think rather erroneously; 
it gives a very distorted mirror.
In France, in Belgium, in Luxembourg and in parts of 
Germany you often hear the expression: ‘The Central and 
Eastern Europeans will be American Trojan horses’, and in 
Britain you hear a slight air of triumphalism: ‘Aaa, these 
will be the staunchest allies of the United States in every 
circumstance’. Both of these views, I think, are going to 
be wrong. I remember, on the night when the planes went to Iraq, when the 
war began last year, sitting at dinner with a senior British Defence official 
who was very proud to proclaim, or to predict rather: ‘As Europe moves 
eastwards, its centre of gravity will move westwards’, hoping, no doubt, 
that the heart of Europe would comes closer to London’s point of view in 
world affairs rather than that of Berlin.
But in fact, I think, EU foreign policy is going to move eastwards with the 
enlargement to the EU’s troublesome neighbours. That is very good news 
in many respects, but it raises new challenges which the European Union is 
only just beginning to grapple with. I am just going to outline briefly four 
ways in which the European Union will change and how that will affect 
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its ambitions and its capabilities in the world. First of all – new versus old 
Europe is a false dichotomy. Iraq was a special case. Although the US can 
count on Central and Eastern Europe when it issues an ultimatum ‘Are you 
with us or against us?’, of course Central Europe is going to say: ‘We are 
with you’. But I don’t think the US can rely on Central and Eastern Europe 
to follow into further military adventures, although perhaps the US public 
may be in that position as well.
Certainly it is true that the new members of NATO are very active in 
peace-keeping operations around the world, they have a large proportion 
of their troops abroad, they are developing niche capabilities which are 
very useful for the Atlantic alliance, have a strong commitment to NATO, 
but there is a somewhat ambivalent attitude in this region towards inter-
national institutions and there is a somewhat different understanding of 
power. This is a desire not to meddle much, not to disrupt the status quo too 
much all over the world, there is certainly not in this region a sharing of the 
neoconservative agenda of spreading democracy from the barrel of a gun. 
There was a very interesting comment made by Polish President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski last week. He was asked: ‘What do you think about the idea of 
promoting democracy in the Middle East?’ He shifted uncomfortably in his 
chair and said: ‘Well, I don’t really like to hear about promoting democracy 
because I heard for so many years the idea of promoting socialism in the 
world’. So I think the neoconservative agenda is not a shared thing here. 
And the understanding of power being somewhat different also affects the 
way in which the new members will approach one of the biggest strategic 
issues that the EU has to face in the years ahead – and that is its relation-
ship with Russia.
Russia is still at the centre of security concern in many countries in this 
region, in the Baltic states for obvious reasons, not just because of their 
history of being coerced into the Soviet Union, but also because of continu-
ing Russian pressure on issues like the Baltic minorities and the Kaliningrad 
exclave. This is why, I think, these countries are so strongly Atlanticist, more 
so even than Poland or Slovakia.
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It is not so much that Central and Eastern Europeans are afraid of inva-
sion, it is more a distaste for sphere of influence and balance of power 
politics. Their view on these subjects, their concern about the fact that the 
resurgent Russian interest in what it sees as its natural sphere of influence 
has a tension, has a potential conflict with the European Union policy for 
its new neighbourhood. That is an area into which the new members will 
be able to put their preferences, their history, their concerns. The idea that 
there is not necessarily a clear division of labour between Russia and the 
EU which can be neatly demarcated along the borders of particular coun-
tries, Ukraine of course is a classic example – how do you divide Ukraine 
between Russia and Europe?
A third area where, I think, the new members will make a significant 
difference to how the EU develops, is in what kind of European security 
and defence policy emerges. As Bronisław Geremek was just saying, it 
is clear that the new members prefer the ESDP which is compatible with 
NATO, of course. But how do we deliver it? And is it really attractive? It 
seems to me that for many people in Central and Eastern Europe, ESDP is 
only attractive in so far as it can deliver, in so far as it can actually resolve 
conflicts, sort out problems, not either as a rival to NATO or as an identity 
vehicle for Europeans to define themselves vis-à-vis the United States, but as 
a practical problem solver.
So far there has been rather lukewarm interest in the European Security 
and Defence Policy from Central and Eastern Europe. The Lithuanian Defence 
Minister for example commented on it: ‘I would be great if ESDP caused 
Europe to develop serious military capabilities. But it will not, so let’s stop 
kidding ourselves, let’s stop paying the lip service to all of this’. But if ESDP 
can be used in the years ahead to sort out things like frozen conflicts, for 
example to replace Russian troops in Transdnistria, then, I think, the Central 
East European members of the EU could actually be convinced about it.
And in particular Poland could be a swing vote here. Poland could be 
a rather interesting country in this respect, Poland could change its mind 
about its enthusiasm for NATO over ESDP, if it were invited to join the big 
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three countries in discussing defence and foreign policy. If Poland were 
able to form a part of quartet with Britain, France and Germany on devel-
oping European security and defence policies, then Poland could become, 
I think, rather enthusiastic about it. But again it depends on the ability of 
the Europeans to deliver.
The final issue is in fact these big three countries – of course the new 
members of the EU do not want to see the EU dominated by the large coun-
tries alone. And the idea of having a hard core Europe which is essentially 
led by France and Germany is not welcome. There are some horrendous 
historical nuances and connotations of the idea of France and Germany 
getting together. We felt those, one could see people shuddering in Central 
and Eastern Europe last year when France and Germany got together with 
Russia to oppose the US in terms of policy on Iraq. This just had exactly the 
wrong kind of historical connotations.
But it may be that leadership from France, Britain and Germany, the 
big Three, on foreign policy in the EU is the only way to get things done. 
As some of the EU’s top officials in foreign policy said last year: ‘Most 
countries in Europe do not really have a foreign policy, and my job is to 
persuade those that do not have a foreign policy that the foreign policy of 
those that do have one, is theirs as well, and is appropriately European.’ 
And I think that this person was right in seeing it as essential that Britain, 
France and Germany agree, it is the only way Europe can have an effective 
common policy, can have a voice in the world. But of course it is also quite 
understandable that the new Member States, like the small old Member 
States, want to have a strong say in the way the EU formulates and con-
ducts its foreign policy. In fact enlargement nearly increases the dilemma 
we have of how to reconcile inclusiveness of decision making in foreign 
policy with effectiveness externally. The new members, of course, are keen 
to be involved, but they do not want to see Franco-German domination 
of foreign policy. But how can we forge a common policy if we spend so 
much time trying to reconcile fairly minor differences rather than facing 
the major challenges?
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In that sense I think the new members will forge very different alliances. 
I agree very much with Bronisław Geremek that there will be no Eastern block 
in the European Union, that in fact the commonality of being candidates 
for membership, the commonality of being Central European is not really 
a glue that will hold, once the new members are fully integrated into the 
EU. And for that reason the alliances are going to be very fluid, there are 
going to be many shifting coalitions between new and old Member States, 
between big and small Member States, and I think actually the divides be-
tween Member States will be much more between big and small, between 
liberals and protectionists, between strong alliance defenders and strong 
Europeanists on defence, rather than between new and old members.
I have been doing a little bit work recently for a book which looks at 
how will the new members forge alliances on particular issues. Actually 
when you look across the whole range of EU issues, economic as well as 
those that have to do with foreign policy, security, justice and home affairs, 
there is no consistent, coherent constellation of countries which are always 
together. The new members don’t stick together on many issues and Poland 
is hardly ever with the other new members. Poland is usually forming an 
alliance with old members, particularly other large countries.
From that point of view I think a very interesting question is whether 
Poland will take a large country view or a small country view on the ambi-
tions for European external policy. Will it be, as I think, a large country with 
a small country mentality? This is still an open question for Poland. Poland 
has the potential to be an enormous contributor to the EU policy. But what 
about new other member states? I started off by saying that many people in 
Britain hope that the other new Member States will be rather like UK, that 
they will have very British preferences. Of course that is the fear in France 
and other countries that they might be like that.
But I would predict that actually most of the new members are not going 
to look like Britain at all, when it comes to their ambitions for EU foreign 
policy and the alliances they will form. They are quite status quo oriented, 
they do not necessarily want to rock the boat, they want European security 
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to be at the top of the agenda for NATO and for European security organisa-
tions. In this respect they resemble another Member State, not Britain at all, 
they look very much like Germany; like the traditional German foreign policy 
which is quite status quo oriented, which is strongly Atlanticist, but which 
also supports the idea of Europeans looking after their own backyard.
This idea that the new members might be rather like Germany in their 
preferences might be somewhat surprising and not entirely welcome in 
Central Europe. But that is, I think, the most likely outcome. And for that 
reason it is much more likely that Europe will end up being a regional power 
rather than a global power.
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Discussion
Timothy Snyder
I would like to give a view about how we talk about the West. It seems 
to me that it is likely that this is the last conference that uses the term 
‘Central and Eastern Europe’. Eastern and Western Europe are strategic 
terms, they are political rather than geographical, they come from the 
Cold War, and over the course of the 1990s something very interesting 
happened: Central Europe was re-born as a cultural idea, cities (Vienna, 
Budapest, Warsaw, Cracow, Vilnius maybe) more than countries, had 
something in common. While as a mutation of the original political idea, 
Central Europe were the countries that had a chance to join Western 
European institutions.
As of May 1 of this year, this kind of Central Europe is now gone, just as 
Eastern Europe was gone roughly in 1989. We are not going to start talking 
this way immediately, but probably we should start talking this way as soon 
as possible, because I think that Professor Bronisław Geremek and Heather 
Grabbe are quite right that these countries are not going to behave as 
a block, and the things they have in common are actually the things that 
they HAD in common. It is precisely ‘wanting to join the EU’ that they had 
in common. Even in terms of good relations amongst themselves, ‘wanting 
to join the EU’ inclined Hungarians, Romanians, Poles and Lithuanians to 
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get along, more actually than ‘being in the EU’ will. The new dynamic will 
be different.
I don’t think that Eastern Europe and Central Europe will go away, it does 
seem to me though that these terms are going to continue their migration 
to the East: there will be a Central Europe but it will relate to countries like 
Serbia or perhaps, Ukraine, in other words - countries which have some 
chance of joining European institutions and in which there are some peo-
ple, we might call them ‘the Central Europeans’, who wish to join Western 
institutions. I think this is the way these terms will probably be employed 
because they are not only accurate but also useful.
This leads me to the second point about these terms and the way we 
talk about Europe. It strikes me that when the frame of reference of this 
conference was formed, one very much still had in mind likely American 
success in Iraq and also rhetorical American success in dividing Europe. Both 
of these things are much less likely now. The terms of the conference were 
formulated six months ago. I would like to finish this remark about time 
and space by asking what you will think about Europe six months from now. 
And now I am echoing the remarks of many others before me. Six months 
from now, whatever the new administration in the United States turns out 
to be, the United States is likely going to need help, and the obvious place 
to ask for help is going to be the European Union.
A great deal depends upon whether the European Union has first of all 
decided whether or not there is going to be any answer, that is whether the 
United States is going to be left to deal with the problems that it has itself 
created, or whether the Europeans are going to treat this as an opportunity 
to restore transatlantic relations.
A second thing which is very important is what that answer is going 
to be? And here I may be echoing Timothy Garton Ash, it strikes me that 
Poland has something very important to offer. Poland may be able to start 
the discussion within the European Union about just what the terms of this 
exchange are going to be. When the United States asks the European Union 
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for help, which I think is extremely likely, what it is that Europe will ask for 
in return, which allows for some dignity on both sides?
Robert Cooper
The new Member States have been at the table since the Treaty was 
signed about a year ago, and from the point of view of policy making they 
have been participating all along. So to some extent, some of the com-
ments and predictions that were being made by the panel I can tell already 
whether they are true or not.
It is certainly clear that Russia features very high on the list of priori-
ties, but the case that particularly came to mind when Heather Grabbe was 
speaking was the case of Georgia where there was actually the initiative for 
doing something, for being more active in Georgia (in spite of the nation-
ality of the Georgian foreign minister). The initiative came from Lithuania 
and has received enthusiastic backing in particular from the new Member 
States. Among some of the new Member States there was clearly a kind of 
strong feeling of sympathy for a country at what we hope is the beginning 
of a transition.
Second point that I want to make is that the problem about the European 
Union is not about having policies, it is about implementing them. There are 
lots of policies available and it is often not too difficult to find what to do, 
but the business of particularly foreign policy, the business of implementing 
foreign policy, of continuing over the years when things don’t seem to be 
going very well, of spending money efficiently around the Mediterranean, 
all of those things – those are the real difficulties, and that’s why the new 
Treaty is important because implementation is about having slightly more 
efficient institutions. The new treaty is not going to solve all the problems 
but it makes some important steps in that direction.
I would just finish by saying two things, specifically addressed to the 
Polish members of the audience. The first is that looking around the new 
Member States at the table I must say that the Poles do pretty well. I think 
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that they organise themselves well, they have clear views, they find the 
right tone to put them across in the meetings, and are among the most 
effective if not the most effective of the new Member States. And the 
second thing I would say is: please do not get to hang up on the question 
of voting and voting weights. Not very many people vote, not very often, 
almost all decisions are taken by consensus. What people think about you, 
how they look at you, whether they regard you as being a serious and 
important player is much more important than the exact voting weight 
that you have.
Ryszard Bobrowski (Central European Review)
I would like to ask a question related to the Eastern Dimension of the 
new enlarged European Union. A number of speakers talked about Ukraine. 
But we didn’t talk that much about Russia and the new relationship between 
the new European Union and new Russia, Putin’s Russia. How the European 
Union will change its attitude toward Russia after this enlargement? And 
the second question is to what extent we, the Central European countries, 
the newcomers, will have a role in this process?
Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas (American Studies Center, 
University of Warsaw)
First, a short remark about the borders, future borders, frontiers of the 
European Union. Russia is a case not yet discussed but I think that Russia 
should be invited, of course if and only if Russia itself chooses to become 
a European nation and abandons its exceptionalism, its attempts to present 
itself as a separate civilisation, something between Europe and Asia. But 
there are other difficult cases to be discussed, like the Caucasus region na-
tions, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan (it is another Muslim European country 
potentially, like Turkey), Albania, Bosnia. Then there is Israel. The Treaty of 
Rome does not actually define Europe as a geographic or a physical Europe. 
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Could it be re-interpreted as a cultural Europe, for example? And in this case, 
if Israel settles its conflicts with Arab peoples, then maybe Israel should be 
invited to the European Union as well?
My second point is about a deeper dimension of changes which are 
taking place. This conference is conducted almost entirely in terms of inter-
national relations. We are talking about the relations between countries, 
states, nations, peoples, and about international organisations. But at the 
very moment we speak, thousands of Poles are on their way to the United 
Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and Sweden, because these countries 
have not imposed any restrictions on employment for the citizens of the 
new member countries. We are not talking about janitors or construction 
workers, we are talking about the young elite, mainly. They will be among 
the first Europeans who are more Europeans than representatives of any 
particular nationality. I think that this deeper dimension may result in 
the strengthening of the European identity. For many Poles, and I guess 
Hungarians or Estonians, being European is more attractive than being 
Estonian or Polish. This is different from being French or German or Brit-
ish. It is a beginning of an emergence of a very large stratum of people 
within the European Union who will be Europeans first. And by the way, 
the citizens of Poland account for almost nine per cent of the entire popu-
lation of the European Union after the enlargement. We are talking about 
big processes here.
Tomas Strazay (Slovak Foreign Policy Association)
I think that Central Europe will not disappear from political vocabulary 
if some instruments of co-operation among Central European countries 
are maintained. Among the models of regional co-operation, the so 
called Vyshehrad co-operation has become very known. My question 
is quite simple – what are the prospects of the Vyshehrad co-operation 
in the enlarged European Union? And what role is Poland supposed to 
play, if any?
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Roman Kuźniar (University of Warsaw)
The enlargement of the EU has obviously radically changed the Central 
European geopolitics and here I differ on this point from Professor Adam 
D. Rotfeld. It has changed our geopolitics much more than we, especially 
in this country, are ready to accept, we still hear a kind of cognitive dis-
sonance. But while geopolitical situation in Central Europe has changed 
so radically, many of our politicians and intellectuals still prefer to live in 
the world that ceased to exist. It seems that they really prefer to live in the 
outdated decorations of 1945, of the middle of the Cold War. This change 
is due to two reasons – first is that the EU has removed the traditional 
Realpolitik from international relations within the EU and has introduced 
a new political culture into this region; second is the fact that the EU is 
becoming a collective defence and security system. The choice of Central 
Europe should be rather to strengthen this tendency than vice versa, which 
occasionally happens, unfortunately. The choice of Central Europe should be 
to contribute to strengthening of this role and of the responsibility of the EU 
in international affairs. And how this may happen? In this context I would 
like to refer to the famous slogan used by the Communists in Poland at the 
end of the 1980s, ‘there is no liberty without responsibility’. The answer 
was delivered by the Polish democratic opposition ‘Solidarność’ during the 
Round Table Conference: I remember that Jerzy Turowicz said ‘there is no 
responsibility without liberty’.
The only way for the EU to become responsible is to become powerful 
and independent which was not the case for the last fifty years. And it has 
to come true in opposition (at least at the beginning) to the US, because any 
new political entity, any new political identity usually comes into existence 
in opposition to its environment, especially the part of environment which is 
questioning its aspiration, and the United States is questioning aspirations 
of the EU on the international scene.
I have recently seen at least two important expressions of international 
role and responsibility of the EU which is the European security strategy 
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and the decision to set up the Rapid Reaction Force. Actually, the European 
security strategy differs totally from the American security strategy, on 
this I disagree with what Robert Cooper said during the morning session. 
I have to say I am quite optimistic about the way the EU is trying to become 
an important, international, responsible, global player, unless obviously 
Central Europe undermines this process.
As to the question what the EU should do about Iraq – I think it is 
a premature question because the US is not asking for help for the time 
being.
Aleksander Smolar
I would simply like to justify the title of the conference which was 
criticised: of course it was not meant in geographical terms, nor in classi-
cal terms, it was a provocation to attract attention. We wanted to stress 
something which was refused here for almost fifteen years – that there 
are tensions and there is a problem of choice. The fact that there might 
be situations in which interests or perceptions can be different as seen 
from Washington and from the EU, was totally refused, for psychologically 
understandable reasons: all our countries were very much interested in 
maintaining the unity of Euro-Atlantic community. Our objective was to 
stress that there is a problem implying choices about the war, the fact that 
was not recognized until the very last moment. Even in the case of the Letter 
of the Eight, the highest Polish authorities declared that nobody thought 
that it was directed against France or Germany.
Timothy Garton Ash raised a very interesting question concerning the 
identity of Europe. I don’t think you can have any community without iden-
tity and any strategic choice without identities. The European ambition for 
emancipation that Bronisław Geremek talked about implies the existence 
of identity. Emancipation is also a process of defining differences.
Heather Grabbe formulated the hypothesis about changing alliances. 
This may also imply instability. I cannot imagine that France and Germany 
Discussion
198
O przyszłości Europy
199New Geopoliticsof Central and Eastern Europe
will renounce their alliance, although it can be weakened through a much 
more complex relation with Great Britain.
Elemér Hankiss
I have heard many very interesting proposals and 
strategies on how the East European states and gov-
ernments should act and participate in the work of the 
European Union and in building up a stronger and more 
beautiful European Union. Almost nothing has been said 
about the people living in this region, how to help the 
people in this region who, at least in the first couple of 
years, will suffer and not profit from enlargement.
Heather Grabbe
I am just going to address a few issues. The issue of 
how to define yourself in Europe is an endlessly fasci-
nating one. I find it so interesting how many countries 
and how many cities call themselves the geographical 
centre of Europe, and I have heard this claim in cities 
from countries like Hungary, Romania, I have heard them 
even in Estonia and in Ukraine. The other claim you very 
frequently hear is: ‘We are in Europe and the barbarian 
East begins on our border’. That is still a very powerful argument, you still 
hear from the countries which are knocking on the door for EU membership 
that: ‘We are the last bastion. If you don’t take us in then the Eastern hordes 
will be upon you’. I think Timothy Snyder is right in thinking that the whole 
concept of Central Europe is moving eastwards, and that it is more and more 
an aspiration term – to call yourself Central European means a half way to 
becoming West European. I think it is not actually a very fruitful dialogue 
after enlargement but it is one which is still very powerful in, for example, 
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Moldova, also in Ukraine, and you certainly hear that at the moment in the 
Caucasus, which brings me to the second interesting point, about Georgia 
and Russia, which Robert Cooper raised. The Georgians constantly stress 
their European aspirations and vocations, the new way of saying: ‘We want 
to join the West’ is to say: ‘We want to join Europe’. And the probable ques-
tion is whether Europe will live up to those expectations.
But I think we are heading for quite a major debate in Europe about 
how to deal with Russia in particular and I have already explained why. But 
just to add to what Robert Cooper said about this issue of Russia rising up 
to agenda – there are strong divisions in Europe about whether or not it 
is right and just and inevitable for Russia to establish a natural sphere of 
influence in the countries which were part of its influence during the Soviet 
period. We heard the views of Ken Jowitt yesterday who said: ‘Yes, that was 
the case’, and we have heard some interesting views of Christoph Bertram 
about countries simply not being suitable for EU membership and in fact 
having more in common with Russia.
A very telling anecdote on the differences of views you hear within the 
European Union is when Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister, ap-
peared in front of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, 
very shortly after the Rose Revolution last autumn, and was attacked by an 
Estonian observer in the European Parliament, who said: ‘Why haven’t you, 
the Italian presidence of the EU, recognised Georgia? Collin Powell has just 
been to Tbilisi to congratulate Sakashvili on the Rose Revolution, when will 
a high level EU delegation go to Tbilisi to do the same?’ And Franco Frattini, 
being of Berlusconi persuasion on this matter, replied: ‘We are just consult-
ing with Moscow when it will be appropriate.’ That tells you a very great 
deal about the differences in the views between some of the old members 
and the new members on the power of Russia.
Next point is on what makes an influential member state, will Poland 
and other new member states be influential? I think certainly the issue of 
organisation which Robert Cooper raised is very important. The determi-
nants of influence in the EU are not really votes or even necessarily size or 
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wealth. I will point to three others. One is ability to form alliances, effec-
tive alliances to pursue your interests. This happens all the time in the EU, 
and to answer Aleksander Smolar’s point on shifting coalitions – do they 
cause instability? I don’t think they do because that is what happens in the 
EU all the time. If you look at it, the same countries don’t stick together 
on the EU’s budget, on defence, on tax competition, on single market, on 
relations with the United States. You just don’t see the same countries in 
coalitions, we already have networks of countries and different constel-
lations of countries in the old EU. And we will see that very firmly in the 
enlarged EU. There is nothing wrong with shifting coalitions, you might 
even call them ‘coalitions of the willing’. I don’t think they cause instability 
but I think it would be dangerous if countries formed defensive alliances 
in order to protect their interests and do dirty deals, for example – I will 
kill your take-over directive if you kill my agricultural reform. I think the 
Franco-German relationship is in fact an anomaly, it is the only one in the 
European Union and it is changing very fast, it is not what it used to be. 
I think it will not form a hard core in the EU but I don’t think that shifting 
coalitions necessarily lead to instability.
Now in addition to forming alliances, two other areas which determine 
a country’s influence are the power of country’s ideas and the capabilities 
of its people. On ideas – look how many good ideas Finns have put forward 
and how much impact it has had on the European Union. If you can come 
up with a solution to a problem, you can be very powerful. So where are 
the Poland’s solutions to the Ukraine problem? I think that is going to be a 
very interesting question. If Poland can find a solution, then that idea will 
make Poland very powerful in the EU. And on people, the organisation 
and the quality of the people that a country sends to Brussels are very im-
portant. Not just the commissioners and ministers, but also the MEPs, and 
personally I think, looking at the party lists so far, both the candidates for 
commissioners and for Members of the European Parliament put forward 
by the new members are generally of a much better quality than those you 
get sent to Brussels from the old Member States. The question is: will this 
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continue in the next Commission and in the next European Parliament or 
is it just the first time round, is it an exciting thing to do and so people go 
in? Will they become disillusioned, will we find from 2009 onwards that 
it tends to be the same combination in the European Parliament of party 
loyalists, young politicians on the make and mavericks who tend to go to 
the European Parliament from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from 
the old Member States?
And finally on a very interesting question on the Vyshehrad co-opera-
tion. I don’t think prospects for subregional co-operation are very good, 
partly because of this issue of shifting coalitions in the EU and the fact that 
the Vyshehrad countries don’t have so much in common any more, but 
also because the Vyshehrad co-operation, frankly, was never very effective 
because it depended so much on the personalities of the heads of state and 
government who have never really got on that well, they don’t now, they 
didn’t in the mid 1990s. The only area where they had a really big impact 
was on Ukraine. Those were the Vyshehrad summits that really had an im-
pact when they invited Kuchma and there was some discussion for example 
about visas or Schengen. To make that work in the EU it cannot just be the 
neighbours of Ukraine which raise it up the agenda because there are too 
few of them. There are a lot of countries that have policy with Ukraine 
but not many of them are members of the European Union. What the new 
members need to do on Ukraine is to engage Germany, which would make 
a huge difference to the pro-Ukrainian coalition in the European Union, 
because Germany has influence when it comes to allocation of resources, 
because it is the biggest paymaster into the budget, because Germany has 
huge influence when it comes to the border policies of the EU. If you want 
to persuade the EU to ease the visa requirements for Ukrainians for exam-
ple, Germany’s say in the Council of Ministers is absolutely critical. And 
also because Germany has influence with France and can try and persuade 
France that Ukraine matters. And that would make a big difference because 
it would mean that you could get the attention of policy makers who regard 
Ukraine as very far down the list of priorities for EU foreign policy. So I would 
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suggest that one coalition to form – that could be quite durable and very 
profitable for new members (and particularly the Vyshehrad four) – is with 
Germany for Eastern policy.
Timothy Garton Ash
I will confine myself to two short remarks. Just to reinforce what Heather 
Grabbe and Robert Cooper and many others have said – the strategic di-
rection of the European Union depends not on what is written in the con-
stitution but on strategic leadership being given by a group of states over 
certain period of time, the Franco-German couple is clearly not efficient 
any more to give leadership but nor is the Club of Three with Great Britain 
if that came about. There is therefore a real political opportunity for Poland 
specifically to be a member of a leading group which by the way will not 
necessarily – as Heather said – be the same group on all issues but nor can 
it be different on every issue. It has to be sufficiently the same on a suf-
ficient number of important issues. There is a real opportunity for Poland 
to be a member of that leading group along with others, including France, 
Germany and Britain, if you will seize it.
My other remark is about Central Europe. Heather mentioned how many 
centres of Europe there are, actually this is a hobby of mine, I collect centres 
of Europe, or claimants to be the centre of Europe, I am up to seven so far 
but still hoping to find more, they are quite widely spread across the whole 
of Central and Eastern Europe and they illustrate just what a mobile concept 
Central Europe is. My favourite is the one in Ruthenia which is quite a strong 
claimant and this whole sight is based on a complete misunderstanding 
by the local Ukrainians of the Latin inscription on an Austro-Hungarian 
trigonometric point which the local people took to mean to say: ‘This is the 
centre of Europe’. In fact it just said: ‘This was placed here by the Austro-
Hungarian military survey’.
I half agree and half disagree with Timothy Snyder. Where I disagree 
is to think that people in any significant number will start talking about 
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Serbia as Central Europe, or Ukraine as Central Europe, or anywhere outside 
the current European Union as Central Europe. People in those countries 
may so describe themselves but I don’t believe it will take off, it takes quite 
a lot actually to launch a new piece of symbolic geography. I think that 
a few people inside the European Union will occasionally talk about central 
Europe with a small ‘c’ in the way they will talk about northern Europe, 
southern Europe, it may become a geographical denominator within the 
European Union. But it will not be a major operational concept of geo-
politics. And this is itself a triumph, the ultimate success of the concept 
of Central Europe, whose purpose all along was its own extinction. If you 
remember, the concept was re-launched politically twenty years ago roughly 
speaking, in 1983, 1984, by Milan Kundera, Czesław Miłosz, György Konrad 
and others. Central Europe, they claimed, was a part of the West that was 
in the East. What was this Central Europe? It was a ferry, it was a political 
idea which was to ferry this part of the world from the geopolitical East to 
the geopolitical West. And on May 1, 2004 the ferry finally arrived at the 
other shore, mission accomplished. There is no longer need for the ferry 
because you are on the other shore. You are on the hard ground of the 
West and so perhaps ending this conference we should consider that this is 
a kind of funeral of the political idea of Central Europe as it has functioned 
for the last twenty years. But as you know funerals can be rather jolly af-
fairs particularly in Celtic countries – what is called a wake where once the 
person is buried and a great deal is drunk and sung. And perhaps we could 
this evening start celebrating a wake for Central Europe and make it the 
merriest funeral in the world.
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Closing remarks
Danuta Hübner
Member of the European Commission
I would like to start by saying that I have an impression 
that there is a fashion for scepticism in Europe. When 
I travel and participate in meetings of intellectuals and 
politicians I can actually sense not only scepticism, but in-
deed a pessimism about the possibility of EU functioning 
efficiently after the latest enlargement. There is a wide-
spread belief that the post-May 1 EU is changing into an 
institution virtually unable either to govern itself or take 
decisions and that we are witnessing a beginning of the 
end of the European integration process. This pessimism 
horrifies me and I believe that it is absolutely necessary 
to restore a more balanced view of the enlarged Europe. 
Indeed, it is indispensable, because this pessimism is likely 
to negatively influence the public opinion, which poses 
a threat to Europeans’ sense of community, their common 
purpose and common values.
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I strongly believe that these negative, pessimistic feelings are unfounded. 
Let us take an impartial look at the Member States now: the undisputed 
advantages of the Internal Market, the fact that the borders have almost 
disappeared, the processes in the Euro zone, the progress in the public 
security and finally the last EU enlargement which would have been un-
thinkable only a dozen or so years ago. These are unprecedented benefits of 
European integration. Furthermore, if we compare the present situation of 
Central-Eastern Europe with what was happening in this area fifteen years 
ago, the epoch-making progress is evident. Few people in 1989 would have 
bet on the present achievements in Poland.
I have the impression that European pessimism is concurrent with cer-
tain phenomena and regularities of globalization. A new Eurostat report 
on public opinion was published yesterday, in which the division between 
the fifteen old Member States and the ten new Member States was made 
for the last time. I would like to emphasise the fact that we (together with 
my colleagues from the European Commission) took a very important 
decision concerning the abolition of this distinction in Eurostat polls. The 
report examines, inter alia, trust in public institutions. It is interesting 
to find that public opinion considers the radio as the most trustworthy 
public institution, more even than television; somewhere in the middle 
of the scale stand the European institutions, while political parties are 
indicated as the least reliable. Only 8% of respondents have declared to 
trust political parties.
I believe that the process of social development in Europe and world-
wide has reached a particular moment: there has been a radical shift in 
the perception of the sources traditionally generating the feelings of secu-
rity, certainty and trust. Although I dislike referring to transition periods, 
I have the impression that we are indeed undergoing a transition period, 
a period of imbalance and mistrust in traditional sources of certainty and 
security. Therefore I believe that the most important challenge for Europe 
now is to start a dialogue with the society, a public debate on the most 
important issues. Without a dialogue, a proper debate, we will not be able 
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to go through the transition period victoriously. The fact that a growing 
number of countries have declared the intention to choose referendum 
as a formula for approving the new EU ‘constitutional treaty’ may provide 
an excellent occasion for an unprecedented European debate that would 
disclose the public expectations vis-à-vis politicians and the UE and that 
could help restore confidence in European institutions.
I believe that one of the challenges that the unifying Europe is bound to 
face in the near future is to find a balance between the need of internal con-
solidation and the need of opening to external activities, and the readiness 
to face them. It would be most unfortunate if the enlarged EU focused on 
its internal consolidation only, without searching for new forces that could 
foster further European integration. Europe today is not only undergoing 
the process of unification but also has to become more efficiently involved 
in solving global problems – poverty, management of limited natural re-
sources, climate changes and new challenges related to the need of further 
liberalization of international trade.
Migration is another problem that Europe will have to face it the 
immediate future. Too little attention has been paid to China and India, 
countries that create hundreds of thousands work places annually, to the 
disadvantage of European and American labour markets. This is an impor-
tant issue related to insufficient competitiveness of the European economy. 
Another external challenge, which is crucial and necessitates efforts on 
our part, is the future of multilateral co-operation as a formula ensuring 
peaceful coexistence in the world. Global terrorism is another problem that 
comes to my mind. When we talk about US-EU relations and the necessity 
of enhancing the Euro-Atlantic dialogue, we have to remember that the 
USA and the EU constitute only a tiny part of the world. Almost 85% of the 
world population live outside the US and the EU, 65% of the gross national 
product originates outside this area and nearly 40% of international trade 
takes place outside of the EU and US territories. We are only a limited part 
of the world and we cannot consider the EU and the US as two empires or 
two global centres.
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The awareness of common threats but also of common values should 
foster the creation of a community of interests and enable us to bridge the 
Euro-Atlantic gap. I believe that we Europeans have not fully comprehended 
how deep a shock the September 11 events produced in the American soci-
ety. Our ignorance in this aspect impedes us to understand the Americans. 
On the other hand, the Americans seem not to understand that exploiting 
a quarter of the world’s natural resources implies also a number of particular 
obligations (I will only mention the Kyoto agreement here).
As for Russia, it is obviously changing, but I think that regardless of the 
internal processes in this country, the EU will always be interested in de-
veloping close relations with it. This neighbourhood is important not only 
in the political context. The EU will not be able to cope with the challenge 
of migration and the threat of international crime networks without good 
relations with its nearest neighbours. This is the framework in which we 
should develop our relations with the neighbours. The coming years will 
bring changes in the project of future EU enlargements. I mean here not only 
Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Croatia. The Western Balkans are likely to 
undergo rapid changes too. The EU New Neighbourhood Policy is maturing. 
Still, we have to keep in mind that, although the EU enlargement continues 
to be perceived as a geographic project, is actually a political project. We 
should be aware of the fact that it goes well beyond a mutual respect of 
partner’s values and it implies participation in the creation of values.
The ability to cope with these problems will heavily depend on the 
economic situation and the competitiveness of the European economy. 
Only as an economic power will the EU be perceived as a partner by eco-
nomically stronger countries. That is why the EU has to build a competitive 
economy and accelerate its growth. Enlargement may provide an impulse 
for a further restructuring and for the creation of a new division of labour 
in the European economy. Conversly, protectionist tendencies may have 
a devastating effect on the EU economy’s competitiveness. The application 
of protectionist measures has already been observable within the labour 
market. There is no valid economic explanation for the restrictions that in 
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the recent months have been being imposed on the EU labour markets in 
relation to the enlargement. The ONLY possible explanation is fear which 
always generates projectionist tendencies. Should such tendencies prevail 
in the future, Poland could soon discover that it will need to protect itself 
from the cheap import from Ukraine, due to diminishing tariff barriers, while 
Portugal will have to protect itself from the Polish cheaper labour force. 
As a result of these attitudes Europe will start to consider its competitive-
ness in terms of the production costs rather than in terms of developing 
innovation capacities.
Another danger ahead of the European Union is related to the uncer-
tainty as to how the EU itself will develop in the future, which may result 
in forming cosy clubs of nations which have known one another for many 
years thanks to their long membership; the idea of a ‘two–speed Europe’ 
is a also a symptom of fear resulting from sense of unpredictability and 
at the same time an example of an inappropriate reaction to this fear. 
I am not questioning the idea of a ‘two–speed Europe’; on the contrary, 
I think that some instruments of flexible co-operation in Europe are vital 
for fostering further integration. However, we should not mistake the 
creation of closed clubs with limited access possibilities for enhanced 
co-operation. I think that such ideas are rooted in the traditional Euro-
pean mechanism of consensus building. Voting is rare in Europe. In the 
last three years the Council has voted only in 15 per cent of cases, while 
in 85 per cent there has been a search for consensus. Mechanisms of 
consensus building which have so far been ensured by Franco-German 
co-operation, seem insufficient now; a new mechanism is being looked 
for. I believe that the project of a ‘two–speed Europe’ is one of the solu-
tions being offered for how to build coalitions able to agree on common 
positions within the EU.
I would like to round up by stressing that the immediate future will be 
difficult for Europe. However, it will also be the time of unprecedented 
chances of an economic upturn, provided we are able to wisely benefit 
from the last enlargement. Moreover, I believe that the near future is 
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a great opportunity to modernise the social model in Europe and a chance 
for improving the political position of the EU in the world.
Last of all, I would like to pose a question which, however, remains 
unanswerable as yet: isn’t the last enlargement a chance for sharing with 
the world this special model of community developed by the EU? We are 
witnesses to a crisis of the multilateral co-operation as a model of inter-state 
relations. However, the European model offers the principles of solidarity, 
loyalty to values and norms and the principle of majority rule (rare in other 
international organisations) which unifies countries and citizens as subjects 
within an international organisation. These solutions may prove to be useful 
in the process of ‘healing’ the multilateralism, in maintaining it in a condi-
tion that would help us avoid the threat of regional fragmentation of the 
world. Perhaps the EU should indeed be also perceived as a positive model 
of co-operation among countries that not only play games with each other 
(as can be observed in a number of international organisations) but have 
the sense of common purpose and want to share a common standpoint on 
the most important issues.
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